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FOREWORD
From the National Security Act of 1947 to the intelligence and security restructuring after September
11, 2001 (9/11), our nation has stood up new security
organizations to meet new challenges. On October 10,
2010, my team and I helped give life to a new U.S. security organization when I assumed command of the
United States Army Cyber Command. As its first commander, I was more than “present at the creation;” I
was responsible for it. In a crowded, yet resourceconstrained defense establishment, Army Cyber was
responsible for all Army cyber efforts—not only in
relation to U.S. Cyber Command, but also the Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence Community.
A single-page General Order from the Secretary of
the Army served as the command’s founding document and mission statement. Army Cyber Command
was designated the lead for Army missions, actions,
and functions related to cyberspace.1 This included
planning, coordinating, and directing the operations
and defense of all Army networks, and when directed,
conducting full-spectrum cyberspace operations to
ensure our own freedom of action in cyberspace and
to deny the same to our adversaries. The overall mission was clear enough, but broad and generally in uncharted territory when it came to specifics. Much like
the virtual world we live in, this new operational domain of cyberspace was immature and continuously
evolving. All aspects required clarity, precision, and
focus to ensure unity of effort.
The lack of clarity in the task was not the only challenge—we needed to build the right team to accomplish this new mission. Indeed, people are the centerpiece to all organizations, but human nature is often
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resistant to change. Thus, transformational change requires effective leadership to excite and motivate the
workforce to common purpose. Assembling a team of
elite, trusted, competent cyber professionals of character who are excited and committed to the vision and
mission is essential in executing the mission daily,
while setting the future direction. As is the case with
many security organizations, this was top to bottom
transformational change.
While transformational change often starts with
changes in law, statute, or funding streams, establishing a new operational command focuses on mission, vision, and leadership. The ability to be a part
of transformational change, whether it is legislated or
operational, is rare and unique. Assuming command
of Army Cyber presented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to help make a difference in an area critical to
national security: Cyber threats were growing rapidly,
and attempts to penetrate our networks were increasing in frequency and complexity.
While we knew the threats were evolving, in the
beginning, there were more unknowns than knowns.
In fact, there was little agreement or understanding of
terms and definitions. No doctrine or policy for cyberspace existed, and the existing culture took our freedom to operate in cyberspace for granted. Establishing
cyberspace as an operational domain was a necessary
change in order to meet the security challenges our
Nation faces in cyberspace.
In standing up a security organization, leaders
must consider historical lessons early on—before a
crisis point occurs. As it had been a long time since
a new Army-level command was established, I asked
the Department of History at my alma mater, The
United States Military Academy at West Point, to pro-
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vide some lessons learned about standing up a new
security organization. Unsurprisingly, Colonel Ty
Seidule was already considering these issues. He and
his team provided a historically grounded appreciation of what it means to stand up a new security organization. These lessons became the basis of this fine
manuscript and were invaluable to me as we grew
and matured the command. All were relevant during
Army Cyber Command’s first three years and several
affected our daily thought and action. Early discussions about these security lessons learned allowed
me to consider the potential friction of organizational rivalry, the need to change a culture, the caution
to avoid bad analogies, the requirement to develop
simulations, and the importance of allies.
Arguably, an appreciation of historical perspective and context is even more important in blossoming agencies, when the contours of the agency are
coalescing around a mold tempered by many—oftencompeting—inputs. Early decisions are critical, since
they often map and shape the command as it develops. Indeed, these early decisions (or what might
be called in the cyber field, “founding frequencies”)
often matter more than strategic decisions in wellestablished agencies.
Security organizations stand up in response to external, often traumatic, events and pressures, cultural
or geopolitical trends, the search for fiscal efficiencies,
or changes in technology. These new missions demand that new organizations deal with a significantly
different landscape than what has come before. The
speed at which cyber threats were growing required a
sense of urgency to increase our capacity and capability to conduct cyber operations. The margin for error
was shrinking, and we needed to get it close the first
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time, while remaining agile and adaptive. People often think the Army is a big, hidebound bureaucracy,
but actually the Army is ever evolving and changing.
For much of the Cold War, new security organizations were often established in support of new mission sets, new potential enemies, and they frequently
involved breaking organizations into their constituent parts. However, after 9/11, new agencies could
emerge by consolidating several agencies, for example, creating The Department of Homeland Security
or merging U.S. Space Command with U.S. Strategic
Command, not just by hiving off mission sets, such as
the separation of the U.S. Air Force from the Army Air
Corps. In standing up new security organizations, the
mission needs to be relevant and add value to national
security. If the American people do not see its necessity, the organization cannot endure.
In this groundbreaking edited volume, West Point
historian Colonel Seidule and Air War College strategist Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt provide a much needed
framework for conceptualizing the development and
take off of new security organizations. They—and the
chapter authors—illustrate the relevance of historical
lessons for current strategy. Their approach encourages us to learn from the past, consider proper historical parallels, and identify previous challenges
and solutions.
This volume should be required reading for policymakers, military officers, and students of American
and international history, but anyone charged with
transformational change will find applicable historical lessons in this volume. The history of establishing
new security organizations is not for historians only,
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but also for practitioners and leaders who find themselves in an environment of continuous change and
transformation, and who are charged to Stand Up
and Fight!
		
		
		
		

Rhett A. Hernandez
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Retired
West Point Distinguished Cyber Chair,
Army Cyber Institute

ENDNOTE
1. Department of the Army General Order 2010-26, “Establishment of the U.S. Army Cyber Command,” U.S. Army Cyber
Command Historical Files, October 1, 2010.
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PREFACE
Starting a new security organization is a difficult business. Hundreds of questions come in staccato bursts; each requires a decision and each decision takes on the permanence of tradition. Tradition
becomes culture and a new organization becomes the
sum of those early decisions. In this collection of essays, historians, most of them military officers, try to
grapple with the challenges of creating new security
organizations. Our aim is to help those few men and
women who start new governmental bodies charged
with protecting the American people to make sound
and historically informed decisions by highlighting
several common themes for consideration.
We began this project in early-2011 when Colonel
Greg Conti of West Point’s Information Technology
Operations Center asked us to assist the fledgling
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as it sprang into
existence under the command of General Keith Alexander. A series of cyber attacks around the world had
galvanized Congress and the Department of Defense
to act. Colonel Conti, working for General Alexander,
wondered if historians might offer useful perspectives as USCYBERCOM made quick decisions about
its future.
In response to Colonel Conti’s request, 14 historians at West Point, NY, volunteered to look at a variety
of security organizations created since World War II.
We looked at functional commands and regional commands, commands that thrived and commands that
died, commands created in response to technological
changes and those created during bursts of reform.
We chose a wide variety of different commands to allow for the broadest view possible.
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Our analysis produced no easy answers on how
to create an effective, efficient, stable and politically
viable security organization. There proved to be no
readymade, “shake and bake” formula. Smart people
made the best decisions they could with limited information and time. Often, those decisions helped create
great organizations. Of course, some decisions led to
failure or even catastrophe.
If we can provide no pat answers, why even try?
This question is a fundamental concern for historians
who are interested in speaking to contemporary policy
and policymakers. Most of us involved with the project called West Point’s Department of History home
as the project was conceived and as chapters were
written and edited. There, in the bowels of Thayer
Hall, surrounded by the inescapable reminders of the
institution’s past, as we taught young cadets to think
and write critically about the past, we strove also to
be loyal to our motto, Sapientia per Historiam (Wisdom
through History), as scholars. We firmly believe history can help define the right questions to ask and provide context about how sister organizations function.
History, then, can broaden one’s knowledge. An old
aphorism is that the thing most like war is other war.
Similarly, the best way to understand one’s own organization may be to study another. One of our goals
here is to place USCYBERCOM in a larger defense
perspective—to understand how agencies and organizations, especially in their formative years, related
to other entities—in order to give perspective to the
wide range of possibilities and outcomes. Ultimately,
this diverse and broadened perspective should alleviate concerns that there is one “right” way, even as
it suggests there are perhaps some best practices to
follow and pitfalls to avoid.
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By looking at the creation of 13 different security
organizations over 70 years, we have found issues that
warrant attention from every new outfit. If history
provides no clear answers, perhaps it can show harried staff officers how others have grappled with similar problems. Perhaps one of these essays will spark a
question in the mind of a policymaker, a senior leader,
or an “iron major,” and lead the organization to see its
current problems in a different light. In short, maybe,
just maybe, our essays will provide a little wisdom.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
OF AMERICAN SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS
Ty Seidule
By 2014, the United States entered the second decade of the “Global War on Terror”—also called “The
Long War,” or, as Army Chief of Staff from 2007-11
General George Casey named it, “the era of persistent
conflict.” Facing significant challenges to U.S. security posed by violent extremist organizations, rapidlychanging technologies, and a complex strategic environment, Congress routinely has passed legislation
creating or reforming security organizations, assuming, apparently, that better systems and organizations
will provide one key to victory. Since World War II,
the United States has seen a huge and steady expansion of defense and security organizations tasked to
protect the American people from “all enemies foreign and domestic,” but this is almost entirely a 20thcentury phenomenon. A historical perspective reminds us that the United States went for more than a
century without a major reform to the nation’s organizational structure for security.
Another major theme from the study of American
security policy is the changing meaning of the word
“security” itself. As we will see, the first organization
created was the Department of War, a cabinet-level
department, that handled all military affairs. In 1798,
Congress split out control of naval affairs. Thereafter, the Secretary of War controlled the Army. As the
name implied, the secretary’s job focused on war, and
despite the myriad tasks assigned to the Army, from
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Indian removal to engineering projects to strike-breaking, security was basically synonymous with war. The
Navy, on the other hand, protected commerce. After
World War II, with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, these organizations were unified
under the Department of Defense, and its mission and
funding increased dramatically.
Since then, the proliferation of organizations created to defend the United States expanded far beyond
the confines of distinct Army and Navy missions.
However, the national concept of security still focused
on external threats. After the September 11, 2001
(9/11) attacks, a new agency was formed, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With that change
to the national security apparatus, the term “security”
became broad enough to cover domestic threats such
as homegrown terrorism and natural disasters. As the
definition of security has grown to include almost any
risk, so too have the resources allocated to it. In the
future, if the definition of security continues to grow
and if Americans are willing to accept less and less
risk, perhaps food, air, and water will also come under
control of security organizations.
SECURITY POLICY: 1789-1900
When the states approved the Constitution in
1789, Congress passed legislation to create a Department of War with responsibility for a small land
force. When the need arose for a Navy, the Secretary
of War took responsibility. In 1798, the demands of
running both forces became too great, and Congress
created a Department of the Navy on equal footing
with the Department of War. The Army and the Navy
answered directly to the President. Only in 1947, af-
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ter 150 years and two world wars, did Congress place
the armed services—now including the Air Force—
under one cabinet-level secretary. Ultimately, many
of the organizations created in the last 60 years stem
from the incoherent structures bequeathed by the
Founding Fathers.
Congress passed other pieces of security legislation in the 1790s that remained extant for more than
a century. The Uniformed Militia Act passed in 1792
set military policy until 1902. It established the dual
military tradition of a small Regular Army augmented
by militia from the states. Unfortunately, it provided
only recommendations to the states with no funding
or accountability.1 When the country went to war in
1812, 1848, 1861, and 1898, the President called for volunteers to bolster the exiguous regulars.2 Yet, none of
these wars led Congress to major security reorganization: the American people and their politicians feared
a strong military and kept the Army and the Navy
weak during peacetime.
When not at war, the small peacetime security resources went toward continental expansion from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. Those two great oceans
protected by the British navy provided security from
major European powers as the nation grew westward.
Yet despite avoiding major war with Britain, France,
and Russia, the American military remained busy in
the 19th century, providing security on the frontier
and protecting commerce. The Army had the dangerous and unenviable task of evicting Indian tribes from
their land and forcing them onto desolate reservations.
In some ways, these uses foreshadowed the domesticsecurity responsibilities of the post-9/11 security apparatus, while still being thought of as a defensive,
outward-oriented force.
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The services suffered from lack of funding, yet
American politicians and military leaders did a better than adequate job of weighing threats and creating a security system that met the needs of the nation.
Few of those needs, many politicians felt, required
wholesale reform of security laws. The only exception
to the paucity of legislation in the 19th century was
the creation of intelligence organizations for the Army
and the Navy in the 1880s, hardly a precedent for
future action.3
SECURITY POLICY: 1900-1941
This is an era of organization.
		

Theodore Roosevelt4

The Spanish-American War, however, changed
the security needs of America forever. In the peace
treaty that followed that war, the United States gained
a fledgling empire with the acquisition of the Philippines, Cuba, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Pacifying and
administering these far-flung territories required not
only soldiers and sailors but also planners, diplomats,
agriculture experts, doctors, and engineers, in short
a security system far more sophisticated than that
created in the 1790s.
To create the new system, President William
McKinley wisely chose Elihu Root, the Secretary of
War from 1899 to 1904. A corporate lawyer with no
military experience, Root was an astute politician.
Through shrewd maneuvering aided by like-minded
political and military leaders, Root crafted a series of
laws that established the beginnings of an overarching American security establishment. It set the tone
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for all subsequent laws aimed at creating a more effective defense system. True to the goals of contemporary Progressivism, a movement that aimed not
only to organize and professionalize America, but
also improve its moral fiber, Root tackled the problem
of rendering the peacetime army capable of fighting
a war through the notion of reform.5 By 1903, among
other things, Root had established a General Staff, reduced the influence of bureau chiefs, reorganized the
Militia into the National Guard and Reserve Militia,
reorganized and expanded the Medical Department,
created the Quartermaster Corps, and established the
U.S. Army War College. Following these so-called
“Root Reforms,” each future attempt to create a better,
more effective, and more efficient organization would
be billed as reform. Perhaps ironically, the notion of
reform, promoted by Progressives as a means of overcoming the natural selfishness of man to create better
relations between all humans, had been harnessed to
the end of organizing more efficiently for war.6
Seen in this way, each security reorganization
since the early part of the last century was an attempt
to create not merely effectiveness or efficiency, but
harmony. No wonder the expectations of new organizations are so high, and why they seldom reach their
stated goals. When they fail to achieve the unachievable, Americans call for more reform, creating a cycle
that continues to this day.
Further reform legislation for both the Army and
the Navy followed the Root Reforms. World War I led
Congress to pass National Defense Acts in 1916 and
1920. The word “defense” here was crucial. For the
first time, military policy in peacetime included more
than the Army and the Navy. The United States needed all the elements of national power to fight a world
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war. The legislation in 1920, in particular, addressed
the need for industry to work with the military services. The first industrial mobilization plan came from
the fertile mind of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a young
Army staff officer.7 The beginnings of interagency organizations came in the plans drawn up to harness the
American economy to fight.
World War I also highlighted the importance of
technology in combat, particularly manned flight. Arguments over who would control the air eventually
spilt the Army into two services and involved a fight
with the Navy as well. Before 1941, the Army-Navy
joint board met regularly to adjudicate disputes; however, those disputes were rarely resolved, unless the
issue reached the President or resulted in legislation.
SECURITY POLICY DURING WORLD WAR II
It is a war of smokestacks as well as of men.
		

George C. Marshall8

During World War II, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the United States, at least initially,
found combined operations between countries easier
to execute than joint operations between services.9 In
discussing strategy with their allies, the Americans
were at a disadvantage because they had no organization comparable to the British Joint Chiefs and tended
to argue among themselves at strategic conferences
instead of presenting a unified front to the British.
Eventually, in 1942, the Americans created a joint staff
and became more adept at presenting strategic alternatives to the British.
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Early in the war, battlefield failure, competition
for resources, and problematic command structures
led to intense rivalry among the services. Problems in
the Pacific Theater were so acute that the Joint Chiefs
in Washington had to make all major decisions, yet by
1944, in all theaters of the war, the services had worked
through their problems and were acting mostly in
concert. By D-Day, General Dwight D. Eisenhower
had finally convinced the Army Air Corps to conduct
air interdiction missions, and by the summer of 1944
even bombers were used in a close air support role
(albeit with sometimes regrettable results).10 Likewise
in the Pacific, the initial rivalry between the Army and
the Navy was resolved as both services supported the
dual thrusts of Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Central
Pacific and General Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. Of course, unlimited funds and extraordinary resources pumped out of the American economy
and into all services in 1944 and 1945 lubricated the
joint engine of war.
World War II showed clearly that organization
mattered. After the debacle of the Pearl Harbor, HI,
raid, intelligence agencies broke military and diplomatic codes and then shared them with senior military
leaders in a timely fashion. The military also reorganized at all levels and created processes to take battlefield lessons learned after early debacles against the
Japanese in Buna, New Guinea, and against the Germans at the Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, and incorporate
them into strategy, operations, and tactics. The final
amphibious operations in Okinawa, Japan, and Normandy, France, were among the best organized campaigns in the history of warfare. The creation of joint
and combined staffs helped articulate goals and set
priorities. Ultimately, the Allies won the global war.
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One of the many reasons they ultimately triumphed
was that the American government, the military, and
industry proved themselves to be far better planners and organizers than their German and Japanese
counterparts.11
Victory came, in part, because the United States
and its allies out-organized and out-produced the Axis
powers. Americans built tens of thousands of Liberty
ships, B-29 bombers, Sherman tanks, jeeps, and two
atom bombs through hard work, ingenuity, and, yes,
organization. Fighting a world war on multiple fronts
against several different enemies required more than
just military services. America integrated military and
industry to a degree never seen before. The only way
to marry two forces with such different ethos and aims
was through superior organization. Assigning priority for thousands of commodities like nylon, cotton,
steel, leather, and rubber required centralized planning. Which were more important, airplanes, tanks,
or carriers? Those disputes need adjudication at the
national level and then each service had to prioritize.
Should fighters or bombers receive priority? Tanks or
half-tracks? At every level, war required deep institutional knowledge and organization.
Inventing, then producing and then implementing
technological innovations also required organization.
The best example was the Manhattan Project that created the atom bomb. Technology required a symbiotic
relationship between industry and government. In
World War II, the government led the technological
charge. Industry alone had neither the need nor the
ability to harness the resources to create an atomic
bomb in such a radically short time. Today, that trend
is often reversed and industry creates and shapes
technology forcing the military to react.
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SECURITY POLICY SINCE 1945
The military profession organizes men so as to overcome their inherent fears and failings.
		

Samuel Huntington12

In 1947, Congress passed the most important security legislation since the Root Reforms, the National
Security Act, setting up the basic contours of all subsequent security legislation.13 Its goal was to solve two
major problems. First, with the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Act meant specifically to prevent another Pearl Harbor. The solution to the second
problem, interservice bickering, was the creation of
a Secretary of Defense in the chain of command over
the services. When the initial law provided a secretary
too feeble to exercise real power, Congress strengthened the position in a series of amendments in 1949
and 1950. The trend throughout the post-war era saw
ever greater involvement of civilians in military policy
and in areas once thought of as strictly concerning the
profession of arms. One example was the Uniform
Code of Military Justice passed by Congress in 1950,
that took power away from military commanders and
instituted a civilian “Court of Military Appeals” over
the courts martial system. The services had only themselves to blame. The Army, Navy and Air Force could
not agree on roles and missions or allocation of the
defense budget. The interservice fights became more
public, more pronounced, and more vicious as each
branch used members of Congress and the press to
help fight their turf battles. The early post-war period
set the tone for strong civilian leadership and tough
service fights.14
9

After 1947, the next major restructuring came in
1986 with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Restructuring Act that addressed sacred service
interests—personnel and procurement.15 Services that
had worked well together in fighting a world war
with relatively unlimited resources proved to be poor
teammates in a resource-constrained environment.
The 1986 Act aimed to fix the interservice tensions
stemming from defeat in the Vietnam War, the failed
Iranian hostage rescue of 1980, and the successful, but
awkwardly executed, invasion of Grenada in 1983.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act took power away from
the services and gave it to regional commanders who
no longer had to plead their case to the Army, Navy,
and Air Force chiefs. It also forced the services to start
a process of shared procurement, especially for cutting edge technology. Additionally, Congress created
an all-services staff composed of officers destined one
day for flag rank. Then Congress forced the services to
create a new education system to prepare officers to
work together as a “joint staff.” Finally, Congress gave
the Chairman explicit remit to recommend changes in
roles and mission for the services, particularly in regards to new technology.
The third and final major security legislation in
the post-war era occurred in 2002 with the Homeland
Security Act. In response to the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in 2001, the President and Congress created the
DHS. Congress clearly articulated its broad mission,
“Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.”16
The same reforming drive that created the 1947 National Defense Act to prevent another Pearl Harbor
animated the political process after the 9/11 attacks
on the World Trade Centers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. Government, and lots of
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it, was the best way to secure the nation from future
terrorist attacks. DHS had its start in an era of crisis
that prevented rational thought about the best way to
accomplish its assignment.
The enormous DHS mission expanded after Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005. In
addition to preventing terrorist attacks, it would also
lead the nation’s response to natural disasters. Yet
DHS has no military or paramilitary arm capable of
accomplishing the missions it was assigned. Despite
several reorganizations, the initial problems of the
organization have gone unresolved. Although a thorough review of the first 10 years might provide some
valuable insights, DHS is the only agency in this study
that has no official historian assigned to it. Nonetheless, because of its gargantuan size and scope, all other
agencies will have to find a way to deal with it over
the next decade.
Organizations and resources dedicated to security
have shown steady growth, particularly after 1945.
The three biggest changes since 1945 (the 1947 National Security Act, 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the
2002 Homeland Security Act) have come as a result of
attack or defeat, and each act expanded the concept of
security. The word “security” has proved remarkably
elastic, encompassing threats that a previous generation would have seen as problems outside the remit
of security organizations. The security industry shows
no sign of slowing.
All professionals look to expand their organizations, and the security specialists have been remarkably successful since 2001. The professionalization of
security is in full swing. Budding security specialists
can now receive a master’s and doctorate degrees
in homeland security in the same way that the post-
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1945 generation developed security studies programs
to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. San Diego State
University (San Diego, CA) and the University of
Colorado-Colorado Springs (Colorado Springs, CO),
among others, offer doctorate degrees in homeland security along with a host of online schools. Should the
security studies programs at prestigious universities
like Stanford (Stanford, CA) and Johns Hopkins (Baltimore, MD) think of these programs dismissively, they
should remember that established fields like history
and political science initially looked at their programs
as unworthy disciplines in the 1940s and 1950s.
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CHAPTER 2
LEGISLATING CHANGE:
THE FORMATION OF U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
Brian P. Dunn
INTRODUCTION
Covered in great detail by Susan Marquis and
William Boykin in respective works and discussed
later in this chapter, the formation of the U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the road to
achieving and sustaining a joint special operations
forces (SOF) capability was tortuous. Ironically, the
very distaste of the Department of Defense (DoD) for
SOF in the post-Vietnam era and the intransigence of
the Pentagon, Washington, DC, to reform resulted in
the bureaucratically radical formation of USSOCOM.
USSOCOM’s structure and orientation were, in fact,
not driven by the unmistakable military necessity of
low-intensity conflict, but by the very resistance of the
DoD to both acknowledge and address this necessity.
Reformers from outside of the organization, recognizing both the Pentagon’s uncorrected focus on the
conventional possibilities of the Cold War and its dogmatic insistence on conventional strategy and procuring, at any cost, the weapons programs needed to win
a conventional fight, rallied to the side of SOF employment. Offering SOF the effective advocacy previously
denied them by the DoD, the fate of an entire unified
combatant command would ultimately rest largely
with several legislators.
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Commanding over 80,000 active-duty service
members and managing a budget exceeding $6 billion
for the fiscal year beginning in 2010, USSOCOM is not
only a key tool in the nation’s national security apparatus, but is also an entrenched institution within
an admittedly bureaucratic DoD.1 Impressively, USSOCOM is also a relatively new institution whose current structure, clout, and cache offer little hint of the
painful struggle behind its inception. Far from being
born primarily from the organizational necessities of
warfare, the story of USSOCOM is, instead, one of intense bureaucratic infighting, charged disagreements
about the nature of warfare in the late-Cold War,
and challenges to the constitutional fundamentals of
civilian control over the military.
Although officially operational in April 1987, the
story of USSOCOM is rooted firmly in Southeast Asia,
where a wide variety of special operations were employed to support the American mission in Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos.2 Indeed, U.S. Army Special
Forces were themselves a product of President John
F. Kennedy’s attempt to “stop the North Vietnamese
aggression without getting American combat troops
heavily involved in the war.”3 Obviously unsuccessful
in achieving this lofty goal, special forces continued to
operate in parallel or conjunction with conventional
U.S. forces as part of the mission in Vietnam. As U.S.
military involvement in the conflict wound down and
U.S. interest in protracted nonconventional conflicts
understandably decreased, SOF were one of the first
bill payers for the post-Vietnam army. Indeed, while
the DoD budget sustained relatively modest decreases
as a portion of total domestic discretionary spending
(slipping from 59.1 percent in 1973 to 48.7 percent in
1979) and sustained itself year-to-year in terms of real

18

dollars,4 SOF funding plunged by roughly 95 percent.
This translated into a 66 percent reduction in the size
of the Army’s Special Forces groups, a massive reduction in SOF-capable aircraft, and the decommissioning
of the Navy’s sole SOF-capable submarine.5 Viewed
largely by the DoD as an early and somewhat misguided experiment in handling the conflict in Vietnam, the end of American involvement in Southeast
Asia rendered unnecessary the wide-scale retention of
special operations forces.
Other conventional attitudes and apprehensions
arrayed against the sustainment of designated SOF
units in the post-Vietnam era, with many of these perceptions hindering the eventual formation of USSOCOM well over a decade later. Even during the height
of the conflict in Vietnam, there existed significant
“mistrust, suspicion, and lack of understanding” between conventional and unconventional forces, where
SOF personnel and units were deemed, with some degree of accuracy, to be “secretive, elitist,” and “clannish.”6 Senior uniformed leaders, whose reaction to
the inception of the Army’s “Green Beret” program in
the early-1960s had been “overwhelmingly negative,”
found little to like about the unconventional forces as
the war appeared increasingly unwinnable.7 With the
eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces, this lasting distaste for the unconventional war in Vietnam, coupled
with the existing distrust of unconventional forces,
left many disinclined to champion the retention of
SOF in the post-war period. This particular variant
of the Vietnam Syndrome proved persistent enough
to complicate the arguments surrounding the institutionalization of USSOCOM years later.
Eager to jettison the albatross of Vietnam, the DoD,
as an institution, reoriented itself away from SOF-

19

oriented missions even before direct military involvement in the conflict in Vietnam had ceased. Indeed,
in his 1970 report to Congress entitled “A Strategy
for Peace: A National Security Strategy of Realistic
Deterrence,” President Richard M. Nixon’s National
Security Council laid out a one-and-a-half war concept designed to fight a major conventional war in
Europe while also fighting in a “sub-theater” conflict
(with the Middle East the likely locale). Supporting
this conventionally engineered initiative, National Security Decision Memoranda 95 deemed it “vital that
NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] have
a credible conventional defense posture to deter and,
if necessary, defend against conventional attack by
Warsaw Pact forces.”8 The services, with the Army in
the lead, were “quick to embrace this return to a more
conducive and comfortable strategic environment.”9
Concurrent to this conventional reorientation, Noel C.
Koch, a deputy Secretary of Defense, concluded there
was a “total absence of defense policy on SOF during the 1970s.”10 To the extreme detriment of SOF, this
orientation towards conventional warfare in Europe
became increasingly ingrained in the institutional
thinking of DoD planners and, more importantly, the
Service Chiefs.
This reorientation towards preparing for a conventional showdown with the Soviet Union drove major
(and expensive) platform initiatives for each of the services. Taking over as the Army Chief of Staff from his
previous position as the head of Military Assistance
Command in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams
lost no time in promoting his “Big Five,” which would
eventually produce some of the mainstays of the Army’s arsenal: a main battle tank (eventually the M1
Abrams), infantry fighting vehicle (the M2/3 Brad-
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ley), attack helicopter (the AH-64 Apache), utility helicopter (the UH-60 Blackhawk), and a surface-to-air
missile (the Patriot system).11 The Navy likewise took
cues from the reorientation towards conventional conflict, initiating programs for guided missile cruisers,
Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, Los Angeles-class submarines, F-14
Tomcats, and F/A-18 Hornets.12 The Air Force’s initiation of programs promoting the C5 Galaxy transport,
F16 Fighting Falcon, and F15 Eagle demonstrated a
similar interest in matching strategic policy with the
hardware to fight and win conventional wars.
These major program initiatives, especially when
born in a period of constrained budgeting, gave rise
to significant interservice competition as proponents
struggled over increasingly limited funding. Indeed,
Henry Kissinger predicted as much in 1968 when he
noted that “given the likelihood of continuing limits
on defense spending . . . there will be intense competition among the Military services for the limited
resources,” that “could lead to a return of the interservice battles of the 1950s and overwhelm any rational defense planning.”13 Spotlighting such a potential
shift towards “irrational” warfighting by the early1980s was both the feudal nature of interservice interaction and the atrophied state of the U.S. special operations arsenal and capabilities. In addition to a spate
of terrorist attacks and hijackings in the late-1970s,
Operation EAGLE CLAW, the failed hostage rescue
attempt in Iran, and Operation URGENT FURY, the
invasion of Grenada, triggered a substantial reevaluation of how special operations forces from the various
services would fit into the conventional DoD. Incredibly, the valuable lessons garnered from both events
were insufficient to spur internal change in a DoD
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increasingly addled by the interservice fighting Kissinger had predicted. Instead, the inadequate response
by the DoD and its services eventually generated the
extraordinary external pressure capable of addressing fundamental problems regarding the organization
and application of SOF in the DoD.
No single event was more critical to the eventual
revitalization and reorganization of special operations
forces than the failed attempt to rescue the American
hostages in Iran. As a tragic capstone to the prolonged
captivity of American hostages, the aborted mission
was a significant blow for not only the special operations communities in the participating services, but
for national morale. In the wake of the joint mission, a
high-profile, publicized report by Admiral James Holloway observed that, given the complexity of the mission, there was insufficient interoperability between
the SOF components from the four donor services.
According to Holloway, this deficiency was driven by
the very nature of the divided missions and fiefdoms
within the DoD. Rather than a standing organization
that remained perpetually capable of accomplishing
such a challenging mission, the report stated:
[t]he Joint Chiefs of Staff had to start, literally, from
the beginning to establish a JTF [Joint Task Force], create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan,
select the units, and train the force before the first mission capability could be attained,14

meaning that the operation was, by the very structure
of DoD, “compartmentalized and reliant on ad hoc
arrangements.”15 Coupled with a recommendation to
form a permanent “Special Operations Advisory Panel” to better inform planners and policymakers of the
capabilities and limitations of unconventional forces,
22

the report also suggested that “an existing JTF organization . . . would have provided an organization
framework of professional expertise around which a
larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce.” 16 Together, these modest recommendations
formed the basis for a complete reorganization of special operations within the DoD.
Although the Pentagon was quick to adopt the
Holloway Report’s recommendations and form the
Counter-Terrorism Joint Task Force and Special Operations Policy Advisory Panel, neither organization
contributed significantly towards fully addressing the
interoperability of joint SOF.17 More encouragingly for
the long-term benefit of the Special Operations community, the massive failure of the special operations
mission in Tehran, Iran, did garner attention both in
the halls of Congress and in the Oval Office. Coupled
with the spate of international hijackings in the late1970s and early-1980s and an increased U.S. military
presence in Latin America, the failure in Tehran underlined the continued need for special operations.
In the age of potential nuclear conflict (according to
Senator Sam Nunn, “the least likely . . . and yet admittedly, most awesome of threats”)18 and an unlikely
large-scale conventional warfare in Europe, low intensity conflicts (LIC) appeared to many defense experts
as “the sort of conflicts that our adversaries [would]
resort to in an age of nuclear deterrence.” In addition
to the small proxy wars taking place across three continents, a renewed Soviet emphasis on spetsnaz forces
made a U.S. countermove seem self-evident. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger likewise noted
that America was “well prepared for the least likely
of conflicts and poorly prepared for the most likely,”
ominously noting the consequences of “failure to deter conflict at the lowest level.”19
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Doctrinally repositioned in the spectrum of U.S.
operations, SOF gradually obtained limited obligated
funding that modestly bolstered its capabilities. While
not addressing the pressing organizational issues facing SOF, congressional funding for special operations
increased from .1 percent of the total Defense budget
to .3 percent, which, although still meager, represented
a full 200 percent jump between 1981 and 1985.20 Yet
while Congress and the administration of Ronald Reagan may have embraced a renewed role for SOF, the
DoD did not. Rather than embrace the new exigencies
facing the United States, the Service Chiefs retrenched
into their four fiefs, reallocated Congressional funding
to conventional projects, and spurned congressional
oversight.
Indeed, the various services became increasingly
territorial about resources, especially as new and increasingly costly programs amplified competition for
limited resources. This often put the services at odds
with congressional intent, a prime example being the
perennial fight between the Air Force and Congress
over the purchase of new SOF-capable MC-130 Talons.
With a receptive Congress allocating funds each year
for the purchase, the Air Force simply ignored legislation in favor of reallocating the resources to big-budget programs driven by the requisites of conventional
combat. The Army engaged Congress and the budget
process similarly, often under the nose of a disapproving Service chief. After General Edward Meyer publically agreed to partially fund a communications program to assist Army Special Forces, the funding was
promptly reprogrammed by his own staff to support a
more mainstream initiative.21 In other circumstances,
funds and even physical “equipment tended to get siphoned off” before reaching the SOF user, leading to
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one instance in which a SOF unit received equipment
a full 17 years after it was requested.22 Not surprisingly, the respective services’ behavior often placed
them at odds with the hand that fed them. Increasingly frustrated over what representatives felt was
a “contravention of law,” Congress still found itself
largely impotent to control individual SOF program
spending within the respective services.23
Given that Nixon’s one-and-a-half war doctrine
was still nominally governing military planning, the
program and funding decisions made by the services
largely reflected their expectation of a major conventional conflict in Europe with a smaller conventional
conflict in another locale. As noted by a Senate Armed
Services Committee staff study from the early-1980s,
however, this also resulted in a cyclical system where,
“the Services have a tendency in force planning to focus on high-intensity conflicts upon which resource
programs are justified.”24 The major equipment programs ushered in during the post-Vietnam era were
considered essential in the achievement of the services’
core functions. Special operations, deemed by most in
the DoD to have “never been a core program,” largely
subsisted on leftovers from the budgeting process.25
SOF jockeying for position and money was complicated by the bevy of new defense programs competing for dollars, most notably the imminent and
expensive Strategic Defense Initiative, which raised
the hackles of Service proponents during the internecine Defense Resources Board. According to one
DoD official, the “perennial DoD problem” consisted
“of stuffing [10] pounds of program into a five-pound
bag.” SOF, on the periphery since the end of Vietnam,
could expect little in the process, and was further
hobbled by conventional wisdom that equated “small
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with unimportant.” While $1 million seemed a drop
in the bucket to the massive Defense budgets of the
1980s, such funding was proportionally significant for
the funding-starved SOF elements of each service.26
Representative Dan Daniel, Chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, noted the ultimate success and failure of the budgeting process in that by
concentrating on “deterring nuclear conflict and the
‘big’ war on the plains of Europe . . . we have avoided
both. But what we have failed to deter is low-intensity conflict—the peculiar province of SOF.”27 Ironically, the repeated denial of funding to SOF across
the services eventually fed the political will to form
USSOCOM.
Also critical to the formation of USSOCOM were
the lessons learned from the American invasion of
Grenada in 1983. The operation highlighted both inadequacies in the employment of SOF and a larger
inability for the services to work effectively in a joint
environment. Outwardly touted as a U.S. victory, stories of inadequate intelligence, avoidable friendly fire
incidents, and a complete breakdown in inter- and
even intraservice communication raised serious questions about the U.S. ability to conduct even narrow
military missions. The apparent mishandling of SOF
during the invasion was also criticized. In testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, retired
Major General Richard Scholtes, commander of SOF
elements for the operation, described his forces as
“misused” by conventional commanders because of
“numerous fundamental misunderstandings of their
tactics and capabilities,” that ultimately resulted in
the deaths of U.S. servicemen. Ranking Senators William Cohen of Maine and Sam Nunn of Georgia were
clearly alarmed, with Nunn noting that:
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A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead
to the conclusion that, despite the performance of the
individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. armed
forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada; we may not be so
fortunate next time.28

Incredibly, the experience in Grenada did little to
spur the services into immediate action in fixing either SOF or joint warfighting doctrine. For the most
part, the DoD remained locked into its focus on the
conventional fight and procurement process, even as
the Reagan administration began to shift some of its
strategic focus towards smaller asymmetric conflicts.
The DoD’s apparent indifference garnered increasing ire from legislators, many of whom now felt that
they were “preoccupied with chasing after resources”
with “more time . . . spent preparing plans for the next
budget than for the next war.”29 As the military bureaucracy continued to define SOF as “peripheral to
the interests, missions, goals, and traditions that they
view[ed] as essential,”30 key legislators in Congress
began to play an increasingly active role in addressing
the “root causes” of the military’s problems, that many
felt were rooted in the current organizational structure
of the Department of Defense. Emerging at the front
of this effort to realize a joint-capable SOF component
were Senators Cohen and Nunn and Representative
Dan Daniel of Virginia. Ironically, as the Pentagon
stubbornly resisted calls from these legislators for a
“negotiated solution” to the unique issues facing SOF,
each legislator shifted from supporting modest reform
to the full reorganization of special operations forces
under what would become USSOCOM.
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Not surprisingly, DoD resistance to SOF reform or
reorganization followed predictable reasoning, including an overwhelming focus on European-based conventional warfare, traditional distrust of an “elitist”
organization, a belief that conventional “preparedness
translates into a capacity to deal with “lesser included
threats,” and a “pervasive and persistent” fear that a
re-energized SOF could again “drag us into another
Vietnam.”31 Spotlighting the lingering fears of a conventional military, a Center for Defense information
publication even cast doubt on modest ongoing SOF
mission by suggesting that:
Special Operations Forces training activities in Central America and elsewhere, like the Green Berets’
training of South Vietnamese troops in 1959, could be
the crucial first step on the path leading to direct U.S.
involvement.32

From the DoD and the various services, bureaucratic intransigence towards Congress was “stiff and
protracted, as is any defense of the status quo.”33 Legislative airing of SOF issues produced the:
unintended effect of eliciting and illuminating some
of the less attractive kinds of behavior associated with
the military-careerism, parochialism, defensiveness—
ills to which, in fact, any bureaucracy is heir, but which
are seen as peculiarly egregious in this one.34

Tellingly, more modest internal initiatives fared
no better. As early as 1982, Army Chief of Staff Edward Meyer attempted to bridge the divide between
a standing mandate for conventional forces and the
growing need for a standing SOF organization possessing substantial joint capabilities. His Strategic
Services Command (STRATSERCOM), a modest pro28

posal compared to the eventual radical reorganization
that produced USSOCOM, was nevertheless soundly
rejected by the Navy and the Air Force, who had little
interest in even temporarily handing over their SEALS
and aircraft to a standing joint organization.35 As one
DoD official caustically noted, the “biggest problem
with STRATSERCOM was the Army invented it . . .
so the Air Force went off and invented its own, which
was called the Joint Operations Agency.” Typical of
the bureaucratic interservice turf wars, “after everybody played push-me-pull-you with it for a while, the
whole business evaporated,” returning the services
to their status quo.36 The entire process of substantial
SOF reform had become so “agonizingly slow,” that
an exasperated Senator Barry Goldwater publically
suggested that, “If we have to fight tomorrow, these
problems will cause Americans to die unnecessarily
[or] may cause us to lose the fight.”37 This failure to
work with the Congress would prove a costly mistake
for the Pentagon.
What legislative proponents increasingly noted
as one of the most serious shortcomings facing special operations forces within the DoD structure was
a “lack of effective advocacy” equivalent to that enjoyed by the respective services and even weapons
platforms.”38 While SOF remained an issue discussed
in professional circles and publications, support for
change was ad hoc, and identifying a full-time advocate was challenging. Representative Daniel stepped
in to fill the role of SOF advocate, which held profound
consequences for the future of SOF. Aided by what a
Congressional Research Service author understatedly
referred to as “several able and persuasive staffers,”
Representative Daniel allied himself with Noel Koch,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, who was an ardent
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proponent of SOF inside the Pentagon and was less
flatteringly described as the “Administration’s ‘rogue
elephant’.” 39 Together, their staffs set about to generate a controversy designed to place the SOF debate
in the national, or at least legislative, spotlight. Using
the pages of professional publications, they released a
series of prepositioned opinion essays by a variety of
authors advocating both reform and, less effectively,
the status quo. The reform essays did not focus on a
single argument, but were universally dedicated to
fixing the SOF problem by restructuring SOF within
the DoD and instituting a permanent advocate for SOF
inside the DoD. Collectively, the articles succeeded in
reinvigorating the debate over fixing SOF and would
prove instrumental in shaping USSOCOM. Noel
Koch’s suggestions that “the short-term solutions are
raising hell and politicking,” seemed to be working.40
Between the release of the first advocacy article
in August of 1985 and the introduction of a Senate
amendment as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Bill, the DoD was in an entirely reactive posture regarding the debate over reinventing
SOF. Whereas the narrative to this point placed most
of the power in the hands of the DoD and conventionalists within the Armed Forces, the persistent inability
and unwillingness of the Pentagon to seriously address the problem facing the doctrine, employment,
and support of a consolidated SOF capability left
key legislators little choice but to save the Pentagon
from itself. Indeed, while Senators indicated that they
“prefer it not be done by law,” because “most of the
organization could be done by the President [via the
Secretary of Defense],” the Pentagon’s track record
since the end of Vietnam did not indicate it would
willingly assist in instituting needed, or even directed,
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changes. Instead, Senator Cohen, who was now fully
embroiled in the debate, indicated that the nation
could “no longer temporize on the need to establish
a clearer organizational focus for special operations
and a clear line for their command and control.”41 Two
competing bills, one from the House and one from the
Senate, were introduced by Representative Daniel and
Senator Cohen, respectively.
Much like the dueling advocacy essays from a
year earlier, the dueling bills shifted the focus of the
debate from the Pentagon to Congress. The two options, while significantly different, also concurred in
the most important innovation in the command and
control of SOF: the reorganization of all special operations forces under a joint entity other than their
respective services. The status quo simply would no
longer suffice.
Daniel’s House bill placed the forces under a civilian-directed “National Special Operations Agency”
(NSOA), while Cohen’s Senate bill placed the forces
in a “Special Operations Unified Command” under
a four-star general. Having endured more reprogrammed funding on the part of the services, Daniel
likewise stripped budget control from the parent services, while Cohen’s bill left budgeting untouched.
Finally, while Daniel’s proposal had “self-contained”
civilian oversight, Cohen’s proposal dictated the formation of an “Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict” to provide
needed advocacy.
In a telling exchange of who now controlled the
debate over SOF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral William J. Crowe, presented both the House
and the Senate with a hastily compiled alternative from
the DoD. Arguing that “change was needed,” but that
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“it should be a DoD responsibility to determine what
form those changes should take and also implement
them,” Crowe suggested a toned-down alternative
in a Special Operations Force Command headed by
a three-star general who, as in Senator Cohen’s plan,
would report to the Secretary of Defense through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).42 Claiming the DoD would
have the JCS plan for SOF reorganization functional
in just 6 months, he was met with a frosty reception in
both chambers. Further “rigidly inflexible” efforts on
the part of the DoD to promote the new JCS plan only
hardened legislative resolve.43
Given a decade of friction involving the organization and funding of SOF, reconciling the approved
House and Senate versions of the bill proved surprisingly easy. Agreeing to “focus on the objectives rather
than the methodology,” some of the shifts were made
to fit more neatly within the larger Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act.44 The following provisions eventually became part of Public Law 99-661:
1. The creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict;
2. The formation of a unified combatant command for special operations forces (USSOCOM) and
the placement of all active-duty and reserve special
operations forces under USSOCOM;
3. The assignment of a four-star general or admiral
to command USSOCOM;
4. The management of personnel and budgeting
by the USSOCOM commander. Importantly, only the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the SOF
commander could place restrictions on the budgets
approved by Congress;
5. The mandating that the SOF commander in
unified combatant commands be a general or flag
officer; and,
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6. The establishment of a “Board for Low Intensity
Conflict” within the National Security Council that the
Senate recommended be headed by a new Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
for Low-intensity Conflict.45
Given the length of time that SOF received no billing, the changes encompassed in the Nunn-Cohen
Amendment were sweeping and, for the Pentagon,
severe. They combined nearly every legislativelyaggressive provision considered. While the House
desire for a civilian-directed SOF agency within the
DoD went unrealized, the establishment of a unified
combatant command placed USSOCOM on par with
just five combatant commands in the military. USSOCOM’s power was further strengthened by the
creation of Major Force Program (MFP) 11 to protect
USSOCOM’s funding from other resource-hungry services. Finally, in an acknowledgment of the increased
potential for special operations forces, the Senate
strongly advocated that the President restructure his
National Security Council to include a Deputy Assistant for Low-intensity Conflict.46 The changes could
not have been a more stark contrast to SOF’s precarious existence just a few years earlier.
After a decade of budgetary and structural omnipotence, the conventional forces within the DoD
made a concerted, but ultimately futile, attempt to
resist implementation of the provisions on the NunnCohen Amendment. Most DoD foot dragging “generally reflected compliance with the letter rather than
the spirit” of the legislative mandates, making for a
halting and disjointed start for USSOCOM.47 Because
no USSOCOM commander had been immediately
identified, the Navy attempted to retain command of
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its SEALs (an effort that ceased with the appointment
of General James Lindsay at the first commander).48
Although clearly intended to be headquartered in the
Washington, DC, area, planners instead established
USSOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, FL,
and, when reluctantly manning it, filled it heavily
with SOF-inexperienced personnel from the recently
deactiviated U.S. Readiness Command.49 More importantly, Secretary Weinberger steadfastly refused to fill
the position of the new Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. When under
pressure from legislators to fill the obvious vacancy,
he pointedly subordinated the position under another
deputy and then filled it with Richard Armitage, a
vocal opponent of restructuring and of special operations in general.50 Even with the ostensible protection
of MFP-11, various services continued to siphon early
funds from SOF units that strayed away from the protective umbrella of USSOCOM.51 While perhaps not
always in “contravention of the law,” as suggested by
Senator Cohen, the “bureaucratic obstacles” erected
by the Pentagon certainly slowed implementation. 52
By this point, however, the balance of power rested
with a Congress that was fully vested in the future of
USSOCOM and committed to seeing “a proportionate response on the part of the military” to address
“the increasing threat from the lower end of the conflict spectrum.”53 With the obvious realization that the
DoD could not be cajoled into embracing the spirit of
USSOCOM, Congress returned to its ability to forcibly force internal reorganizations on an unwilling
DoD. Armed with the legislative pen, and “forced by
bureaucratic resistance within the DoD to take very
detailed legislative action,” Congress produced Public Law 100-180 and Public Law 100-456, prescribing
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in great detail Congress’ expectations from the Pentagon, to include an unprecedented amount of continuous congressional oversight.54 The results, while
not addressing all the issues facing USSOCOM and its
legislated advocacy, continued to shape and reshape
USSOCOM’s mission, employment, and organization
well into the 1990s.
While USSOCOM’s continued presence by the
mid-1990s indicated that it was firmly cemented into
the security framework of the DoD, the road to achieving and sustaining a joint SOF capability was tortuous.
Ironically, it was the very distaste of the DoD for SOF
in the post-Vietnam era and the Pentagon’s intransigence to reform that resulted in the bureaucratically
radical formation of USSOCOM. USSOCOM’s structure and orientation were in fact not driven by the unmistakable military necessity of low-intensity conflict,
but by the very resistance of the DoD to acknowledge
and address this necessity. Reformers from outside of
the organization, recognizing both the Pentagon’s uncorrected focus on the conventional possibilities of the
Cold War and their dogmatic insistence on conventional strategy and procuring, at all costs, the weapons
programs needed to win a conventional fight, rallied
to the side of SOF employment. Offering SOF the effective advocacy previously denied them by the DoD, the
fate of an entire unified combatant command would
ultimately rest largely with several legislators.
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CHAPTER 3
SAILING ON STORMY SEAS:
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND
REORGANIZATION IN THE POST-COLD
WAR WORLD
Seanegan P. Sculley
INTRODUCTION
From 1993 to 2002, United States Atlantic Command
(USACOM), formerly Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), implemented a reorganization initially meant
to foster a new ethos of joint operations throughout
the Armed Services community. USACOM quickly
implemented significant changes during a period of
heightened tension within one of its Areas of Responsibility (AOR), and did so efficiently and effectively.
During the next 8 years, however, regions were reallocated to other commands, and USACOM became
increasingly functional in focus. In the wake of a new
massive reformation throughout the Defense community in 2002, USACOM lost all of its operational
capacity and became the purely functional command
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). For the next
decade, the command positioned itself as the prominent laboratory for transformation concepts. In 2002,
USJFCOM ran the most expensive and extensive exercise in U.S. history to test those theories, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002, but with mixed results.
Now, in 2011, USJFCOM is being de-commissioned.
Arguments about the reasons and effects of this reorganization are polarizing. Some argue that in an era of
limited resources, commands without an operational
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focus are superfluous, while others suggest that USJFCOM has successfully fulfilled its functional purpose. The most compelling argument may lie between
these two.
In the early fall of 1994, a large American force was
gathering against a small Caribbean nation. Paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division mustered on the
“Green Ramp” at Pope Air Force Base, Fayetteville,
NC, to be issued their ammunition and board C-130
cargo aircraft. Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division were already aboard the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower off the coast. Naval aviation, Air Force fighters, and
Army helicopters stood by, while Marines prepared
for a possible amphibious landing. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was about to commence.
Simultaneous to the military prepositioning of
forces, a small group of diplomats was meeting with
Haitian leaders. In January 1991, Jean Bertrand Aristide was instated as President of Haiti. His tenure was
cut short, however, by a military junta that overthrew
Aristide’s government and controlled Haiti for more
than 3 years. In an attempt to reinstate President Aristide, the U.S. Government under President William
Clinton imposed tough economic sanctions, which
created a flood of refugees from Haiti and, it was
hoped, brought the junta to a more congenial position
with regards to American demands.
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell led
the diplomatic contingent to Haiti. They informed
their hosts that American paratroopers were in the air
and the full military might of the United States would
be brought to bear against the Haitian government if
Aristide was not allowed to return to the island and
peacefully assume his role as President. Faced with
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overwhelming odds and certainly reflecting on American success in Panama (and more recently in Iraq),
the military leaders of the junta capitulated and, for
the most part, violence was avoided.
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the first
military operation for a new unified command reorganized just months earlier under the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986. U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was created to do more than act as a headquarters for commands from the various services, and its responsibilities were larger than the regions over which it had
control. Formed under the supervision of Powell in
the early-1990s, USACOM was the new unified command tasked as the advocate for joint training, joint
provision, and joint integration for all continental U.S.
(CONUS)-based forces. It was organized to provide
trained joint forces from the United States to other
combatant commands around the world if mission
requirements exceeded the internal forces of the supported command; additionally, it was responsible for
the defense of North America, the Atlantic Ocean, and
the Caribbean Sea.
Rather than form a new unified command to accomplish this goal, Powell decided to give the mission to Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) and allow its
commander in chief (CINC), Admiral Paul D. Miller,
to reorganize to meet the new mission requirements.
This feat was not accomplished in a vacuum. LANTCOM had an AOR that spanned the Atlantic Ocean
and Caribbean Sea. Missions were ongoing in the
Caribbean due to the escalating tensions with Haiti
and responsibilities still existed from the Cold War
towards the Azores and Iceland. Yet in the spring of
1993, LANTCOM staff developed a sound implemen-
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tation plan that, within months, was accepted by the
Secretary of Defense and the President, and allowed
for the success just 1 year later of Operation UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY.
The following years would continue to change
USACOM’s structure and mission. Gradually, AORs
were given to other commands. Initially, the command surrendered the Caribbean to U.S. Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM); this move was followed by
the loss of the Atlantic to U.S. European Command
(EUCOM); finally, in 2002, USJFCOM was divested
of its role as defender of CONUS with the formation
of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). At the
same time, new functional organizations were placed
under its control, refining its focus as the joint advocate for all U.S. forces.
In October 2002, after 9/11 and the rapid escalation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), USACOM
was renamed U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)
and divested of all of its operational requirements.
The command accepted its role as a purely functional
command, focused on developing concepts derived
from the Pentagon, Washington, DC-directed programs of Transformation and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This focus was best exemplified
in the largest joint exercise in history, MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE 2002 that produced mixed results and
one very public controversy. Additionally, many
of those opposed to the concept under which USJFCOM was formed remained hostile, and some who
were responsible for USJFCOM’s creation ultimately
joined its enemies’ camp. While the reorganization of
USACOM in 1993 was a success, the eventual reality
in 2002 of USJFCOM as a purely functional command
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focused on joint operation advocacy and transformation limited its perceived relevance in the GWOT and
allowed those in opposition to the concept to move for
its disestablishment.
THE NAVY’S BACKYARD: ATLANTIC
COMMAND AND THE COLD WAR, 1947-90
Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was originally
created under the Unified Command Plan of 1947.1 By
the early-1950s, LANTCOM evolved into a largely naval command responsible for the defense of the North
Atlantic against a growing Soviet threat. Sub-unified
commands were created in the Azores and then Iceland, to provide air and naval bases from which to
launch forces and keep sea lanes clear. LANTCOM’s
command structure revealed this focus clearly: the
CINC for LANTCOM commanded the main component command, the Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) and
was the Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic (SACLANT) under NATO. As Soviet submarine
and surface fleet capabilities grew, LANTCOM’s
importance increased and it played a key role in the
Cold War.2
While it played a chess match in the North Atlantic, LANTCOM gradually gained responsibilities closer to home. In the Caribbean, Communism became
a constant threat to the small nations of the Antilles
and Central America. Over time, LANTCOM took
over defense of the Panama Canal, then the waters
of the Caribbean and, eventually, the defense of the
Caribbean islands. This expansion of responsibilities
occurred in the 1960s, a time of growing tensions between Cuba and the United States. LANTCOM was
integral to the naval blockade of Cuba in 1962 during
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the Cuban Missile Crisis and took control of Joint Task
Force (JTF) 120 and 122 during the 1965 invasion of the
Dominican Republic.3
These operations continued to illustrate the difficulties inherent in joint operations. Starting in 1963,
LANTCOM began hosting large joint training exercises between different U.S. services and often included
allied forces as well. Originally named Quick Kick,
these biannual events evolved into a large-scale field
exercise off the East Coast of the United States called
Solid Shield. Conducted in the 1980s, Solid Shield involved between 40,000 and 50,000 personnel from the
Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, with a focus on the
rapid deployment of joint forces within LANTCOM’s
AOR. This focus on joint operations led to the selection of LANTCOM to lead the mission into Grenada
in 1983.4
Similar to the subsequent intervention in Haiti,
Operation URGENT FURY was a large-scale joint mission that attempted to include every service in the U.S.
military, including Special Operations forces from
both the Army and Navy. While the mission was a
success, many in the Armed Services and in Congress
were critical of the logistical planning and execution,
believing either that only one service should have been
involved or that American military joint capabilities
needed reform. While historians argue over the initial
catalyst for change, the complications in the execution
of the invasion in Grenada undoubtedly helped secure
the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.5
The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986
was to encourage joint cooperation between the
Armed Services and streamline joint operations in the
future, both of which had been attempted unsuccessfully in the past. Both Strategic and Tactical Interdic-
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tion Keeper of Eagle Command (STRIKECOM) and
U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) in the 1960s
and 1970s had been created to support joint operations, but neither command possessed the structure
to support the mission and overcome interservice
rivalries.6 Under the auspices of Goldwater-Nichols,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) had
new authority. Not only would he have a direct line
to the Office of the President as chief military advisor,
the CJCS was also in charge of joint operation doctrine
and, at the request of the President, could be used as a
conduit of communication between the CINC and his
unified commanders. Furthermore, the law defined
the roles of the unified commanders and encouraged
the Service Chiefs to place their best and most promising officers in joint assignments.7
These new legislative guidelines were intended to
foster a spirit of “jointness” between the services, to
encourage effective and efficient military operations
that would combine air, land, and sea forces to defeat
enemy nation-states in a large-scale, conventional war.
The debate over the best way to accomplish this goal
was heated and split the services while, in many instances, uniting politicians across party lines. The U.S.
Army and Air Force were largely in favor of the new
act as it was drafted, but there were accusations made
by staffers for the Senate Armed Services Committee
that the Department of the Navy actively opposed
the bill.8
Simultaneous to the debate in Congress over the
passing of the new law, the Chief of Naval Operations
requested in 1985 that the staffs and commanders for
LANTCOM and LANTFLT be separated to allow the
commander-in-chief LANTCOM (CINCLANT) to
concentrate on the increasingly complicated role he
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was playing. LANTFLT would remain a component
command under LANTCOM but would not continue
to fulfill its de facto role as the unified staff for all of
LANTCOM.9 In 1989, the role as commander of Atlantic Command became more difficult with the end of
the Cold War.
A FIGHT FOR RELEVANCE: USACOM FINDS ITS
PLACE IN THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
REORGANIZATION AND THE ENDING
OF THE COLD WAR
In August 1991, as the new Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Powell held his annual CINC
Conference. At that meeting, he proposed a vigorous implementation of the reorganization within the
Armed Services he believed was intended in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Despite military successes in Panama and Iraq in 1989 and 1991, Powell knew budgetary
restrictions were on the horizon and much of the U.S.
force would be returned to CONUS bases. This would
further complicate projection of joint forces globally
and would require a focused approach to the problem.
To solve it, he proposed a new unified command dedicated to joint force advocacy, and he had a command
and commander in mind.10
Admiral Paul D. Miller was a native Virginian
and the CINC for the Atlantic Fleet in 1991. Powell
described him as “a very aggressive and brilliant commander” and a true believer in the concept of joint operations.11 Though Powell’s suggestions to reduce the
number of unified commands from 10 to six and create a new unified command in charge of all the Americas was rejected by the CINCs at the annual CINC
Conference in 1991, that next summer he placed Miller
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(then CINCLANT) and his staff in charge of creating a
plan to implement the necessary efficiencies and provide a joint force advocate to change the culture of the
American military.12
During this time, other CINCs and members of
Congress, including Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), voiced their
agreement that reorganization of the Armed Services
was necessary to meet growing international requirements in the face of shrinking resources. At the CINC
Conference in August 1992, Powell submitted his idea
to place all CONUS-based forces under a single unified command, and Miller seconded the idea, suggesting LANTCOM as the unified command. By the end
of the conference, the CINCs had agreed to research
three possibilities: 1) keep current organization of
forces; 2) give the new Air Combat Command (ACC)
specified command status (allowing the ACC to command and control all Air Forces in the United States);
or 3) reorganize LANTCOM to command all CONUSbased forces as the joint force integrator.13
Miller placed his special assistant, Navy Captain
William D. Center, with the Joint Staff Strategic Plans
and Policy directorate (J5) to research and write a
concept paper discussing a unified command focused
on joint force advocacy. The plan that was eventually
devised would increase the scope of LANTCOM drastically by placing all CONUS-based forces under its
command to facilitate its new role as joint force provider and trainer to other unified commands around
the world.14 Powell agreed with the concept. He
viewed LANTCOM as the best choice for the assignment. It had a history of joint cooperation over the past
3 decades in the Caribbean. It had a reduced mission
requirement as the defender of the Atlantic follow-
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ing the fall of the Soviet Union. The new commander,
Miller, was an adherent of Powell’s joint concept and
willing to do the work needed to regain relevance for
his command.15
In a March 1993 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Powell argued for the reorganization
of LANTCOM as the joint force integrator of America’s
CONUS-based force. On March 29, 1993, Aspin wrote
a letter to Nunn, agreeing with Powell’s argument
that such a reorganization would create efficiencies
and unity of effort in the realm of joint operations.16 At
the same time, Miller’s staff began planning for implementation, knowing that final approval would require
an implementation plan acceptable to the majority of
the CINCs and Service Chiefs.
The LANTCOM staff created a LANTCOM Implementation Working Group (LIWG), within the command and outside of it with other CINCs and their
staffs to quickly write a draft plan that incorporated
input from the entire LANTCOM staff and from the
component commands. To do so, the organization
of the LIWG was based on a cross-functional model.
Seven functions of the new organization were identified, and the directorates of LANTCOM most closely
associated with those functions were assigned leadership of the development teams. Each team had a general officer/flag officer as a team leader and a colonel
as the team director. The teams created a list of “kick
start” issues they considered of primary importance
to allow for quick action once implementation started
because they feared a period of inaction often associated with the formation of new groups.17
While the plan was being drafted, LANTCOM
held periodic general officer/flag officer review group
meetings with the CINCs and their staffs from the
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proposed component commands. As their concerns
and suggestions were included, the draft plan was
sent to the staffs of the CINCs for the other unified
commands and then to the CINCs themselves. Miller
knew these commanders would initially have serious
doubts about the proposed plan and hoped to shortcircuit such objections by giving each unified command CINC the opportunity to voice concern during
the planning process. All of this was designed to allow
for the greatest amount of participation and inclusion
while accepting a very short planning cycle.18
At the same time, in the period of November 1991
to June 1993, Haiti was in the throes of a military coup.
Following the imposition of economic sanctions by
the United States, Haitian refugees attempted to flee
to America in makeshift boats. An injunction blocked
any attempt to return these people to their home island and a refugee camp was established at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba. LANTCOM was in charge
of the joint task force running the operation (JTF-GTMO), and over the next 2 years, the population in the
camp fluctuated from a few hundred to over 15,000
men, women, and children.19
As the CINCs took the time to examine the proposed implementation, several observations were
forwarded and considered. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) wanted to be included in all joint
planning and was unwilling to give up command of
Air Force lift assets. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was concerned because U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM) was not going to be forced to relinquish its
control of CONUS-based forces on the West Coast.
CENTCOM also feared any joint force packages it received from LANTCOM would not include the best
forces for the mission. Not only would LANTCOM
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gain command of the four main service-related force
commands in the United States (U.S. Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM), LANTFLT, ACC, and Marine Forces Atlantic (MARSFORLANT), it would
also be responsible for the continental defense of
the United States. In this role, U.S. Space Command
(SPACECOM) insisted that North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) be included in the
planning. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) refused to give LANTCOM authority to include Special
Operations Forces (SOF) in their joint force packages,
and many wanted LANTCOM’s AOR greatly reduced
to give its staff the ability to focus on the complexities of its new mission.20 In short, Miller’s staff was
threatening to break rice bowls, and the CINCs were
not willing to sit quietly while it happened.
The LIWG took into account the concerns of the
other unified commands and presented the draft Implementation Plan to the CINCs again in May 1993.
The concerns addressed in the new draft were consolidated into three main objections, and the plan was forwarded to the Joint Staff and the Service Chiefs. These
objections focused on the fact that USACOM (the new
acronym for LANTCOM under the Implementation
Plan) would not command all forces in the U.S. (PACOM would retain command of forces on the West
Coast), that few commanders understood the new
concept of lead operational authority created by the
LIWG to explain how component commands would
run routine missions, and that there was fear the concept of adaptive joint force packages would not be
flexible enough to meet the needs of supported commanders.21 The Service Chiefs from the Army and the
Air Force agreed with and supported the plan while
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso did
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not. He, along with the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, believed this reorganization would drain money from the Department of the Navy to the benefit of
the other services and not add a benefit to naval forces. The Marine Corps contended it already conducted
joint operations and did not need a separate unified
command to act as trainer, provider, or integrator.22
Despite these objections, the plan was approved and
signed into the Unified Command Plan on September
24, 1993, by President Clinton. The rebirth of LANTCOM as USACOM was celebrated in a ceremony on
October 1, 1993.
The fact that a plan of this magnitude could be conceived, created, and approved in a year is astounding. The cultural and organizational ramifications of
the new USACOM as joint trainer and provider were
profound. The use of a functional organization model
and an adherence to inclusion of the entire unified
command community were responsible for the success of this achievement. For the next 10 years, that
implementation plan would be the basis for a successful command, one that expanded quite quickly, but
one that ran into some unforeseen obstacles early on
as well.
STAKING ITS CLAIM ON AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE: TRANSITIONING DURING THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
On the day of Powell’s retirement, October 1, 1993,
USACOM—the giant—was born. It now not only had
responsibility for most of the Western Hemisphere, it
also commanded the majority of American military
forces. At the same time, American diplomats believed
they had reached a peaceful solution to the problem in
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Haiti. The junta in charge of the island agreed to allow
Aristide to return with American forces to aid in a political transition. But when the USS Harlan County, carrying the initial contingent of U.S. forces, was turned
back in the fall of 1993, the Joint Staff began planning
for a force-based solution.23
Two operational plans (OPLANS) were devised by
USACOM into 1994. One was for a forced entry into
Haiti (JTF-180) and the other was in case a peaceful
solution was reached (JTF-190). With both JTFs positioned in September of 1994, the stage was set for
the successful diplomatic mission of President Carter
and General Powell. Since both JTFs were ready, the
actual operation that reinstated Aristide to power
was a combination of forces from both.24 Despite the
success of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY from
the standpoint of joint operations, the Secretary of the
Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations were able to
convince the Secretary of Defense to alter the Unified
Campaign Plan (UCP) in 1995 and remove the Caribbean from USACOM’s AOR; it was given to SOUTHCOM to streamline drug interdiction operations and
became effective in January 1997.25
This shift was, arguably, the most important when
looking toward the future for this newly reorganized
command. From its inception, USACOM failed to gain
the support of its former master, the U.S. Navy. The
only service to maintain its objections against the concept of a unified command focused on joint operation
advocacy was also the service charged with financing
USACOM. Throughout its existence, the command
remained woefully short on manpower. In an interview in 2003, the man responsible for standing up the
Joint Warfighting Center, Eugene Newman, stated his
two biggest concerns in implementing joint training
were a lack of forecasted funds and perpetual under
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manning.26 Given its limited resources, it may not be
surprising that USACOM lost its control of the Caribbean. Yet the precedent that was set, and a growing
institutional belief that the future of the command lay
in its functional role may have begun a 5-year slide
toward a complete loss of operational responsibilities.
In other ways, though, the command was still expanding. It created a new facility to aid its reorganized
Joint Training Directorate (J7). The Joint Training,
Analysis, and Simulations Center (JTASC) focused on
training commanders and their staffs in joint missions
at the operational level and worked primarily through
computer simulations. Staffing remained a constant
problem in USACOM and to combat this, U.S. Air
Force Major General Michael Short (J7) devised a
method of incorporating reservists during peak training times in the Joint Reserve Unit (JRU). Then in 1995,
USACOM created the Joint Processing and Onward
Movement Center (JPOM) at Fort Benning, GA, to deploy joint forces from CONUS to the Balkans.27
Following the success of these joint ventures, in
1998, five Chairman Controlled Activities all focused
on joint integration and training became part of the
USACOM organization.28 Yet one of the key concepts
for USACOM as envisioned by both Powell and Miller
failed to materialize. Adaptive Joint Force Packaging
(AJFP) was not accepted by the combatant commanders overseas. The idea of training habitual joint units
in different configurations to meet possible contingencies was considered too rigid by the other unified commanders. They wanted the power to decide
what force structures they needed for their mission
sets. They were not willing to trust USJFCOM to predict all possible contingencies and build packages to
meet those outcomes. Instead, an ad hoc system was
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devised that involved the Joint Staff, the supported
command, and the supporting command and allowed
other unified commands, like PACOM, to also fulfill
the role of joint force provider and give the supported
command greater latitude in prescribing manning
requirements.29
Still, by 1999 USACOM was fully engaged in its
functional role as joint force trainer, provider, and integrator. It gained another three Chairman Controlled
Activities focused on joint functions. At that point, to
recognize this fact and to highlight the future of the
organization, USACOM was renamed in the UCP
1999 as U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Additionally, it still had substantial regional responsibilities, not the least of which was the defense of CONUS.
So when the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
occurred, USJFCOM was ready to provide joint task
forces to aid New York City. Though these forces were
not required, USJFCOM did work to stand up a JTF
Headquarters for Homeland Security.30 Shortly thereafter, however, a new reorganization of the American
defense community would come and leave USJFCOM
with no operational responsibilities whatsoever.
In the new UCP 2002, the Atlantic region was taken from USJFCOM and given to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and defense of CONUS was given to
the newly formed U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Thus, USJFCOM was left as a solely functional
command.31 In effect, the attacks on 9/11 led to a reduction in USJFCOM capabilities first demanded by
the other unified commands during implementation
planning in 1993. In the space of less than 10 years,
following an unprecedented attack on U.S. soil, the
largest, and possibly most powerful, unified command had been relegated to training, integration, and
experimentation.
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SAILING INTO PORT OR SINKING
TO THE DEPTHS?
THOUGHTS ON THE DISESTABLISHMENT
OF USJFCOM
USJFCOM was the one unified command to be
cut in another era of budgetary cuts that came in the
early-2010s. This decision came less than 20 years after
it was designated the premier command for a transformational military of the future. Yet command historian William McClintock has some thoughts on the
structural weaknesses inherent in USACOM that may
have led to this situation. First, USACOM, though a
large unified command, remained under the budget
of the Navy, which was the main opponent to the idea
of a joint forces command from the outset. The Navy’s
budget was shrinking in 1993, and the Chief of Naval
Operations had already given his opinion that the new
USACOM brought no value-added to his service. With
this in mind, it is not surprising USACOM also habitually encountered manning problems. It was always
understaffed for its mission. Second, USACOM did
not control the budgets of its component commands.
Without the power of the purse strings, it is difficult
to imagine directing FORSCOM or MARSFORLANT
to do something contrary to the wishes of its service
chief. Finally, while the original concept placed all
CONUS-based forces under USACOM, the reality
was this never happened. Instead, these forces were
split between east and west coasts. Without the full
complement of forces, it was difficult for USACOM to
maintain a position as the joint force provider.32
Nevertheless, USACOM was successful through
the 1990s and into the new millennium. What hap-
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pened after 9/11? An interview with the director of
the Joint Warfare Center in 2003, Dr. Eugene Newman, is enlightening. He claimed the quality of officers arriving at the center for training had changed
for the better. In 1993, officers often arrived without
computer skills, without joint experience, and without
an understanding of why joint training was necessary.
Ten years later, he noted none of that was true. It was
now foreign to American officers to think outside of
joint operations; if the mission did not involve joint
forces, it did not pass muster.33 Perhaps the time for a
dedicated force to serve as the joint force trainer and
integrator has passed precisely because USJFCOM
succeeded in elevating “jointness” as a mandatory
consideration in military operations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said as much in February 2011,
when he claimed that joint cooperation was now fully
embedded in American military ethos and so the need
for a separate command dedicated to joint advocacy
had passed.34
The manner with which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approached the dismantling
of JFCOM belies a successful completion of mission.
Senators and Congressmen from Virginia, concerned
about the 5,000 jobs at stake with the dissolution of the
command, claim Gates did not provide adequate analysis or transparency for his decision. They threatened
to subpoena him to testify before the House Armed
Services Committee to justify his actions. Congressional outrage lessened after an agreement was made to
keep approximately half the jobs threatened, transferring select organizations within JFCOM to other commands identified as fulfilling still relevant functions
for the military.35
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Still, the decision to disestablish USJFCOM was
made quickly and did not appear to include the input
of the Armed Services or Congress. The idea was first
presented at the Public Session Quarterly Meeting
for the Defense Business Board (DBB). The DBB was
established by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to
find inefficiencies that would streamline the defense
budget. Retired Marine Corps Major General Arnold
Punaro led the committee and delivered the first blow
to JFCOM. In his review, Punaro claimed JFCOM was
riddled with redundant commands and should be
eliminated to save the Department of Defense (DoD)
money. He announced this recommendation on July
22, 2010.36 Within a month, in August 2010, Gates appeared on various news outlets and stated he would
recommend to the President that JFCOM should
be dissolved. By January 6, 2011, the new UCP was
signed by President Barak Obama, and the decision
was finalized.
It is interesting that Punaro would be the person
leading the charge to sink JFCOM. He spent 24 years
as a congressional staffer to Senator Nunn (D) where
he was neck-deep in the fight to gain the votes necessary within the Armed Services Committee to approve the Goldwater-Nichols Act. His actions earned
him condemnation from members of his own service
in the Pentagon for supporting the bill.37 From 1994 to
1997, Punaro served on the General Officer’s Steering
Committee for the CINC, USACOM. It would appear
he was one of those in Washington responsible for the
creation of JFCOM, a loyal proponent for the joint advocacy Powell envisioned in the early-1990s. Thirteen
years later, he had completely reversed his position
with regards to the command.
A possible explanation could lie with the largest
exercise ever executed in American history—MILLE59

NIUM CHALLENGE 2002—a massive undertaking
meant to test joint concepts devised by JFCOM. It was
both an exercise and an experiment, incorporating
computer simulations and field exercises to create a
joint operation focused on the situation in the Middle
East to test initiatives based upon Revolution in Military Affairs tenets, particularly the concept of EffectsBased Operations.38 MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE
2002 took 2 years to plan, involved 13,500 personnel
on 26 different installations and cost the taxpayer
$250 million.39
While a spokesman from USJFCOM claimed the
experiment was a success, and the concepts tested
were sufficiently validated for acceptance as doctrine
by the DoD, a senior-ranking member of the exercise publicly denounced this assertion. Retired Marine Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper (U.S. Marine
Corps [USMC]) was hired as a contractor to play the
part of the opposing force (OPFOR) commander. For
the first 3 days of the 3-week-long exercise, Van Riper
was allowed to determine all of his actions relatively
unfettered. He exploited over-reliance on technology
by the U.S. forces to sink much of the naval force arrayed against him and caused those running the experiment to re-set the simulation. Van Riper stated in
news articles in the months following the exercise that
he decided to quit as the OPFOR commander when it
became clear he would be required to follow a very restrictive script that would allow the U.S. forces to win
the game. He claimed the concepts failed testing or
were not properly vetted, and he would not allow his
name to be attached to their validation and use by the
armed forces. He made further assertions that he had
witnessed the same absence of intellectual integrity in
a previous exercise, Unified Vision 2001, an exercise
also devised by USJFCOM.40
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While there is no proof that Van Riper spoke with
Punaro privately about his concerns, it is probable that
they have known each other since the Vietnam War.41
Regardless, it appears USJFCOM had suffered a serious setback with the public and costly embarrassment
following MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 that
could have changed Punaro’s position regarding the
relevance of the command. Furthermore, throughout
the first decade of the 21st century, the command wedded itself to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
vision of Transformation, a model based on tenets
of a so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. These
tenets have since been largely discredited in many
circles of the military and do not seem to mesh well
with Secretary Gates’s vision for the future military as
enumerated in his recent comments at the various service academies.42 Combined with a prolonged war, a
growing debate over the federal deficit, and an overall
acceptance by the services of a joint ethos, USJFCOM’s
adherence to Transformation concepts provided its
critics with an opportunity to torpedo the command.
Whether through success or irrelevance, the niche USJFCOM created for itself has disappeared.
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CHAPTER 4
ORGANIZATIONAL INSECURITY AND THE
CREATION OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
James C. Harbridge
INTRODUCTION
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has its
origins in the turbulent social and political events of
the 1970s in the Middle East. These events fundamentally altered the base upon which American foreign
and military policy rested. In response, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was created. The
creation of the RDJTF caused much interservice and
intraservice conflict, which hampered its effectiveness. In the early-1980s, RDJTF was reconstituted as
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), a permanent
unified command with regional responsibility. The
basic culture and organizational structure, however,
did not change, and this stability presented significant
challenges to an organization that consistently felt the
need to prove itself. Thus, the culture of insecurity
and justification that existed within RDJTF persisted
in USCENTCOM. Indeed, the culture persists to this
day and affects operations and command culture.
At midnight on January 1, 1983, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston assumed command
of USCENTCOM, located at MacDill Air Force Base in
Tampa, FL. The unusual timing resulted from the fact
that this was not a change of command; it was, rather, the assumption of command of an “entirely new”
unified command. In reality, USCENTCOM was organizationally the same on that New Year’s morning
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as it had been when it was the RDJTF on New Year’s
Eve. This fact was not lost on any of the Commanders
in Chief (CINCs) of the other unified commands—of
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Atlantic
Command (USLANTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)—nor was it lost on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) and its staff, or indeed, the commander
and staff of USCENTCOM itself.
The creation of USCENTCOM as one of five geographically oriented major commands marked the
culmination of an organized 3-year plan within the
Department of Defense (DoD). This plan aimed at addressing the unpreparedness of the United States to
deal with the geopolitical realities of Southwest Asia
that became apparent in the 1970s. Ultimately, rivalries both among the four services and within individual services played a major role in the final plans for
USCENTCOM. Additionally, the structure of both the
RDJTF and USCENTCOM played an important part
in shaping the culture of the new unified command.
This fact is readily apparent in the “culture of justification” that shaped commanders’ interactions with
their higher and peer organizations.1 It also affected
the focus of the new command.
BACKGROUND
The strategic importance of Southwest Asia has
been recognized by the United States for decades. Unhindered access to the region’s petroleum reserves has
been a long-term U.S. strategic goal through a succession of Presidential administrations. These administrations relied on the “Twin Pillars” of the Shah of Iran
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to keep the region
relatively stable.2 The turbulent events of the 1970s
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fundamentally changed the foundation on which
American policy was based, and propelled the region
into the spotlight of continual presidential concern.
As the United States ascended to superpower status following World War II, in competition with the
Soviet Union, the Middle East—along with policy
for other regions of the world—came to be viewed
through the lens of the Cold War. As such, the U.S.
strategic focus in the region was on “denying turf and
access to oil” to the Soviet Union.3 In addition to DoD
assets, the area was a major focus for the State Department, intelligence agencies, and many other executive
agencies. Despite this history, no single command
was assigned ultimate responsibility for synchronizing and directing operations or setting strategic objectives for the region. Indeed, the Middle East, broadly
understood, was the responsibility of several different commands, including USEUCOM, USPACCOM,
and USLANTCOM; all had responsibility for various
portions of the region.4
This arrangement, while not perfect, was satisfactory until the 1970s when events in the region fundamentally changed the situation. Before, when the region was relatively stable, Southwest Asia was seen
as an economy of force mission for the DoD, resulting
in a collective American effort in the region that was
uneven and uncoordinated. This arrangement was acceptable at the time because under the Richard Nixon
Doctrine, the United States called for her allies to take
an active part in countering threats in the region.5
Throughout the 1970s, however, events in the “crescent of crisis” began to worry observers throughout
the government. In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, the JCS looked to new solutions for the region,
proposing a “mobile task force” to respond to such
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crises, but the idea never gained any traction among
decisionmakers.6
The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 fundamentally changed how the United States viewed the
Middle East and led to recognition at the highest levels of the need for a unified way to deal with threats
to American interests in the region. Additionally, the
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union on December 26, 1979, made the prospect of Soviet troops in
oil-rich Iran plausible. As a result of this rapid change
in the strategic balance in the region, President Jimmy Carter announced what came to be known as the
“Carter Doctrine” during his final State of the Union
address in 1980. The Carter Doctrine stated that the oil
fields of the Persian Gulf Region were “of vital interest to the United States, and that any outside attempt
to gain control in the area would be ‘repelled by use
of any means necessary, including military force.’”7
Subsequent to this announcement, the RDJTF was established at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Tampa, FL,
on March 1, 1980.8
RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE
The establishment of the RDJTF at MacDill AFB
seems somewhat mystifying. Why would a Joint Task
Force (JTF) with responsibility to react to crises in the
Middle East have its headquarters in Florida? The answer lies not in the pleasant climate of Florida’s West
Coast, but in the original mission of the RDJTF that
contributed to much of the organizational paranoia
that has colored most of its existence and also that of
its successor, USCENTCOM.

68

By design, a JTF is a temporary headquarters that
is assembled for a finite period of time to deal with a
specific situation. It is not a permanent organization
and, by definition, is focused on the operational level
of war. The result, in real terms, is that JTFs do not
have organic troops or units. Instead, JTFs are essentially staff organizations that coordinate the efforts
of component units from other commands and must
communicate with the national command authority
through their higher headquarters. The problem in the
early days of the RDJTF was that it was designed to
counter any contingency. As such, it was rather unfocused except for the mandate that it be able to deploy
multiple division-sized elements to react to contingencies. The JCS came to the conclusion that the only
command able to provide and transport the necessary
forces was the U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM), that was based at MacDill AFB. Even with this
particular issue resolved, support for the establishment of the RDJTF was far from unanimous. There
was much debate within the JCS and Congress about
which service should have primacy within the RDJTF.
Several alternatives were proposed.9 This interservice
rivalry was a theme that continued even after the RDJTF was formally established under USREDCOM.
The first Commander of the Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force (COMRDJTF) was Marine Lieutenant
General Paul X. Kelley. He was a well-respected officer who would later become the 28th Commandant of
the Marine Corps.10 He immediately conducted a series of command post exercises. These exercises demonstrated some practical problems with the current
command arrangement. In addition to demonstrating some of the limits of the RDJTF structure, it also
fueled Kelly’s frustration with the CINC of USREDCOM, U.S. Army General Volney F. Warner.
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The relationship between General Warner and his
subordinate, Lieutenant General Kelley, was strained
from the beginning and only worsened the longer
they worked together. The relationship between the
two men eventually deteriorated to the point of “personal animosity.”11 The relationship was strained for
several reasons. First, Warner had advocated the return of responsibility for the Middle East to USREDCOM because in its former incarnation as U.S. Strike
Command (USSTRIKECOM), it had been responsible
for the region. Additionally, Warner also viewed correctly the RDJTF as a subordinate element of his command. Both of these views conflicted with the role that
Kelley envisioned for the RDJTF. Kelley was particularly frustrated because he was not authorized to communicate directly with the JCS and the Secretary of
Defense, independently of the CINC of USREDCOM,
on matters relating to the RDJTF.12
The fact that Kelley was a Marine also adversely
affected the relationship between the two commanders, especially because the competing versions of the
proposed structure for the RDJTF gave primacy within the organization to different services. At the time,
the proposal that seemed to have the most serious
chance of implementation was the one that gave the
Marine Corps primacy. Warner later recalled, “Unfortunately, we were both caught up in the service argument as to whether it should be a premier Army
or Marine force.”13 The personal conflict between the
two commanders eventually affected the members
of their staffs. The environment at MacDill AFB was
tense and confrontational, as the two units assumed
the personality of their respective commanders. The
situation got so bad that newspapers began to report
on the animosity.
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Then in April 1981, looking to overcome some of
the issues that had plagued the RDJTF, the Secretary
of Defense requested that the JCS formulate a plan to
move responsibility for the Middle East from the JTF
to a “separate unified command.14 In response, the
JCS established a three-phased plan for gradual transition over an 18-month period. In phase one, RDJTF
remained subordinate to USREDCOM as component
headquarters for the other services that were placed
under operational control of COMRDJTF. During this
time, Kelley was replaced by U.S. Army Lieutenant
General Robert Kingston on July 17, 1981. Phase two
would be concluded when RDJTF was removed from
USREDCOM and activated as a separate command on
October 1, 1981.15 Phase three would conclude with the
disestablishment of the RDJTF on December 31, 1982,
and the establishment of USCENTCOM on January 1,
1983.16 Kingston would then become commander of
USCENTCOM.
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
A new name and upgraded status as a unified command did little to change the culture of justification
that had permeated the RDJTF from its inception. The
difference was that now the focus was to justify itself
as a unified command on equal footing with the other
unified commands. Despite claims to the contrary,
the structure of USCENTCOM looked essentially the
same on New Year’s Day, 1983 as it had as RDJTF the
previous evening. This fundamental stability made it
easy for old habits, especially the focus of the operational level of war, to remain in the new strategic-level
command, which had long-lasting effects on how USCENTCOM operated, and, some say, continues to operate even today.
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When the RDJTF was disestablished and USCENTCOM was created with the same commander,
it created a unique situation. Kingston had been the
commander of a JTF, which was a three-star billet, but
the job of commander of USCENTCOM was a fourstar billet, putting Kingston in the unenviable position
of being outranked by his peer CINCs. Undoubtedly,
this situation did not go unnoticed by the other CINCs
and the JCS. There is some indication that USCENTCOM was viewed by others as just the RDJTF with
a new name.17 USCENTCOM’s official history states
that “General Kingston’s task as first Commander in
Chief, United States Central Command . . . was to establish the command’s bona fides as a unified command
and as a credible force” and that “General Kingston
championed the idea that USCENTCOM was a fullfledged unified command in exactly the same sense as
the others.”18 Kingston was not promoted to General
until November 6, 1984, a full 23 months after assuming command of USCENTCOM.19 It is certainly reasonable to assume that his insecurity at his inferior
rank was translated to his staff and manifested itself
as organizational insecurity in regards to other unified
commands.
In his effort to be seen as equal to the other unified
commands and not just a renamed RDJTF, Kingston
made significant structural changes, most of which
were positive for the organization. He demanded that
his command be assigned “actual component forces
from the Services” and not “notional forces” as he
had been assigned as COMRDJTF. He also eventually
secured control of security assistance operations in
the region from USEUCOM. This was extremely important because it was an important tool for strategic
economic relations. Finally, he also assumed respon-
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sibility, from United States Air Forces in Europe of
Airborne Warning and Control Systems.20
Despite all of the gains made by Kingston, when
Marine General George B. Crist assumed command
on November 27, 1985, he said:
USCENTCOM was a unified command in name only
. . . an RDJT whose sole purpose was to go to Iran and
wage World War III against the Russians in a conflict
restricted solely in our theater of operations.21

To counter this perception, Crist scrapped the
operations plan for defending Iran against a Soviet
invasion and put special emphasis on diplomacy in
the region. He tried to convince others, and even went
so far as to issue an order to his staff to start using
the term “Arabian Gulf” to refer to the body of water
commonly known as the Persian Gulf, out of consideration for the majority of the Arabian population in the
region.22 Despite his efforts, old habits die hard, and
USCENTCOM was sucked down to the operational
level of war in 1987 when USCENTCOM Naval forces
began escorting reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers in Operation EARNEST WILL, as well as a series of other
incidents involving Iran.
The operational focus and culture of justification,
left from the days of the RDJTF, can even be seen in
U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s direction of Operation DESERT SHIELD and Operation
DESERT STORM. Doctrinally, it would have been
appropriate to assign a subordinate combined JTF
to conduct these operations. This would have freed
Schwarzkopf and his staff to remain focused on the
strategic implications of the operations. Instead, he
moved his headquarters forward to Saudi Arabia and
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directed the fight himself, then quickly returned his
staff to MacDill AFB when the fighting was over. Because of this strict operational focus, he gave limited
thought to the long-term effects of the operations on
the region. Subsequent commanders of USCENTCOM
have continued to follow this model. In fact, General
Tommy Franks seems to have modeled his conduct of
CENTCOM’s response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, almost exactly as Schwarzkopf’s. This
model can be somewhat effective for short durations,
but when the conflict becomes a long-term one, the
model is less effective.23 The commander and his staff
become lost in the minutiae of operations (instead of
leaving such matters to local commanders and thus
remaining one level removed) and focused on setting
conditions for long-term success in the region.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental change in the security situation in
the Middle East in the 1970s caused the United States
to have to come to grips with the fact that American
national interests in the region were not being fully
supported by the current military command. As a result, Carter created the RDJTF to try to create an organized way to respond to emergencies in the region. It
became apparent quickly that inter- and intraservice
rivalries, personal rivalries, and the temporary nature
of a JTF made it difficult for the RDJTF to accomplish
its mission. As a result, the creation of USCENTCOM
was an organized and well-planned gradual process.
It was designed to address the shortcomings of the JTF
structure and provide a stable strategic headquarters
to plan and direct U.S. efforts in the region. Unfortunately, the organizational culture of operational focus

74

and the culture of justification that was central to the
RDJTF remained at USCENTCOM and have affected
how the command conducts operations to this day.
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CHAPTER 5
OVERCOMING INERTIA THROUGH
SIMULATION: U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
Gail E. S. Yoshitani
This essay was directly adapted from a master’s thesis written
by the author for Duke University, Durham, NC, and completed
in 2001. While large portions of this work are directly taken from
that thesis, for ease of reading, they are not so marked. The full
thesis is available from Defense Technical Information Center,
www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA412949.

INTRODUCTION
The military leaders serving on the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) in the late-1970s understood that the nation’s ability to quickly and decisively relocate forces
and material was a linchpin in the nation’s defensive
strategy of deterrence. To that end, they understood
the importance of responsiveness in the nation’s
military transportation system to the direction of the
National Command Authority (NCA). They demonstrated that understanding by undertaking a study to
identify and evaluate which system of military command and control would ensure the best responsiveness to the direction of the NCA in times of crisis and
war. Nevertheless, in 1977, the Joint Chiefs chose to
retain a flawed transportation system because considerations, organizational power structures and relationships, and other bureaucratic concerns—rather
than warfighting—focused their decisionmaking. The
primary reason those bureaucratic issues were able to
drive decisionmaking was that they were more famil-
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iar and tangible to military leaders than warfighting
concerns that remained quite intangible and difficult
to conceptualize. In 1978, a computer simulation,
code-named NIFTY NUGGET, led the Joint Chiefs to
change course and create a new coordinating authority for mobilization deployment planning, the Joint
Deployment Agency (JDA), which was a forerunner
to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This chapter demonstrates that the
power of simulation exercises stem from their ability
to provide an impetus for positive change by enabling
military leaders to realistically confront their systems
of operation and make decisions for improvement
based on what is best for warfighting.
The years between 1978 and 1987 witnessed a
profound transformation of the U.S. ability to project force. At the beginning of this period, the nation’s
method for moving soldiers and equipment consisted
of a patchwork of Army, Navy, and Air Force transportation systems, organized and effective on paper
but disorganized and ineffective in reality. Although
they all fell under the purview of the Department of
Defense (DoD), each service’s transportation system
nonetheless remained divided into separate domains
that were stubbornly isolationist in their dealings with
one another, and only fitfully and infrequently drawn
together as a unified force. However, with the formation of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 1987, these rivalries were superseded by unified imperatives. Charged with providing global air,
sea, and land transportation to meet national security
objectives, the new command placed a single leader
in charge of all three services’ transportation systems,
thus beginning a dramatic conversion from disjointedness into jointness.
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On April 18, 1987, President Ronald Reagan signed
the order that directed Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger to establish USTRANSCOM. The order
represented victory for some and defeat for others, for
all attempts to unify DoD transportation functions had
met with resistance. This opposition was ultimately
overcome in 1986 by a three pronged assault: the first
came from Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, known as the Packard Commission, that recommended establishing a unified command; the second came from the Goldwater-Nichols
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, that ordered
the Secretary of Defense to consider the creation of a
unified transportation command; and the third came
from Air Force Lieutenant General Alfred G. Hansen,
Joint Staff Director of Logistics, who convinced the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral William J. Crowe, to recommend to the President
the establishment of the unified transportation command over the nonconcurrences of the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and Marine Corps Commandant.
These matters are related in a number of oral histories conducted by Dr. James K. Matthews and Dr. Jay
H. Smith, in their roles as Directors of the USTRANSCOM Research Center.1
While each of the aforementioned efforts served as
important stimuli in prompting the development of
USTRANSCOM, this chapter focuses on an earlier period in time and on a particular stimulus that proved
capable of overcoming enough bureaucratic inertia to
enable the JDA, a forerunner to USTRANSCOM, to be
formed. That stimulus was known as NIFTY NUGGET, a simulation exercise run in October 1978 by the
JCS. Truly, change does not come easily to the DoD;
however, this story demonstrates that simulation can
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help leaders in a large organization, such as the military, change their corporate minds and strike out in
new and uncomfortable directions. The power of simulation exercises such as NIFTY NUGGET stems from
their ability to enable military leaders to confront realistically their systems of operation and make decisions
about what is best for warfighting, thus providing an
impetus for positive change.
NIFTY NUGGET 78
According to a JCS memorandum, NIFTY NUGGET 78 was designed to “test Service and joint plans
and procedures during full mobilization and initial
deployment processes.”2 The operation itself was 3
weeks long, running from October 10 to October 31,
1978. Participants, representing 52 different DoD and
Federal Civil Departments and Agencies, reacted to
computer-generated scenarios just as they would during actual mobilization and deployment for war.3 NIFTY NUGGET was the first time in the nation’s history
that an exercise of such magnitude and specific focus
was attempted. The baseline scenario for the exercise
was a fast-breaking attack by Warsaw Pact forces on
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in
Europe, a contingency that leaders in the DoD considered one of the least likely, but most dangerous, of
Cold War scenarios.4 The exercise synopsis accurately
reflected the heart of all American defense planning
during the Cold War: the defense of Western Europe.
Exercise participants quickly discovered significant problems in mobilizing, deploying, and
sustaining American military forces. While Soviet
forces marched through one European country after
another, U.S. military leaders encountered severe dif-

82

ficulties transporting combat soldiers, supplies, and
equipment to Europe. Some units were flown into
the combat zone without all their personnel because
they had been left behind by the Air Force. Such units
were forced to fight shorthanded, some for as long as
4 days, before the Air Force finished transporting the
14,304 bypassed soldiers.5 One account of the simulation exercise suggests that close to 400,000 American
Soldiers in the theater of operations “died” because
they failed to receive needed supplies.6 None of the
services was blameless. The military transportation
system of planes, ships, trucks, and trains to support
military defensive plans in Europe had proven unable
to carry out its mission.
Fortunately for the nation, the Soviet attack and
failed response took place only in the processors of
a DoD computer. Instead of a disaster for the United States and its NATO allies, the simulation was a
profound and ominous warning that the nation was
wholly unprepared to defend Europe, largely because
there was no single manager to oversee the mobilization and deployment of forces.
While the JCS planned NIFTY NUGGET to be an
exercise primarily focused on mobilization, the problems of deployment and defense department transportation operations soon overshadowed the design.
An analysis report from the joint staff on the exercise
confirms that “a shift in exercise focus from mobilization to deployment seemed to occur.”7 The sheer
volume of reports detailing problems in the deployment phase of the exercise indicates that a large number of participants viewed this as very important and
helped to pinpoint numerous defense transportation
shortcomings. Interest in this aspect of the exercise
is unsurprising given that the military’s ability to
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quickly and decisively relocate forces and material
was a linchpin in the nation’s defensive strategy of deterrence. Frighteningly, NIFTY NUGGET made that
linchpin appear very suspect. By definition, a linchpin is a “central and cohesive element,” but in 1978,
while many government leaders might assert that the
nation’s defense transportation system was central to
securing national security interests, one would have
had difficulty finding leaders who would declare the
system cohesive.8
The Problem: “The Single Manager Plan.”
During the NIFTY NUGGET exercise, participants
relied upon a military transportation system that had
been in place with very little change since it was first
developed in 1955 by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Although it was a system designed
to minimize inefficiencies across the three services’
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) transportation systems, it
also was meant to maintain peace between the services. Ironically, the plan that won approval in 1955 was
called the “Single Manager Plan,” so named because it
placed each service in charge as the “single manager”
of transportation assets in its area of expertise, but
this effectively produced multiple “single managers.”
Although the Secretary of Defense was responsible
for the overall management of defense transportation
issues, he delegated that responsibility to his three
service secretaries. In turn, each service Secretary further delegated responsibility to an executive agent
of a Transportation Operating Agency (TOA).9 For
the Army, the executive agent was the Commander
of Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC);
for the Navy, the Commander of Military Sealift Command (MSC); and for the Air Force, the Commander
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of Military Airlift Command (MAC). Respectively,
each TOA was assigned responsibility of its service’s
general area of expertise: MTMC was designated the
single manager for military traffic, land transportation, and common-user ocean terminals; MSC was
the single manager in charge of common-user sealift; and MAC was the single manager in charge of
airlift services.
Although the breakdown of responsibility seemed
straightforward, the command relationships established under the Single Manager Plan for each TOA
were far from simple. Each TOA was technically commanded by its parent service, but its single manager
status made it ultimately responsible to the DoD as
a whole. Consequently, each TOA received guidance
from both its service secretary and from the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) (OASD MRA&L). MAC’s
designation as a specified command on February 1,
1977, added yet another direct link within its command structure to the JCS. Additionally, MTMC’s
designation as traffic manager for the DoD produced
a very peculiar relationship for that organization
with other services. In its capacity as traffic manager,
MTMC was charged with overseeing and evaluating
the entire DoD transportation system that awkwardly
included inspecting areas within the other services’
jurisdiction. Finally, each TOA relied on numerous
connections with civilian organizations outside of the
DoD to ultimately determine its success or failure.10
In 1979, the OASD MRA&L contracted the Harbridge House, a think tank headquartered in Boston,
MA, to analyze the “functional and organizational
interrelationships of the three transportation operating agencies.”11 When the Harbridge House published
its findings, it described the defense transportation
85

system as “characterized by splintered responsibilities and initiatives, fractionated and incompatible
systems, and divided loyalties and interests.”12 The
report further emphasized that:
such disparity of interests is evident in entrenched parochialism, inadequate and incorrect documentation,
inefficient and duplicative procedures, added costs,
and a limited ability to respond to national command
authorities.13

Remarkably, this same system managed, in spite
of such shortcomings, to function under peacetime
conditions. Nevertheless, the problems caused by the
complexity of relationships born from the Single Manager Plan developed in 1955 were clearly revealed
during the military scenarios executed during NIFTY
NUGGET.
The deployment management problems identified
during NIFTY NUGGET seemed to stem from a single
root cause—the absence of a single manager for mobilization and deployment. This conclusion was not lost
on the Senior Observer Group tasked with evaluating
the exercise; it was immediately clear to them that issues of command and control were negatively affecting the overall efficacy of the defense transportation
system. Thus very early in the exercise, they recommended to CJCS General David C. Jones that he “designate one headquarters or agency responsible for all
deployments.”14 The observers advised the Chairman
that such an agency should be responsible for managing all overseas movements, maintaining the databases that support such movements, and coordinating
deployment activities between the Joint Staff, commands, and separate TOAs.15
Remarkably, a first version of the new terms for an
agency to serve as the single manager for deployment
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planning was forwarded to the JCS by November 17,
1978, just 17 days after the conclusion of the NIFTY
NUGGET exercise. General John J. Hennessey, Commander of the United States Readiness Command
(USREDCOM), was assigned the task of overseeing
the creation of the new agency. Hennessey’s final plan
for the new agency incorporated general recommendations from each service’s transportation management agency and comments from the supported unified and specified commanders. By March 27, 1979,
the JCS had approved the terms creating the JDA, and
on May 1, 1979, the organization was officially established.16 Its mission was to serve as the Joint Chiefs’
coordinating authority for mobilization deployment
planning.17 The JDA was located at MacDill Air Force
Base in Tampa, FL, along with the USREDCOM.18
Developing the JDA moved the Joint Staff in a new
and uncomfortable direction; it was unprecedented
for combatant forces to be placed under the direction
of an agency and not a command.19 The military chain
of command ran from the President to the Secretary
of Defense to the unified and specified commanders.
Neither the military departments nor the JCS were included in that chain of command. The military departments were responsible for training and supplying
the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who were
assigned to the unified and specified commanders,
while the JCS served as military staff and advisors to
the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the initial terms developed for the JDA made it
only a coordinating authority. Nevertheless, the JDA’s
initial designation as a coordinating authority should
not be seen as a slight.20 Military leaders had taken a
first step in an uncharted direction by inserting this
new agency into their organizational system.
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The Power of Simulation.
While the establishment of the JDA was an important milestone along the path toward the creation of the
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the
primary reason for looking at the JDA’s formation is
to see how the Joint Chiefs came to conceptualize their
transportation problems and how they established
their willingness to solve those problems by moving
in new directions. Thanks to NIFTY NUGGET, Jones
and the other members of the JCS identified 487 deficiencies that required correction in the nation’s system
of mobilization and deployment for warfare or emergency operations. While not all of those deficiencies
were related to the transportation system, those that
did were identified as significant problems.
The logic and simplicity of the reforms the JCS
implemented in 1978 begs the question: why was such
an agency not created earlier? As it turns out, the Joint
Chiefs had considered just such an agency in June 1977,
just 15 months before the start of NIFTY NUGGET.
At that time, however, the Chiefs elected to maintain
the status quo, concluding that, “no major deficiencies were identified within the current peacetime and
wartime” transportation structure of command and
control and “no further organizational realignments
. . . should be undertaken.”21
Why did the military leaders serving on the JCS,
responsible for ensuring that the nation’s armed forces were prepared to deploy around the world, decide
in 1977 to keep a military transportation system that
proved to be so flawed in 1978? The answer lies in how
the JCS assessed both the existing transportation system, which they chose to retain, and the study alter-
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native that, if selected, would have created an agency
akin to the JDA. The Joint Chiefs’ justification for why
the current transportation system was preferable to
the other study alternatives provides a clear contrast
between how they conceptualized these issues with
and without the benefit of simulation. NIFTY NUGGET was decisive in changing how the JCS conceptualized the issues surrounding defense transportation.
The purpose of the Joint Chiefs’ 1977 study was
to analyze 10 alternative methods for command and
control over the services’ transportation managers. A
cover memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense submitted with the study’s results
explained that the goal of the study was:
to identify and evaluate alternatives which would insure [sic] responsiveness to direction to by the NCA
[National Command Authority] in times of crisis/war
and compatible peacetime economies in procurement,
management, and resource utilization, with consideration given to maintaining an appropriate balance
between unified and Service needs.22

It further specified that the Joint Staff had analyzed
10 alternatives, each in terms of its “responsiveness to
unified direction, command relationships, economy
and efficiencies, operating procedures, Service requirements, funding, and legality.”23 Nevertheless, the
Joint Chiefs specifically pointed out in their memorandum that “crisis and wartime responsiveness to the
NCA was the primary criterion” used in their evaluation process and that “compatible peacetime economies were a secondary criterion.”24
The Joint Chiefs selected the study alternative advocating continuance of the current system. Under that
system, the Air Force’s transportation management
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agency, MAC, was a specified command, while the
other two services’ transportation agencies, the Navy’s MSC and the Army’s MTMC, received direction
from their respective services. MAC was designated
a specified command on February 1, 1977, taking the
agency out from under the command and control of
the Secretary of the Air Force and placing it directly
under control of the JCS during war. This command
relationship enabled it to operate and plan airlift matters directly with the other unified commanders.25
While that arrangement protected MAC from receiving guidance from multiple channels, the other two
services’ transportation managers were still subject to
receiving direction from both their individual services
and from the JCS. It was this system, in which each service’s transportation manager received guidance from
different sources, that ultimately produced many of
the problems encountered during NIFTY NUGGET.
According to the Joint Staff report, MAC was accorded its special command relationship because it
controlled significant “forces in peacetime as well as
wartime,” while the Army and Navy’s transportation managers were viewed basically as “managers of
contractor assets.”26 The report argued that airlift was
more likely to be required on short notice for contingencies and crises than surface lift, the movements by
trucks and rail contracted by the Army and by ships
contracted by the Navy.27 Nonetheless, the evaluators
did note that sealift carried 90 percent of the supplies
delivered to U.S. forces in both the Korean and Vietnam wars. Furthermore, although Army and Navy
transportation managers relied on contracting civilian
assets for movements, they still played a large role in
the success of transportation of soldiers and equipment. After all, it was the Army that was ultimately
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responsible for the arrival of all soldiers and equipment at the air or sea point of embarkation and the
overseas ports of debarkation.28
Interestingly, the Joint Chiefs did note in their findings that the one disadvantage of selecting to maintain
the status quo was that it did not enhance responsiveness of the MTMC or the MSC to unified direction or
coordination.29 Although the purpose of the study
was to identify a system of command and control that
would ensure responsiveness to the direction of the
NCA over the services’ transportation managers, this
disadvantage did not weigh heavily against maintaining the status quo. The Joint Chiefs reconciled
this conflict by explaining, in a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense, that while responsiveness to the
NCA might be improved by establishing a direct organizational relationship to the JCS, no major deficiencies had been uncovered in the current organizational
structure to warrant such realignment. They reasoned
further that “unless an in-depth cost-benefit analysis
indicated significant projected long-range saving”
no further organizational realignments needed to be
undertaken.30
The following points can be made with the knowledge that a mere 15 months later during NIFTY NUGGET, significant problems were uncovered. There is
little question that the Joint Chiefs believed that the
military transportation system needed to be responsive to the NCA, a point emphasized numerous times
throughout their 1977 study results. However, there is
a question as to whether they had an accurate conception of this relationship before their NIFTY NUGGET
experience. Examining the Joint Chiefs’ criticisms
of the study alternative that would have created an
agency similar to the JDA provides a look at how
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they conceptualized transportation issues without the
benefit of simulation.
Under this particular study alternative, all three
services’ transportation managers, even the MAC,
would be responsive to a transportation agency that
would report to the Secretary of Defense through the
JCS.31 The Joint Chiefs cited five specific disadvantages to this alternative.
1. The Joint Chiefs did not like the idea of adding
an additional organizational element into the chain of
command between the Joint Chiefs and the transportation managers.
2. The Joint Chiefs were against the idea of removing the military department secretaries from their
historical role as single managers over their service’s
transportation assets.
3. While the Joint Chiefs agreed that having one
single manager for transportation did seem advantageous under this organizational structure, the additional headquarters would require increased manning
without decreasing any manning requirements at the
service levels.
4. This plan would place the JCS between the Secretary of Defense and the service transportation agencies, a role to which they were unaccustomed.
5. The Joint Chiefs were wary of making the unprecedented move to place combatant forces under
the direction of an agency and not a service.32
Clearly, NIFTY NUGGET revealed those five
concerns to be less consequential than the need for
coordination. Yet, in 1977, the JCS did not have the
benefit of that experience to guide their thinking and
conceptualization of these transportation issues. Some
will argue, nevertheless, that as senior military lead-
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ers responsible for ensuring that the nation’s armed
forces are prepared to deploy around the world, they
ought to have been able to envision such problems
without a simulation exercise. Such arguments, however, do not change the fact that for some reason, in
1977 the leaders serving on the Joint Staff, although
stating that warfighting was their primary criterion,
placed a much greater focus on bureaucratic concerns.
Economic considerations, political agendas, and organizational power structures and relationships ruled
the day. Then, for at least a short time in 1978, this
bureaucratic noise was muted by the NIFTY NUGGET simulation exercise that demonstrated to military
leaders in a stark and frighteningly realistic way the
strengths and weaknesses of their current system of
operations. When forced to confront these problems
head on, warfighting concerns moved to the forefront
and bureaucratic concerns became simply hurdles
to overcome.
It may be also argued that the Joint Chiefs based
their decision for the status quo upon a desire to satisfy internal political objectives. In other words, they
recognized that maintaining the status quo was not
the best alternative but accepted it to avoid organizational strife. Interservice rivalry should always be
taken into consideration when examining and assessing military decisions and activities, for no service
wants to relinquish dollars, responsibility, or authority to another. Historically, many fierce battles have
been waged between the three services over such issues. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter,
the transportation system as it stood in 1977 was one
that had been pieced together by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1955 to maintain peace
between the services by splitting responsibilities for
transportation between all of them.
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This chapter asks readers to accept several judgments: first, that the leaders serving on the JCS in 1977
recognized the importance of the nation’s military
transportation system’s responsiveness to the direction of the NCA; second, that even though those leaders recognized that their current system of command
and control did not optimize service responsiveness,
they still considered it to be the best in meeting all
considerations; and last, that the primary reason military leaders retained the status quo stemmed from
their inability to accurately conceptualize warfighting issues that left bureaucratic issues to drive their
decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
The military leaders serving on the JCS in 1977
understood the importance for the nation’s military
transportation system to be responsive to the direction
of the NCA. They demonstrated this understanding
not only by undertaking a study to identify and evaluate which system of military command and control
would ensure the best responsiveness to the direction
of the NCA in times of crisis and war, but also by their
statements made throughout that study regarding the
importance of responsiveness.
In their study, they determined that their current
system of command and control, while not maximizing all services’ responsiveness to the NCA, was still
the best option of those considered. They disregarded
one alternative that would have created an agency
similar to the JDA, citing concerns over adding an additional organizational element into the chain of command, removing military department secretaries from
their role as managers over their services’ transporta-
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tion assets, adding a requirement for more manpower,
positioning the Joint Staff in between the Secretary of
Defense and service transportation agencies, and placing combatant forces under the direction of an agency
and not a service.
NIFTY NUGGET identified serious deficiencies in
the military transportation system that the Joint Chiefs
were relying upon to carry out the security strategy of
the nation, one that relied heavily upon conventional
forces being able to rapidly deploy around the world.
Once those shortcomings were identified, the Joint
Chiefs immediately set out to implement changes in
their operating system.
This chapter has argued that the Joint Chiefs retained a flawed transportation system in 1977 because economic considerations, organizational power
structures and relationships, and other bureaucratic
concerns focused their decisionmaking rather than
warfighting concerns. The primary reason those bureaucratic issues were able to drive decisionmaking
was that they were more familiar and tangible to
military leaders than warfighting concerns, which remained quite intangible and difficult to conceptualize.
NIFTY NUGGET led the Joint Chiefs to change course
and create a new coordinating authority for mobilization deployment planning, the JDA, which was a
forerunner to USTRANSCOM. This chapter shows
that the power of simulation exercises stem from their
ability to provide an impetus for positive change by
enabling military leaders to realistically confront their
systems of operation and make decisions for improvement based on what is best for warfighting.

95

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. For instance, see Dr. James K. Matthews, General Alfred G.
Hansen, United States Air Force (Retired): Establishment of the United
States Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base (AFB), IL: USTRANSCOM, March 1999; Dr. Jay H. Smith and Margaret J. Nigra, eds., Reflecting on the Origins of the United States Transportation
Command: A Panel Discussion, Scott Air Force Base, IL: USTRANSCOM, October 4, 2007; Dr. Jay H. Smith, Lieutenant General Edward
Honor, Establishment and Evolution of the United States Transportation Command, Scott AFB, IL: USTRANSCOM, August 2006.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum (JSCM)-465-77, dated
January 10, 1978, sent to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 (U), Scott AFB, IL: USTRANSCOM Research Center, p. 1. The research center holds all USTRANSCOM
archival material as well as the retired historical reports and archives from the JDA, 1979-87. The archive will be abbreviated as
TCRC. Note that not all sources will have a file and record number because some have come from the archive’s library and safes.
This particular memorandum also provided a brief history of the
origins of the exercise. The memorandum states that a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, December 23, 1976, “Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance,” directed the JCS
and the Services to make plans for an “extensive testing of the
full mobilization process.” By August 1977, the Office of the JCS
informed the chiefs of the services and the commanders of the
unified and specified commands that a joint mobilization exercise would be run in October 1978. The concept and objectives for
Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 were published as an attachment to
JCSM-465-77.
3. Detailed Analysis Report Exercise Nifty Nugget 78 (U), April
11, 1979, prepared by Operations and Exercise Analysis Branch,
Exercise Plans and Analysis Division, Operations Directorate (J3), OJCS. “Executive Summary,” EX-1, TCRC. The TCRC archive
also has an extensive collection of documents on NIFTY NUGGET. Henceforth this particular source document will be abbreviated in the following manner Nifty Nugget 78 (U).
4. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report,
Fiscal Year 1979, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1978, p. 78.
96

5. Nifty Nugget 78 (U), “Executive Summary,” EX-11; Nifty
Nugget 78 (U), Section III-Deployment Processes, pp. III-24, III-26,
III-27.
6. James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much,
So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic
Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Scott AFB, IL:
Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and Research Center, USTRANSCOM, 1996, p. 1.
7. Nifty Nugget 78 (U), Section III-Deployment Processes,
p. III-16.
8. The American Heritage Dictionary: Second College Edition, s.v.
“Linchpin.”
9. Historical Background: Military Traffic Management Command,
Washington DC: Military Traffic Management Command, 1985,
p. 13, TCRC.
10. Harbridge House, A Study of DoD Organization for Transportation and Traffic Management, Boston, MA: Harbridge House,
1980, p. III-2, file 32.A-6-A, RG 32, TCRC. Narrative is drawn
heavily from this source.
11. Ibid., p. I-1.
12. Ibid., p. III-17.
13. Ibid.
14. Nifty Nugget 78 (U), Section III-Deployment Processes,
p. III-9.
15. Ibid.
16. Joint Deployment Agency History (U) 1979, p. 1, TCRC.
17. The organization’s official history explains that “the term
‘mobilization deployment planning’ means the act of using authorized systems and measures for planning, coordinating, and
monitoring movements and deployments of mobilized forces and
material necessary to meet military objectives.” See ibid.
97

18. In September 1977, President Carter requested that the
Secretary of Defense conduct a review of the National Military
Command Structure. That study recommended that the USREDCOM “be designated as the focal point for the coordination of
the day-to-day aspects of mobilization/deployment planning of
all CINCs, particularly as they pertain to lift requirements and
detailed follow-through during major reinforcements.” See The
National Military Command Structure: Report of a Study Requested by
the President and conducted in the Department of Defense, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 20-21.
19. JCSM-264-77, “Appendix: Report on the Analysis of Alternatives for Control of the Military Airlift Command, The Military
Sealift Command, and the Military Traffic Management Command,”, file 32-A-3-A, RG 32, p. 33, TCRC.
20. Joint Deployment Agency History (U) 1981, Vol. II, TCRC.
In October 1981, the agency was given new terms increasing its
power and authority.
21. JCSM-264-77, dated June 15, 1977, “Appendix,” file 32-A3-A, RG 32, p. 12, TCRC.
22. JCSM-264-77, file 32-A-3-A, RG 32, p. 1, TCRC.
23. Ibid.
24. JCSM-264-77, “Appendix,” file 32-A-3-A, RG 32, p. 2,
TCRC.
25. Ibid., pp. 13-16.
26. Ibid., p. 11.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 15.
30. JCSM-264-77, file 32-A-3-A, RG 32, p. 2, TCRC.

98

31. JCSM-264-77, “Appendix,” file 32-A-3-A, RG 32, p. 5,
TCRC.
32. Ibid., pp. 32-35.

99

CHAPTER 6
COMMANDING THE FINAL FRONTIER:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED
SPACE COMMAND
Samuel P. N. Cook
INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) circulated a memorandum to service chiefs asking for their
opinion regarding the creation of a unified space command (U.S. Space Command [SPACECOM]). The
chiefs uniformly rejected the proposal and argued
against “militarizing” space. Yet the chief opponent of
a unified space command at the time, the Air Force,
soon became its biggest advocate and took the lead in
establishing an Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
that would serve as the centerpiece for SPACECOM
that was formed when President Ronald Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The
story of the establishment of the SPACECOM presents a cautionary tale about the pitfalls of establishing a military architecture in a theater or technological
space in which none has existed before. This chapter
describes the formation of SPACECOM, focusing
on its decisions on the best way to support national
defense and avoiding the adverse effects of appealing to narrow service interests during its critical
formative period.
In 1974, commander of the U.S. Air Force Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) General Lucius
D. Clay, Jr., wrote a letter to the Chairman of the JCS
(CJCS) advocating the creation of a “Space Com-
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mand.” The CJCS, General David C. Jones, took this
recommendation and wrote a letter to the head of each
of the military branches and asked them to provide
their opinions on the creation of such a command.
The responses from the Chiefs presented a uniformly
skeptical response to the idea of turning space into a
military field of operations. The Air Force leadership
especially opposed the formation of such a command
because it was already the funding component for
space and did not want to divert resources away from
its primary mission of achieving strategic and tactical
air superiority. The Chiefs were hesitant to divert time
and resources to the potentially expansive project of
developing space into a military theater of operations,
especially given their current focus on disengaging
from Vietnam and an increasing fear of the potential
for Soviet space-based anti-missile capabilities. Just
over 10 years later, on September 23, 1985, CJCS General John W. Vessey, Jr., presided over the formation
of an organization that would, in fact, establish space
as a theater of war: SPACECOM at Peterson Air Force
Base (AFB) in Colorado. In his remarks, he stated that
the new Space Command, “is not a force built to escalate the arms race. . . . The command will make its
contribution to that fundamental element of United
States strategy, the prevention of war.”1
Less than 10 years after it had uniformly rejected
the idea of making space into a theater of operations,
the Department of Defense (DoD) fully embraced the
concept of space as a new theater of military operations. The formation of SPACECOM presents a classic
case study of how the DoD dealt with forming a new
theater of operations based on exploiting and developing new technologies. But while space became a
new theater of operations, DoD never envisioned it as
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a literal battlefield or a tactical objective. Instead, they
viewed it as a new dimension—a technological space
that would enable and enhance operations in the geographically based unified commands that were in
place and served as the central fronts in the Cold War.
The formation of SPACECOM went through three
phases of development. Between 1974-81, a small cadre of U.S. Air Force staff officers conceptualized and
developed a vision for an AFSPC, but they ran into
the strong headwinds of downsizing, given the Jimmy
Carter administration’s reluctance to escalate the Cold
War. In 1979, the Air Force leadership supported the
creation of an AFSPC, which became operational in
1982 after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as President. This administration initiated a key component of
its vision of the Cold War by launching the SDI, popularly known as “Star Wars,” and under this umbrella
the AFSPC quickly became a reality. As it became
clear that space-based technology would become the
foundation of a new integrated strategic posture, the
AFSPC pushed for the creation of a fully integrated
SPACECOM. A unified command would combine the
capabilities of all services, would allocate Title X funding to space operations, and would grant appropriate command authority to influence national defense
policy. The process of actually creating a unified command lasted from 1982-84, as DoD grappled with how
to organize and integrate all space-based capabilities
across the services. The concept of a SPACECOM ran
into many challenges on the road to its formation: the
challenge of merging assets from disparate commands
from all sources, properly defining its new mission in
an unknown technological and spatial environment,
and finally dealing with interservice rivalry.
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DEVELOPING A VISION FOR SPACECOM
From 1974-1981, advocates of turning space into
an arena for military operations faced a significant
series of challenges. First, the operational experience
of most of the Pentagon leadership had been formed
during the Vietnam War, and they saw little that
space technology could have done to help in Vietnam.
Moreover, the budget cuts and troop reduction of the
Vietnam era became a priority among the Pentagon
leadership. Finally, the Carter administration pushed
to streamline and reduce command structures during
this period, making the case for creating a new command significantly more difficult. But despite these
prevailing headwinds, the advocates for space operations forged ahead with their vision and even used
these challenges to shape the future of a SPACECOM.
On July 1, 1975, the JCS designated ADCOM as a
specified command reporting directly to the JCS for
operational control; on the same day Continental Air
Defense Command (CONAD) was deactivated.2 ADCOM now assumed all responsibilities of CONAD.
Sensing that its mission was also becoming obsolete,
planners within ADCOM sought to redefine its role
around space operations. Despite the original opposition in the JCS towards expanding into space, a group
of talented staff officers within ADCOM developed a
vision for a future SPACECOM that would provide
the foundation of future space operations under SDI.
In October 1976, ADCOM produced a memorandum
outlining the case for a space defense command. Required Operational Capability 5-76 Memorandum called
for establishing a defense operations center that would
serve as an all-source command and control center.
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This advanced space command center would control
anti-satellite operations, execute a plan for survival in
the event of a nuclear war, control space surveillance,
and conduct operational functions related to wartime
operation of satellite ground stations. This new planning memorandum marked a shift to an aggressive
space posture.3
In 1977, the Carter administration took control
at the Pentagon and made a large push to downsize
and streamline the military to deal with rising combat budget deficits and the nation’s overall economic
troubles in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Air
Force Chief of Staff General David C. Jones authored
a study that proposed combining North American
Air Defense Command (NORAD) and ADCOM. Both
organizations advocated the move and planned to
transfer ADCOM aircraft to Tactical Air Command,
missile warning systems to NORAD, and space capabilities to Strategic Air Command (SAC). Secretary of
the Air Force Harold Brown approved disestablishing
ADCOM on November 20, 1977. A group of officers at
ADCOM, Operations and Plans division, believed that
the decision to deactivate ADCOM would sacrifice the
hard-earned knowledge and expertise they had developed in advancing space operations. They feared that
the body of knowledge gathered in Colorado Springs,
CO, would be dispersed with the disestablishment of
the command. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Van Inwegen
led a group of junior officers who produced a series of
studies and presentations over the next 5 years to keep
the idea of space operations alive.4
In 1979, Air Force leadership made a dramatic shift
and began to embrace the idea of space operations that
the planners at ADCOM had long advocated. In 1978,
for example, Secretary Thomas C. Reed commissioned
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a Space Mission Organization and Planning Study
(SMOPS). On February 5, 1979, SMOPS published
its recommendations. It formally advocated creating
a space command within the Air Force and revising
DoD Directive 5160.32 that recommended that the
Air Force receive the designation of DoD Executive
Agent for Space. The Air Force quickly realized that it
needed to develop a space operations organizational
structure.5 On March 1, 1979, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense directed the Air Force to prepare a plan
establishing Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) responding to the Required Operational Capability
5-76 Memorandum. He asked for a plan by April 1 and
an established SPADOC by July 1 of that year, reflecting the urgency of the mission. SPADOC met these
deadlines and officially began operations on October
1. At the same time, the Air Force enhanced NORAD’s
role in space and announced plans to deactivate ADCOM. Ultimately, it turned out that the requirement
of downsizing benefitted the Air Force as it forced the
service to consolidate and improve efficiency, both essential foundations for the formation of an operational
space command.
U.S. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND
By 1979, Air Force leadership was thoroughly behind the concept of establishing a space command capability, but the Carter administration did not encourage this vision. In an effort to downgrade the missile
defense mission, the administration downgraded the
commander of NORAD and ADCOM to a three-star
billet. The staff at ADCOM also faced an overall hostile environment due to severe budget cuts. Soon the
Air Force decided to consolidate the Satellite Test Cen-
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ter (STC) at Fort Peterson in November 1979.6 Again,
these significant external pressures actually served a
positive end, as they forced the Air Force to clarify its
vision and to streamline space operations. Once Reagan took office in 1981, these painful but necessary
moves catapulted the Air Force space advocates to the
forefront of national security policy development and
implementation.
In March 1979, Secretary of the Air Force John
C. Stetson hosted a conference at the U.S. Air Force
Academy in Colorado Springs, and ADCOM operations and plans officers had developed a briefing for
exactly this occasion, one designed to push for saving
ADCOM and orienting it towards the emerging mission of space defense and to expand it into a full space
command. Privately, the planners called it the “Save
the Day” briefing. At the last minute, Major General
Bruce Brown pulled Van Ingwegen aside and told him
they were “beating a dead horse.” The staff shelved
the presentation and renamed it the “dead horse briefing.”7 It was never given. However, in 1980, Lieutenant General Jerome F. O’Malley, the deputy Chief of
Staff for operations, plans, and readiness, directed the
Air Force staff to begin planning for space defense.
Van Inwegen went back to the shelf and pulled out the
“dead horse briefing.” Then, after Reagan’s inauguration, the Heritage Foundation issued a report called,
“High Frontier: A New National Strategy.” This highly influential document advocated expanding military
operations and missile defense into space.8 The tide
seemed to be turning in favor of establishing a space
command.
The possibility of expanding military operations into space captured the imagination of the new
president. In the meantime, the Air Force began pre-
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paring an operational home for Space Operations at
NORAD/ADCOM headquarters. In January 1982, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a
report in which it criticized the Air Force for violating the “Single Manager Concept” in its approach to
space organization since it dealt with only one branch
of service. The GAO recommended a new Combined
Space Operations Center in Colorado Springs serve
as the “future space command” and recommended
withholding funding until DoD “comes up with an
overall plan for the military exploitation of space.”9
This report, combined with the Reagan administration’s interest in space, spurred the Air Force to further action. Lieutenant General James V. Hartinger,
the commander of NORAD, sought to make ADCOM
the foundation of a new space command.
The Air Force announced the creation of the Air
Force Space Command on June 5, 1982. It became
operational on September 1, 1982, and the Air Force
activated it with the intention of making it a specified
command (meaning it would have official funding
and recognition with the DoD and report directly to
the JCS rather than to the service Chief).10 The new
command consolidated systems from SAC, ADCOM,
and the STC. SAC contributed assets from the Defense
Support Program, defense meteorological support
program, SPACETRACK, and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. The new command’s mission revolved around one purpose: space defense. The main
component of protecting American military assets in
space focused on deploying technology to defeat the
Soviet anti-satellite programs. Space Command also
had the mission of developing anti-satellite capabilities to counter Soviet satellites. Congress, however,
cut funding for these programs. So essentially, the
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new Space Command had no funding for the mission
it had been asked to carry out.11
FORMATION OF A UNIFIED SPACE COMMAND
Just 1 month after the Air Force announced the formation of Air Force Space Command, the Reagan administration announced its new national space policy
goals: building survivable and enduring space systems, developing an anti-satellite capability, and detecting and reacting to threats to U.S. space systems.
This strategic vision would form the foundation for the
March 1983 SDI, known as “Star Wars.” CJCS General
John W. Vessey stated that, “SDI highlighted space’s
potential as a theater of operations.”12 The administration’s vision of an aggressive expansion into space
led to the planning for a SPACECOM. The Air Force,
which had been the first service to push for a unified
space command, took the lead in pushing their existing Space Command forward as the foundation of a
unified command. This push elicited a strong reaction
from the U.S. Navy and set off 3 years of interservice
rivalry that hampered and delayed the formation of a
fully unified space command.
On March 7, 1983, Aviation Weekly & Space Technology broke the story of the plan to form a joint space
command. There was no indication if the new command would be a specified Air Force command or a
unified command under the JCS that would involve
component organizations from all the services. Space
officers in the Air Force were concerned the Army and
Navy would not be willing to form the component organizations necessary to have a fully operational unified command. In testimony before the House Armed
Services committee, Secretary of the Navy John Lehm-
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an and Admiral James D. Watkins opposed the idea of
a unified space command. Secretary Lehman claimed,
“The whole idea of more and more unified commands
in peacetime is a bad idea because it centralizes. Decentralization is clearly the way to gain efficiency in
defense matters.”13 Lieutenant General Hartinger,
the commander of Air Force Space Command, stated
that he would design the unified command to serve
all services, saying, “we recognize that spacecraft are
indifferent to their customers.” Unlike the Navy, the
Army was supportive of the move and sent a team to
Space Command within a month to get a full briefing
on the capabilities, even though it had no command.
The plan for the new command would be 50 percent
military personnel and 50 percent civilian contractors.14 Just one month after this article was published,
Hartinger forwarded his formal proposal for the organization of a unified space command. He argued that
it was necessary in order to implement the recently
announced SDI.
The study, History of the Unified Command Plan
1946-1993, describes the mission of SPACECOM at
its inception as one to “consolidate the mission areas
of space control, space support, force application and
force enhancement, and exercise operational control
over all related systems developed for military application.” It went on to state that the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marine Corps all agreed with the recommendation.15 But the official agreement over the formation of a unified command papered over a vigorous debate within the Pentagon. On June 19, 1983, The
New York Times reported that the Navy planned to
establish a Navy Space Command on October 1, 1983,
consolidating communications, navigation, surveillance, and other space activities within the Navy. In
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August, the Navy went through The Washington Post
to register their official protest:
The Navy opposes the proposal and plans to create its
own space command in Dahlgren, VA, on 1 October.
The interservice rivalry on the issue reflects traditional
competition for defense dollars as well as differing priorities on how space should be used. . . . Navy officials
fear that their need for satellite information would
take second place to the Air Force’s desire to develop
‘Star Wars’ weaponry.16

According to the Times, the Army, on the other
hand, was supportive of the new unified command
and pledged to support it with Air Defense Assets.17
On November 18, 1983, the Pentagon announced
that it had decided to form a SPACECOM. The Washington News continued the theme of the Navy’s resistance to the plan: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff, skirting
Navy opposition, have decided to form a unified
military command to control defense operations in
space.”18 The Washington Post provided more detail
about internal disagreements when it reported that
initially the Joint Chiefs voted 3 to 2 in favor of the
plan: the Navy and Marine Corps had opposed the
formation of the command. They agreed to forward
a unanimous recommendation after the Joint Chiefs
agreed to delay the activation date for 2 years, a delay
that would give the Navy time to mature the capabilities of its own command. Accordingly, Pentagon
leadership saw the Navy’s move as an attack on the
concept of a unified command, and Navy leadership
seemed to hope that, by delaying the formation of the
unified command, the very concept of it would be
weakened and possibly eliminated.19
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In February 1984, the JCS issued a planning memorandum for a new space command that would take
over the functions of ADCOM. Its primary mission
would be to provide tactical warning in combined
space operations, control of space, direction of space
support activities, and planning for ballistic missile
defense. The guidance went into detail to define the
relationship between NORAD and SPACECOM due
to the many overlapping responsibilities.20 Organizationally, NORAD would be over SPACECOM, which
would be a supporting command to provide NORAD
with integrated early warning and assessment information of missile threats. Then NORAD commander
General Robert T. Herres recommended combining
NORAD with SPACECOM. The CJCS, the Chief of the
Air Force, and the Chief of the Army all agreed with
this recommendation, but the Navy and Marine Corps
Chiefs disagreed.21 Based on this split recommendation of the JCS, President Reagan ordered Space Command to become fully functional on October 1, 1985.
Still, there were service disagreements over management and technical relationships, the role of strategic
defense initiatives, who should command, and where
the headquarters would be located. The Reagan administration was quite concerned about the Navy’s
lack of support for the command, so the administration allowed it to maintain relative autonomy within
the unified command by keeping the headquarters in
Dahlen, VA. The JCS had the opposite problem with
the Army, which still needed to define its own space
needs in its newly emerging doctrine.22
Despite its limited contribution in terms of assets and expertise to the formation of SPACECOM,
the Army embraced the formation of the command
enthusiastically and began a serious study of how it
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could make space technology an integral part of the
new “Air/Land Battle Doctrine” it was developing.
The Army, which had bowed out of space operations after the formation of the U.S. Air Force, took
a renewed interest in the available technology. After
looking at naval operations, the Army moved to develop technology, namely satellites, that would assist
land movements in terms of navigation and communication. In its renewed focus on countering the Soviet
threat in Europe, and in relation to its emerging view
of space, the Army also developed a concept of “Deep
Battle.” Critical to the doctrinal concept of Air/Land
battle was gaining observation of the enemy’s formations in depth before they deployed into battle formation. The Army developed the capability to use Air
Force satellites to do imaging reconnaissance in any
weather conditions in order to identify concentrations
of Soviet armor. The Army moved to develop a space
policy and a space office in the Pentagon, and set the
groundwork for the future Army Space Command
that would eventually become operational in 1988.23
While the Army saw the need to develop its own space
command to put it on an equal footing with the Navy
and the Air Force within the SPACECOM structure,
it had done so in a way that expertly capitalized on
the existing technology, demonstrating the potential
of interservice cooperation rather than competition.
On September 23, 1985, DoD activated the U.S.
SPACECOM with General Herres as the commander
of both NORAD and SPACECOM. Despite budgetary
challenges and interservice rivalry, DoD had managed
to conceptualize and implement a SPACECOM based
around emerging technologies that every service
needed. Reagan’s SDI provided the necessary impetus
to overcome these considerable obstacles. More spe-
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cific applications came later. For example, when the
JCS endorsed the operational requirements proposed
for Phase I of the ballistic missile defense system, they
placed it under the command of SPACECOM. Clearly,
the development of the SDI’s broad strategic mandate
demanded a coherent and high level integration of
complex systems across all services to make it effective.24 The end of the Cold War decreased the emphasis on space defense and the overall need for space
operations, but the groundwork laid before this time
helped to revolutionize and unify the way all four services organize, navigate, communicate, and fight.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. Iver Peterson, “U.S. Activates Unit for Space Defense,” The
New York Times, September 24, 1985.
2. L. Parker Temple, Shades of Gray: National Security and the
Evolution of Space Reconnaissance, Reston, VA: American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronauts, 2005, p. 501.
3. Ibid., p. 502.
4. Ibid., pp. 509-510.
5. Ibid., p. 515.
6. Ibid., p. 518.
7. Ibid., pp. 516-517.
8. Ibid., pp. 520-524.
9. Ibid., pp. 524-525.
10. Ibid., pp. 525-526.
11. Ibid., pp. 526-527.

114

12. Joint History Office, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
History of the Unified Command Plan, Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 1995, pp. 95-98.
13. Craig Covalt, “USAF Command Influencing Direction
of Programs,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 7, March
1983, p. 44.
14. Ibid., p. 45.
15. The History of the Unified Command Plan, p. 96.
16. Fred Hiatt, “Military Considers Unified Space Command,”
The Washington Post, August 27, 1983.
17. Richard Halloran, “Air Force Seeking Joint Space Unit,”
The New York Times, June 19, 1983.
18. Richard C. Gross, “Joint Chief Recommends Unified
Space Command,” United Press International, Washington News,
November 18, 1983.
19. Fred Hiatt, “Pentagon Proposal; Joint Space Command
Sought,” The Washington Post, November 18, 1983.
20. Temple, p. 536.
21. The History of the Unified Command Plan, p. 96.
22. “Joint Staff to Shape Space Command,” Aviation Week &
Space Technology, Vol. 10, December 1984, p. 21.
23. “Army Reviewing Space Program Efforts,” Aviation Week
& Space Technology, Vol. 28, January 1985, p. 21.
24. The History of the Unified Command Plan, p. 97.

115

PART II:

SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
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CHAPTER 7
U.S. CYBER COMMAND’S ROAD TO
FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
Michael Warner
INTRODUCTION
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) achieved
full operational capability in October 2010 as a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command.
Its course to this status took several turns due to a
number of factors related mostly to the novelty of the
cyber domain, which left considerable uncertainty in
the minds of decisionmakers at several levels in the
Department of Defense (DoD). What ultimately prevailed was the strong support of the Secretary and
the conviction among senior defense leaders—even as
they debated the particulars—that the nation needed
something done swiftly to defend military networks.
The main lesson of U.S. Cyber Command’s accomplishment thus would seem to relate to the centrality
of national-level policy concerns even in military matters. Secondary lessons include the importance of staff
coordination and the staff’s command of information
vital to decisionmaking processes.
CYBERCOM’s attainment of full operational capability (FOC) status took roughly 2 years from the time
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates set the process
in motion. In many ways, the process toward FOC
typified the establishment of a major organization in
the DoD, but in other respects, the novelty of the cyber domain—in which every Service, combatant command, and agency operates and even “fights”—added
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unforeseen complexity to decisionmakers’ roles. Indeed, nearly every senior leader in the Department
had some equity that would be affected by the work
of the new CYBERCOM, and many of those leaders
had advice for the principals making the key decisions
about it.
An examination of CYBERCOM’s progress to FOC
thus has to be more than a chronicle of the key events
and relevant leadership actions. The formation of a
major new defense organization in a new battlespace
is automatically a primer in organizational change.
This chapter surveys the events leading to FOC and
reflects on their significance by drawing upon the documentation assembled by the CYBERCOM team that
managed the process, supplemented not only by the
memories of the team members but also by research
in Command records. It is by no means definitive, but
its accuracy and timeliness should complement the
breadth and depth of research that will be possible in
the future.
ANTECEDENTS
The Information Revolution has empowered people and institutions to work more efficiently and take
advantage of unprecedented opportunities. At the
same time, however, the networking of the world’s
information systems in “cyberspace” has opened new
fields for criminality and coercion, and tied the security of private individuals to that of enterprises and
nations in unforeseen ways. The importance of cyberspace to national security became a pressing concern
after the end of the Cold War. Such concerns increased
dramatically as exercises like “Eligible Receiver 97”
demonstrated network vulnerabilities and, as Ameri-
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can officials discovered with the Moonlight Maze incident in 1998, that foreign entities had been probing
sensitive U.S. military networks.1 The Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) in their 2004 National Military Strategy declared cyberspace a domain (like air, land, sea, and
space) in which the United States must maintain its
ability to operate.
The DoD and the Armed Services responded to
these evolving challenges through a variety of organizational initiatives. The first of these was the Joint
Task Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND), a
small organization chartered by the Secretary of Defense and reporting directly to him. JTF-CND operated
in conjunction with the Department’s de facto Internet
service provider, the Defense Information Systems
Agency (DISA), and attained initial operating capability on December 1, 1998.2 President Bill Clinton under
Unified Command Plan 1999 soon assigned JTF-CND
to U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM). The offensive
and defensive cyber missions came together under
the same organization in 2000, when SPACECOM
formally took over the DoD computer network attack
planning. As a result, JTF-CND was re-designated
the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations
(JTF-CNO) in April 2001. When SPACECOM was dissolved and its functions merged into the reorganized
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) on October 1, 2002, JTF-CNO had 122 positions and a $26
million budget. Its new mission, under Strategic Command and with the geographic combatant commands,
was to:
coordinate and direct the defense of DoD computer
systems and networks; [and] coordinate and, when
directed, conduct computer network attack in support
of combatant commanders’ and national objectives.3
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JTF-CNO was headquartered in Arlington, VA, with
DISA’s Global Network Operations and Security Center (GNOSC), and had a 24-hour watch floor there.
In 2002, the transfer of Defense-wide computer
network operations responsibilities to USSTRATCOM
occurred as discussions in the Department over these
roles were increasing. USSTRATCOM soon approved
the Joint Concept of Operations for Global Information
Grid Network Operations. In June 2004, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld added the final step in this
transformation by authorizing the creation of the Joint
Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO),
with the three-star Director of DISA dual-hatted as its
Commander (and as USSTRATCOM’s Deputy Commander for Network Operations and Defense). The
next year, Strategic Command’s General James Cartwright (USMC) completed the task of rearranging
USSTRATCOM by creating a series of joint functional
component commands to perform the Command’s
various missions. The new Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW)
would be commanded by the Director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) and take on the offensive side
of the now-defunct JTF-CNO’s responsibilities.
When USSTRATCOM finished its reorganization,
DoD had assembled a complicated arrangement of
cyber capabilities and organizations. DoD also provided information technology services Departmentwide via DISA; used NSA for cyber intelligence and
information assurance; and administered some policy
and oversight functions in the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense of Networks and Information
Integration (who was also DoD’s Chief Information
Officer). USSTRATCOM grouped its military cyber
capabilities (both offensive and defensive) in two
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organizations: JFCC-NW was paired with NSA, and
JTF-GNO with DISA. Those two partnerships gave the
offensive and defensive operators, respectively, access
to subject matter expertise, but their bifurcation also
meant that they talked less to one another than they
had under the old JTF-CNO. Each Service had its own
cyber component, moreover, to manage its own networks. This congeries of capabilities fully satisfied no
one, and within 2 years a high-level effort to revise it
was underway.
INITIAL DECISIONS IN 2008
In early-2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
wondered about better ways to organize the DoD’s
cyber functions, setting in motion studies of alternatives to the current arrangement. Indeed, the possibility of a “Cyber Command” had been discussed that
February by General Kevin P. Chilton, the new Commander of USSTRATCOM, and senior officials from
the Pentagon, Washington, DC, NSA, and the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence. This preliminary work led to the Secretary’s direction in May 2008
to task a Departmental-level review of cyber roles and
missions, to be conducted by the Quadrennial Roles
and Missions Review’s Cyber Team. The team considered reorganization schemes that summer under
the supervision of Principal Deputy Undersecretary
of Defense (Policy) Christopher “Ryan” Henry and
USSTRATCOM’s Deputy Commander, Vice Admiral Carl V. Mauney (USN). This effort was among the
earliest to contemplate the creation of a “Cyber Command,” and it revived the notion that the new entity
should oversee both the offensive and defensive facets of cyber operations. Another study group, led by

123

a former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Larry
Welch, evaluated the issues for the Joint Chiefs under the auspices of the Institute for Defense Analyses
(Welch was that organization’s president). In sum, it
appears that a consensus had emerged that the current division of labor between DoD cyber security and
network attack organizations was sub-optimal and
needed to be changed sooner rather than later. Secretary Gates heard the briefs, and on October 2, 2008, he
“indicated that a four-star sub-unified Command under USSTRATCOM should be DoD’s organizational
endstate for cyber C2 [command and control].”4
At this point, Secretary Gates declined to decide
the new entity’s ultimate configuration and instead,
on November 12, 2008 realigned the existing organizations. Citing “a pressing need to ensure a single command structure is empowered to plan, execute, and
integrate the full range of military cyberspace missions,” he directed USSTRATCOM, effective immediately, to “place [JTF-GNO] under operational control
of Commander [JFCC-NW].”5 This added a new job
to the duties of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander (United States Army), who was already serving
as both Director of NSA and Commander of JFCCNW. More important, it meant that both the offensive
and defensive components of DoD cyber capabilities
would, for the first time, operate in close proximity to
the nation’s signals intelligence system.
Several events factored in the Secretary’s thinking
and the timing of his order. In particular, NSA had
played a key role in detecting the presence of foreign
intelligence malware in DoD classified networks in
October 2008, and was helping DoD organizations
neutralize the infection in an operation named BUCKSHOT YANKEE.6 Additionally, Secretary Gates was,
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at this point, reasonably certain he would be asked to
stay on under the incoming administration of President-elect Barack Obama, which would allow him to
implement broader changes he was directing in DoD
cyberspace organizations.
FORMING A COMMAND,
JANUARY 2009-MAY 2010
President Obama took office on January 20, 2009,
and, by coincidence or not, discussions over implementing the Secretary of Defense’s order around that
time took a decisive turn. The previous month, a blueribbon panel convened to advise Secretary Gates on
managing the nuclear weapons stockpile had concluded that USSTRATCOM had too many missions,
and publicly recommended that the Command’s responsibilities be narrowed to nuclear matters only
(leaving cyberspace and other missions to other DoD
organizations).7 In March, USSTRATCOM assembled
a team of planners to work with NSA and JFCC-NW
experts at Fort Meade, MD, to develop a commanders’ estimate, which Alexander could use to explain
to Chilton how he planned to exercise the operational
control of JTF-GNO, granted him the previous November. The estimate’s scope was expanded in April,
however, to encompass options for a new Cyber Command, shortly before rumors of a new military command hit the news media.8 Alexander briefed Chilton
on May 1 on the progress toward the commander’s
estimate.
A few days later, Alexander explained to the
House Armed Services Committee in a public session that the replacement of analog technologies by
digital networks meant the world was now linked in
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“the same network.” The U.S. military had seized opportunities resulting from this development but was
not yet addressing the accompanying risks; indeed, in
Alexander’s view, the current approach to cyber security “does not work.” Hinting at the DoD impending
decision, he added:
we’re looking at the steps of what we have to put together in the sub-unified command as an option, or in
a Joint Functional Component Command—how will
we put these capabilities together to ensure our networks are secure and provide us freedom of maneuver
in cyberspace.9

Secretary Gates gave his answer on June 23, 2009.
“Effective immediately,” he directed USSTRATCOM
“to establish a subordinate unified command designated as U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).” JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO would be dismantled and their
personnel reassigned to USCYBERCOM, which the
Secretary “preferred” to see based at Fort Meade with
NSA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to issue a planning
order to USSTRATCOM to develop an implementation plan, and initial operating capability was to be
reached by October 2009, with full operating capability following in October 2010. USCYBERCOM was
also authorized direct liaison privileges with the geographic combatant commands.10
USSTRATCOM responded smartly to the Secretary’s direction. The commander’s estimate team
had already been re-chartered as the “Implementation Planning Team” 2 weeks earlier. Talks between
senior officers from USSTRATCOM, NSA, JFCC-NW,
JTF-GNO, and DISA set the stage for the Implementation Planning Team’s work. Meeting at NSA, the
team started drafting an Implementation Plan and
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created a “cyber story board” to explain the emerging
concepts. That brief served as the basis for briefings
delivered across Washington and the military in ensuing months. Meanwhile, Chilton sent the finished
Plan to the Chairman on September 1; it listed 13 required tasks for reaching initial operational capacity
(IOC) but did not set hard criteria for determining
FOC. Instead, the Plan included several dozen tasks
of varying importance and specificity to complete by
October 1, 2010, in its larger matrix of actions for attention between 2009 and 2011.11 At FOC, the Plan’s
“Commander’s Intent” was that:
USSTRATCOM [Unified Command Plan] authorities
and planning responsibilities related to cyberspace
will have been transferred to CDRUSCYBERCOM
[Commander, USCYBERCOM], and USCYBERCOM’s
capacity and capabilities for cyberspace operations
will have matured to a point where it can plan, synchronize, and execute cyberspace operations as a supported or supporting command.12

The new organization soon began to grow, building on existing JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW manpower.
On October 16, 2009, President Obama nominated Alexander to be the first Commander of USCYBERCOM.
A couple weeks earlier (on October 5), JFCC-NW and
JTF-GNO had begun to merge their staffs and operational centers into a consolidated staff. It in turn began
hiring senior officials to head its “J-Code” directorates.13 Many of the functions of the JFCC-NW Deputy
Commander now went to the new chief of staff, Major
General David N. Senty (United States Air Force Reserve), to manage for the consolidated staff.
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LOW-HANGING FRUIT, MARCH TO
AUGUST 2010
The Pentagon had expected confirmation hearings
for Alexander before the end of the year. For a number
of reasons, however, the confirmation was delayed.14
Alexander testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on April 15, 2010, and 3 weeks later, the
Senate approved both his nomination to head the new
USCYBERCOM and his promotion to general.15 With
this step taken, on May 21, the Secretary of Defense
presided at a promotion ceremony in NSA headquarters, deactivating JFCC-NW, and declaring that USCYBERCOM had achieved IOC.
The new Command had to have a way of measuring progress toward FOC. In April, Senty began tracking a series of metrics based on the Implementation
Plan (I-Plan) and a dozen commander’s priorities that
his staff had recently crafted for then-Lieutenant General Alexander.16 On July 27, Senty’s staff, which had
helped draft the I-Plan, requested Command staffs to
provide weekly details of progress toward FOC and a
re-validated list of milestones.17 The resulting “Strategy to Tasks Status Update” brief sorted dozens of IPlan actions according to the commander’s priorities
into 23 tasks and placed them in a matrix that would
be the main device for tracking progress. The work
paid off that summer and fall, when the staff’s matrix
repeatedly won praise for the situational awareness it
provided to senior leaders.
Creating situational awareness in cyberspace was
also vital for the new Command. On March 5, 2010,
the consolidated staff merged watch personnel and
expertise (mostly from JTF-GNO and JFCC-NW) in
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a combined Joint Operations Center (JOC) at Fort
Meade. Control of USCYBERCOM operations from
the combined JOC began on May 17, along with new
procedures designed to “operationalize” DoD information networks. By August, the JOC was functioning
well enough to continue JTF-GNO’s watch function.
Another hurdle was the move and assimilation
of JTF-GNO, the planning for which had begun by
August 2009. In Fiscal Year 2010, JTF-GNO was authorized 66 military and 138 civilian personnel, some
of whom would return to DISA, their parent organization. Many of those who chose to go with USCYBERCOM needed upgraded security clearances
before they could effectively support the Command’s
mission at Fort Meade. The upgraded clearances all
sat with the DISA in Arlington, VA (DISA’s Director, Lieutenant General Carroll Pollett, also served as
JTF-GNO’s Commander). That in itself added another
complicating factor, as DISA had been slated by the
Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) process in 2005
to move to a new headquarters building at Fort Meade
in 2011. Thus, DISA was in the midst of planning its
own move north. All these factors came together to
delay JTF-GNO’s transition. USCYBERCOM had assumed JTF-GNO’s command and control functions
by early-June, but the full transition of personnel and
databases that had been slated to occur on June 30 had
to be pushed back 2 months. JTF-GNO was formally
disestablished at a ceremony at DISA on September 7.
Finally, on August 5, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Major General Robert E. Schmidle (USMC)
to be the first Deputy Commander, USCYBERCOM;
he was promoted to lieutenant general 4 days later
and reported for duty on August 10. These moves
set in place many of the personnel and structural
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issues that came with setting up a new command, and
the new command had effectively accomplished several organizational tasks that demonstrated progress
toward FOC, but challenges still remained.
TOUGH ISSUES, JUNE TO OCTOBER 2010
Several issues seemed likely to persist even after
the declaration of FOC. As Senty’s aide explained,
these issues amounted to “building capability and capacity in Service cyber forces, and gaining the requisite authorities and fully resourcing the Command.”18
Each presented an interlocking series of complications
for every decisionmaker who approached it. Gates
himself introduced another problem set in August.
The issues collectively prompted high-level debates
over the wisdom of declaring the Command to be in
FOC status later rather than sooner.
The first set of challenges revolved around questions of authority. What authorities would USCYBERCOM possess? As a sub-unified command, it operated
under the authorities delegated to it by its institutional parent, USSTRATCOM, which in turn were derived
from the Unified Command Plan approved by the outgoing President George W. Bush in December 2008.
That same month, Gates had directed USSTRATCOM
to draft a global campaign plan to secure, defend, and
operate DoD information systems. USSTRATCOM
had responded with Operation GLADIATOR PHOENIX, delivering a draft of its execute order to the Joint
Staff in May 2009. Staffing and coordinating the order in the Department began promptly, but with the
change in direction dictated by Gates’ announcement
of his intent to create a cyber command that June and
the delay in the Commander’s confirmation, it was
not completed until after the Command reached IOC
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a year later. Chilton briefed Gates on GLADIATOR
PHOENIX in June 2010, and Gates approved it on
February 11, 2011.
USCYBERCOM also had to determine how it
would exercise command and control over the Service
cyber components that were to be assigned to it. USCYBERCOM also had to plan how it would integrate
its operations with those of the geographic combatant
commands. The Joint Chiefs discussed these challenges in August 2010, directing the Command to run
a series of tabletop exercises to identify the relevant
issues. Schmidle ran the first of these at Fort Meade
in October. The event helped to demonstrate that
the Command was assuming its responsibility to advance the debates over lines-of-authority in the new
cyber domain.
As questions about USCYBERCOM’s authority
were ironed out, questions about resourcing emerged.
The new Command’s leaders waited months to learn
which Service units the Pentagon would assign to USCYBERCOM. The Services had begun reorganizing
their cyber capabilities in late-2009, with the idea of
creating headquarters units (in addition to those already assigned to USSTRATCOM) that would function with the proposed USCYBERCOM. Over the next
few months, the Services created the Army Cyber
Command; Marine Forces Cyber Command; Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet; and Air Force Cyber
Command/24th Air Force. As USCYBERCOM neared
its FOC date, however, these forces remained in an institutional limbo, not yet assigned to any command.
Gates approved the new Assignment Tables for all
the unified commands only in December 2010—after
FOC—and USSTRATCOM delegated operational control of various Service cyber units and their headquarters to USCYBERCOM a few days later.
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A third set of questions about efficiencies also
emerged close to the FOC target date. On August 9,
2010, Gates added another consideration for decisionmakers at USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM. Speaking at a Pentagon press conference, he announced
broad budget cuts across the DoD; defense agencies
and unified commands in particular were to hold their
future personnel totals to Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 levels.
USCYBERCOM had not been scheduled to receive real
increases in manning until FY11. Its combined JFCCNW and JTF-GNO numbers totaled just over 500 FY10
billets, vice the 900-plus it had been projected to have
in FY11 to perform its significantly expanded mission.
The Command formally appealed for an exception in
September, and several weeks later Deputy Secretary
of Defense William Lynn granted the request.
At the same press conference on August 9, Secretary Gates also announced his intention to change the
way the Department organized itself to administer its
information networks. The Secretary stated a desire to
shed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks
and Information Integration (ASD/NII) position and
to divide its functions (along with some of those of
the Joint Staff’s J6) between DISA, the DoD Chief Information Officer, and possibly USCYBERCOM as
well. Behind the scenes, moreover, another move was
afoot. Gates quietly asked for options for increasing
DoD reliance on a network architecture derived from
a “cloud computing” proposal. The possibility of expanding USCYBERCOM size and mission was very
much on the minds of senior defense officials as the
date set for FOC drew near.
With Gates’ October deadline for FOC approaching, Alexander noted USCYBERCOM accomplishments on the road-to-FOC tasks listed by the Secre-
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tary, noting the remaining challenges (IT efficiencies,
manpower, and personnel), and recommended the
Secretary approve the declaration of FOC. Although
concerns persisted over the risks created by those gaps,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael
Mullen (USN) and Vice Chairman General James
Cartwright (USMC) urged the Secretary to declare USCYBERCOM to be in FOC status. On Sunday, October
31, 2010, Lynn approved FOC for USCYBERCOM. His
statement noted that the Command had accomplished
Gates’ five critical tasks from the previous May, and
ordered USSTRATCOM to articulate requirements for
personnel, authorities, and information technologies
efficiencies.19 Thus, in a sense, USCYBERCOM’s real
work was just beginning.
CONCLUSION
The creation of USCYBERCOM marked the culmination of more than a decade’s worth of institutional
change. DoD defensive and offensive capabilities were
now firmly linked, and, moreover, tied closely, with
the nation’s cryptologic system and premier information assurance entity, the NSA. That interlocking set
of authorities, personnel, and organizations would
also be better able to partner with both the geographic
combatant commands and other U.S. Government
agencies to defend the nation in cyberspace and ensure its freedom to maneuver in this new and challenging domain.
In organizational terms, USCYBERCOM’s stand
up represented an enormous amount of work performed at a fast pace. Despite a compressed schedule, the consolidated staff at USCYBERCOM and the
legacy organizations it subsumed were able to accom-
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plish a great deal by October 2010. They established a
Joint Operations Center at Fort Meade, and disestablished USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component
Command for Network Warfare as well as its Joint
Task Force for Global Network Operations. The latter task took considerable planning and effort because
JTF-GNO’s activities and workforce had to be moved
from Northern Virginia to Fort Meade while leaving
the daily functioning of DoD information networks
unimpaired. The consolidated staff fashioned effective command and control of cyber forces in the Services and reinforced a good working relationship with
the DISA. It installed liaison officers at the combatant
commands and cyber support elements as well, and
deployed expeditionary teams to support operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also made progress in support of operational planning by the combatant commanders and in building processes for them to issue
requirements for cyber support. In addition, the Consolidated Staff completed actions or made progress on
a number of other matters, and accomplished all of
this relatively seamlessly, keeping DoD operations secure while making the transition transparent to users
of its information systems.20
Three important issues remained unresolved at
USCYBERCOM’s attainment of FOC. First, DoD had
a shortfall of assigned cyber force capacity to plan,
operate, and defend its networks and ensure freedom to access and maneuver in cyberspace. Second,
the Command inherited authorities from predecessor
organizations that seemed sufficient to defend DoD
networks, but insufficient to protect the U.S. Government’s networks or those associated with critical
infrastructure in ways that the evolving cyber threat
seemed to require. Thus, there was a respectful airing
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of views in 2010 over the levels of risk associated with
various options for pushing forward with a declaration of FOC for a new organization in a new domain.
What drove the decision in the end was the leadership
and support of the Secretary, as well as the conviction
among senior leaders. Even as they debated the particulars, they agreed with one another that, because
the nation needed something done swiftly to defend
its military networks, it was riskier to hold USCYBERCOM in an indeterminate status than to advance its
formation despite the lack of final resolution for these
tough issues.
The process by which USCYBERCOM reached
FOC was unique because cyberspace is a unique domain. Nonetheless, the events are worth recounting
and patterns noticed because they have relevance for
organizational change in DoD and for other sorts of
organizations adapting to work in cyberspace. In this
vein, there are several observations that might have
more broadly applicable significance across DoD, particularly in regard to the attainment and declaration of
FOC for a new command.
First and foremost, an FOC declaration for a major command entity is inherently a policy (and perhaps political) judgment. It broadcasts as U.S. policy
the DoD belief that it could one day have to fight in
a certain place or in a certain manner. Therefore, no
determination of FOC can ever be entirely military in
nature—and thus it will be driven by considerations
partly outside of “objective” criteria and metrics. Similarly, IOC and FOC are the Secretary’s to set and determine and declare. It is difficult to know in advance
just how the world, the threat, and DoD will look as
FOC nears. His vote on whether an entity is “ready”
is the only one that counts. All other DoD actors in the
process serve in an advisory capacity.
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The policy implications notwithstanding, setting criteria for an FOC determination is important,
as everyone concerned has to live with the results of
a declaration when it comes. Criteria should be set
early and well—and not chosen in any sort of ad hoc
manner. Their meaning and relative centrality for
FOC need to be understood, and they should not be
changed as the process unfolds (they are either met, or
unmet). When new items or tasks are added or obsolete ones removed from a list of FOC criteria, such an
amendment needs to be executed with copious documentation and justification—in short, transparency.
The initial standards for FOC should also designate
the entity authorized to make such amendments and
explain the process for doing so.
Organizationally, “Stoplight charts” or other metrics for criteria impose salutary discipline on the analysis of progress toward FOC. They also help seniors
and staff to coordinate their perceptions and their actions. Obviously they are only a tool, however, and
should not come to represent an end in themselves. Finally, staffs need to use those tools to coordinate with
one another. IOC and FOC by definition involve a new
staff emerging from an existing one. Both staffs must
be synchronized. This is doubly tough to accomplish
when the staffs are geographically separate—which
only increases its importance.
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CHAPTER 8
CORDS IN CHARGE:
ORGANIZING FOR PACIFICATION SUPPORT
IN THE VIETNAM WAR
Gregory A. Daddis
INTRODUCTION
Most American estimates of South Vietnam in
early-1965 painted a grim picture. Political instability
wracked the Saigon government. National Liberation
Force (NLF) insurgents posed both a political and
military threat in the countryside and increasingly
showed a willingness to confront South Vietnamese
Army (ARVN) units in battle. Political subversion,
assassination of government officials, and attacks on
infrastructure continued at an alarming rate. Equally
grave, American intelligence analysts picked up indications of regular army units from North Vietnam
infiltrating into the south.1 That spring, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander
General William C. Westmoreland, who believed the
American advisory effort had done all it could to support the teetering Saigon government, requested the
introduction of ground combat troops. On June 26,
1965, Washington officials gave the general permission “to commit U.S. ground forces anywhere in the
country when, in his judgment, they were needed to
strengthen South Vietnamese forces.” The number of
American forces rose precipitously. At the beginning
of 1965, 23,000 U.S. troops were in Vietnam. One year
later, the number soared to 184,000 troops.2
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The troop escalation mirrored the growing concerns of Westmoreland and his officers. Their analysis
of the operational environment, and the nature of the
threat, led them to believe the enemy was doing all
it could “to destroy the [South Vietnamese] government’s troops and eliminate all vestiges of government control.”3 In fact, this assessment struck close to
the mark. Responding to U.S. intervention, planners
in Hanoi, North Vietnam, became convinced, albeit
not without disagreement, that only by escalating
the struggle inside South Vietnam could they eventually defeat the “American aggressors.” In March 1965,
Hanoi’s Party Central Committee decided to “mobilize the soldiers and civilians of the entire nation to
strengthen our offensive posture and to attack the
enemy.” Especially important, however, is that this
strategic offensive encompassed more than just military escalation. Communist leaders in South Vietnam
spent considerable energy on “a wide-ranging political campaign throughout the armed forces and the civilian population” to minimize the effects of American intervention.4 This combined political-military
campaign was aimed at orchestrating the efforts of
regular and insurgent forces, as well as coordinating
the activities of political cadres and military units.
The point was not lost on the MACV commander.
As early as mid-1965, Westmoreland realized that
simply destroying enemy forces would not secure
victory in South Vietnam. Even before the November
1965 clash between American and North Vietnamese
regulars in the Ia Drang Valley, MACV’s chief maintained that the “war in Vietnam is a political as well
as a military war.”5 The problem for the Americans,
however, centered on building an organization that
could manage the disparate tasks of a strategy built on
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both political and military objectives. “Probably the
fundamental issue is the question of the coordination
of mission activities in Saigon,” Westmoreland opined
in early-1966.
It is abundantly clear that all political, military, economic, and security (police) programs must be completely integrated in order to attain any kind of success in a country which has been greatly weakened by
prolonged conflict and is under increasing pressure by
large military and subversive forces.6

Despite this perceptive assessment, it wasn't until
1967 that the American military command in Vietnam
created an organization to coordinate the nonmilitary
aspects of Westmoreland’s strategy. In the process,
American leaders, both in Washington and Saigon,
relied on historical analogies to argue for a reorganization of the pacification effort in South Vietnam. This
chapter examines the process such leaders underwent to create an organization for managing pacification, the wartime effort to mobilize popular support
across the South Vietnamese countryside for the Saigon government. Historical antecedents appeared to
offer clear guidance on organizing for success in an
unconventional environment.7 Only through a unified
effort with fully coordinated civil and military functions could one hope to defeat an insurgency. While
the creation of a pacification organization went far in
coordinating such functions, in the end American attempts to influence popular support among the South
Vietnamese countryside proved inadequate. Reorganization could remedy neither ingrained problems
nor inconsistencies within a society so long subjected
to war.
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PACIFICATION—A FITFUL START
Unsurprisingly, the South Vietnamese themselves
realized that the insurgent threat required more than
just a military approach. In March 1964, the Saigon
government announced its Chien Thang (Victory) National Pacification Plan, which integrated economic,
social, and governmental reform efforts.8 The program,
supported by American advisors, drew heavily from
the British experience in Malaya. The successful counterinsurgency against the Malayan Communist Party
in the 1950s seemed to offer a model for success in
counter-revolutionary warfare, especially in the wake
of the French defeat in Indochina. British specialists
such as Sir Robert Thompson argued forcefully for “a
proper balance between the military and civil effort,
with complete coordination in all fields.”9 While the
Chien Thang program faltered due to governmental instability—coups had wracked Saigon since President
Ngo Dinh Diem’s assassination in 1963—it nonetheless established a foundation for future efforts in synchronizing political and military functions.
In supporting Chien Thang, American advisors
found historical analogies like Malaya all too alluring. The British experience not only informed early
pacification efforts in Vietnam, but also validated U.S.
Army counterinsurgency doctrine, which counseled
commanders that “police operations, civic action, and
combat operations against the guerrilla force” should
all be “conducted concurrently.”10 The problem, however, centered less on creditable intentions than on
implementation in the field. The increasing American
commitment in Vietnam brought confusion over who
was responsible for the growing number of military
and civilian agencies and personnel operating within
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the war-torn country: MACV, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). As one army colonel noted, “everybody
is wandering around without any clear-cut direction
and management.” Both historical precedence and
army doctrine clearly advocated a joint effort against
the growing insurgency in South Vietnam, yet all levels of the organization lacked such coordination.11
By early-1966, Washington officials could no longer ignore the inadequacy of governmental coordination in Vietnam. At the February Honolulu Conference, President Lyndon B. Johnson met with South
Vietnamese leaders to discuss the rising importance
of pacification. Johnson’s Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, concurrently offered a grim assessment,
noting that pacification was a “basic disappointment.” McNamara further concluded that “part of
the problem undoubtedly lies in bad management on
the American . . . side.”12 This pressure from civilian
leadership proved an important, if not essential, element of organizational change. The President’s interest in what was increasingly being called the “other
war” left both civilian and military war managers
little choice but to embrace the task of organizing for
pacification support. Westmoreland, in attendance at
the Honolulu Conference, returned to Saigon and dutifully began placing increased emphasis on pacification and revolutionary development.13
In fact, many uniformed officers were reaching
similar conclusions as Johnson and McNamara. In
March 1966, the Army staff published a report on the
war titled “A Program for the Pacification and LongTerm Development of South Vietnam.” PROVN for
short, the report charged that “interagency competi-
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tion” within the American mission in Vietnam was
a major obstacle hindering the achievement of U.S.
objectives.14 Westmoreland followed suit, placing
command emphasis on revolutionary development
and civic action programs and noting in his strategic
guidance for 1967 that the pacification effort should
“properly dovetail the military and civil programs.”
Even officers returning from South Vietnam were advocating change. One lieutenant colonel, writing his
student essay at the U.S. Army War College in mid1966, highlighted the need for an “integrated strategy” that synchronized the various military, economic,
social, psychological, and political aspects of the war
in Vietnam.15
This confluence of external and internal stimuli for
organizational change provoked a still-reluctant U.S.
Embassy in Saigon to create the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in November 1966. Although embassy officials feared that OCO would lead to a military takeover of civilian programs—Westmoreland supported
MACV serving as the “single manager” for pacification—the new office directly improved supervision
of the pacification effort’s civil side.16 OCO unified
interagency direction and created a pacification chain
of command from Saigon to the countryside’s districts
and provinces. Senior officials working on pacification, from the CIA to USAID, now worked together
in a central location, which facilitated planning and
coordination. The office consisted of six program divisions run by nearly 1,000 American civilians operating on a budget of $128 million. OCO now managed
refugee programs, revolutionary development cadre
training, psychological operations, and public safety
planning. The military side of pacification, however,
remained outside of OCO’s purview. Thus, while the
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office served as the first full step towards a new pacification organization, the “other war” remained separated from military operations being conducted by
MACV, including those related to pacification. Less
than 6 months later, American officials, citing a visible lack of improvement in the field, dismantled OCO
and incorporated it into a new organization.17
CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS)
IN CHARGE
Despite its size, OCO simply did not have the resources to implement the programs for which it provided oversight. Westmoreland’s strategic concept for
1967, which included more than just attrition of enemy
forces, left OCO increasingly unable to cope with the
coordination of civil and military efforts. Westmoreland recalled that as:
the American military effort expanded, so did the programs managed by [US]AID, CIA, and USIA, so that
in time all agencies were competing for resources and
scarce South Vietnamese manpower.18

The problem simply was too large and complex
for OCO to handle alone, and once more historical
analogies contributed to reorganizing for pacification support. Again, the British experience in Malaya
seemed to corroborate American claims that population security necessarily preceded pacification of the
countryside. (The Army’s officer corps largely viewed
counterinsurgency as a sequential process in which
security served as the prerequisite for governmental
and social reform.) If OCO did not have the resources
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or capabilities to attain this security, it increasingly
became clear that only one component of the U.S. mission in Vietnam did have such means.19
On May 9, 1967, President Johnson charged MACV
with responsibility as the “single manager” of pacification in South Vietnam. The President appointed
Robert W. Komer, a long-time CIA analyst and National Security Council staff member, as Westmoreland’s deputy for pacification. As Johnson declared,
this “new organizational arrangement represents an
unprecedented melding of civil and military responsibilities to meet the overriding requirements of Viet
Nam.”20 Holding ambassadorial rank, Komer assumed control of the newly-created office of CORDs
and reported directly to Westmoreland (see Figure
8-1).21 The new CORDS chief was not an advisor or
coordinator but rather held broad authority to manage the American pacification effort. Every program
relating to pacification, whether civil or military, now
fell under the supervision of Komer and his office. As
Westmoreland recalled, it was an “unusual arrangement, a civilian heading a military staff section with
a general as his deputy, and a similar pattern of organization was to follow down the chain of command.”
Thus, the President’s “single manager” concept guided reorganization at every level of the U.S. effort in
South Vietnam.22
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Figure 8-1. Structure of U.S. Mission Showing Position of CORDS,
May 1967.

Whereas its predecessor had failed to integrate
military operations into an essentially civilian organization, CORDS uniquely incorporated civilians
into the military chain of command. The former OCO
staff director, a civilian, headed the CORDS office in
MACV while a brigadier general served as his deputy.
(Komer even received authority for civilians to write
performance reports on military personnel.) The main
CORDS staff, operating alongside more traditional
staff sections like intelligence (J2) and operations (J3),
oversaw a wide venue of programs (see Figure 8-2).23
To make the transition easier, Komer maintained the
six field program divisions established under OCO.
His reach over pacification programs, however, expanded greatly. “Personnel,” Komer recalled, “were
drawn from all the military services, and from State,
[US]AID, CIA, USIA, and the White House.”24 CORDS
assumed responsibility for coordinating rural development programs, conducting village and hamlet
administrative training, and overseeing agricultural
affairs and public works projects. The integrated, interagency office handled research and development
planning, wrote MACV policy directives on pacification, and advised military commanders on civic action
programs. Komer even assumed the job of training
and equipping South Vietnamese regional and popular forces to provide local security for pacification
programs.25
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Figure 8-2. Organization of Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS.

It was here, at the local level, that Komer sought
to address the fundamental problems of pacification
support through reorganization. The new ambassador assigned each of MACV’s corps headquarters a
deputy for CORDS, usually a civilian, who outranked
the corps commander’s chief of staff. Similarly, Komer
appointed an advisor to each of South Vietnam’s 44
provinces. Illustrating the collaborative approach of
CORDS, 25 provincial advisors were military personnel, the other 19 civilians. These province teams reported directly to the corps deputies, while coordinating local military operations with the entire array of
pacification programs.26
The sheer breadth of pacification requirements,
however, strained the capacity of Americans in the
field. Reorganization could accomplish only so much.
One American colonel, advising a South Vietnamese
infantry division, noted the extent of effort required
by pacification. Once units had established security,
they then had to:
determine the people’s needs, act as a link between
the higher governmental agencies and the people, see
that the people’s needs were met, inform the people,
organize hamlet self-government, assist the people
in agricultural and economic development, establish
intelligence nets, detect and eliminate the Viet Cong
infrastructure, and eventually restore the legitimate
government in the hamlet.27

Establishing a “single manager” for pacification
surely made sense. Coordinating and successfully executing the vast number of programs under that manager proved extraordinarily more difficult.
Still, the chief contribution of CORDS was to pull
pacification’s numerous activities under one central-

150

ized command. At its peak, CORDS employed roughly
5,500 officials to support its wide range of programs.
Historical precedence in Malaya and external pressure
to reform certainly encouraged the reorganization process. So did the support of Westmoreland. The MACV
commander gracefully endorsed an arrangement that
made few distinctions between civilian and military
officials, and he fully backed Komer’s ambitions of
enlarging the role CORDS played in local population
security. As Westmoreland recalled, “Who headed the
program at each level depended upon the best man
available, not whether he was military or civilian.”28
The MACV commander committed himself to facilitating the implementation of CORDS rather than serving as an obstacle. Thus, if CORDS represented the
single most important managerial innovation during
the Vietnam War; Westmoreland’s support played
a decisive role in the organization’s inception and
subsistence.29
THE LIMITS OF A PACIFICATION
ORGANIZATION
Innovations in organizational design and management do not lead automatically to innovations in
strategic thought or analytic problem solving, nor do
they ensure successful execution of programs. CORDS
certainly streamlined the process of pacification for
MACV but Westmoreland’s strategy still required resolving a wide range of military, political, economic,
and social problems. Too often in South Vietnam,
military operations worked at cross purposes with
pacification. Success in one area did not equate to or
support advances in the other. Even the metrics for
progress to assess population security and pacifica-
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tion efforts proved inadequate, if not inimical, to other
efforts under Westmoreland’s purview.30 Moreover,
as the MACV 1967 Combined Campaign Plan noted,
the “ultimate responsibility for population security in
the RD [revolutionary development] plan rested with
the RVN [Republic of Vietnam].”31 The U.S. mission
in Saigon may have reformed the American side of
pacification, but its South Vietnamese allies, those ultimately responsible for pacification’s success, never
made comparable revisions. CORDS had solved only
half of the problem.
In truth, CORDS never came to grips with the underlying problems of the war inside South Vietnam.
If those in the American mission had successfully
looked to the past for perspectives on integrating civil-military operations in unconventional warfare, they
concomitantly dismissed the failures of past counterinsurgents such as the French in solving intractable
problems within South Vietnamese society. Both civil
and military leaders assumed that American military
power could be wielded successfully to attain any
foreign policy objective. In the process, they too often misjudged the difficulties posed by a weak Saigon
government. Certainly those involved in pacification
recognized the lack of flexibility among their allies,
the widespread corruption in both the army and government, and the shortage of initiative and leadership
within the South Vietnamese camp. Nonetheless, the
CORDS restructuring effort, as significant as it was,
never confronted directly these “fundamental constraints on effective administration.”32
While the American effort in Vietnam ultimately
failed to break the enemy’s morale, the creation of
CORDS demonstrated the Americans’ willingness to
make organizational changes during a time of war. It
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equally revealed that American war managers realized success depended on more than just killing the
enemy. As Komer recalled, “Pulling together civilian
and military efforts . . . led to greater recognition that
the war was as much political as military and that
adequate interface was essential.”33 Outside political
pressure and analogies of past insurgencies surely
served as important stimuli for change, but, so too did
the readiness of key figures to accept organizational
transformations during wartime. This conversion to
a unified civil-military staff eventually proved inadequate in furthering American war aims, and perhaps
it is here where the CORDS experience offers perspective for those considering organizational change
today: True military innovation requires more than
simply addressing organizational problems.
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CHAPTER 9
AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS:
THE U.S. ARMY AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT
IN GERMANY
Kevin W. Farrell
INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest accomplishments in the history of the U.S. Army is its successful occupation of
Germany at the end of and immediately following
World War II during 1944-49. The reason for this success was early identification of the scope and nature
of the mission and selection of the correct personnel
well in advance. The relevance of this historic episode
for any modern military organization is clear: proper
planning and effective leadership are essential to the
success of any new command. In addition to its mission of providing military government, the U.S. Army
also created a new military organization, the Constabulary Corps, to provide security, stability, and policing functions within the American sector of occupied
Germany. The rising tensions of the Cold War and the
formal creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact prematurely ended
the Constabulary Corps as well as the U.S. Army’s
role in military government in Germany. Ultimately,
their striking success and quick demise ensured their
obscurity in the historical record. Although largely
taken for granted in retrospect, the U.S. Army’s unparalleled success stands as a testament to the benefits
of good planning and inspired leadership.
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One of the greatest success stories in the entire
history of the U.S. Army is also one that is rarely remembered or recognized within or outside the U.S.
Armed Forces. This oversight is undoubtedly the consequence of that very success, a success that grows evermore remarkable and improbable with the passage
of time. Out of the wreckage of a devastated Germany
that had spawned the most destructive war in human
history causing the deaths of tens of millions of people, the U.S. Army accomplished a feat never before
experienced in human history.1 Although the Allied
Powers of Great Britain and France assisted significantly in this process in their respective areas within
the “Western zone,” it was the U.S. Army that served
as the primary agency for not only creating stability,
providing security, and disarming the former Nazi
regime, but also laying the foundation for one of the
strongest and most stable democracies in the world
in a region that had never experienced genuinely
stable democratic government: the Federal Republic
of Germany. An examination of how the U.S. Army
accomplished this task is of great relevance today for
any command or organization attempting to begin
virtually from scratch.
Obviously there were many factors that contributed to this successful outcome while certain circumstances were unique in history (most obviously, the
complete devastation and massive occupation of Germany). Above all, however, the keys to the success of
the U.S. Army’s role in military occupation and military government were thoughtful planning and innovation in execution. Long before there were adequate
resources and personnel assigned either to the mission
or its future organization, there was frank recognition
of the scope of the problem and a general consensus
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as to how to move forward. This chapter traces how
the process went from a vague idea into concrete execution. Additionally, it will briefly explore the genesis of a completely new military organization, the
Constabulary Corps.2
Almost imperceptibly, the U.S. Army’s very success led to swift dismantlement and transformation
of this significant achievement in Europe (second in
importance only to the role it played in the war). Little
over a year after the unconditional surrender of Nazi
Germany, the realities of the Cold War necessitated a
completely new relationship to the German people and
an end to previous occupation policy. On September
6, 1946, in a speech in Stuttgart, Germany, U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes made it clear that America’s
approach to Germany had changed from one of occupation to one of protection, proclaiming, “The principal purposes of the military occupation were and are
to demilitarize and de-Nazify Germany but not raise
artificial barriers to the efforts of the German people
to resume their peacetime economic life.”3 He went
on to announce a completely new bond between the
two countries. Rather than continue in the style of the
wartime occupation, Byrnes reassured Germans of the
occupation’s goal:
The American people want to return the government
of Germany to the German people. The American
people want to help the German people to win their
way back to an honorable place among the free and
peace-loving nations of the world.4

This clearly articulated policy anticipated new
treaties and finally the creation of a sovereign Federal
Republic of Germany: the Brussels Pact of March 17,
1948; the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949; the
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approval of the Basic Law and Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany on May 23, 1949; and full
membership in NATO on May 5, 1955.5
Thus it came to be that shortly after its creation of
a military government in Germany, the U.S. Army no
longer had a role in occupation per se and its post-war
military formation dedicated to this task, the Constabulary Corps, had become unnecessary. The U.S. Army
continued to have a significant presence in Germany
with its force commitment to NATO and continues to
have a presence there to this day, although the current role is rather ambiguous, generally consisting of
support to NATO and forward staging for ongoing
military operations worldwide. Nonetheless, had it
not been for the early, spectacular success of the U.S.
Army, everything that followed would have been
impossible.
The U.S. Army’s formal occupation of Germany
began before the war ended in the final months of
1944 with a small slice of German territory in U.S. possession in the final months of 1944. The most significant portion under occupation during this period was
the historic city of Aachen. Although the U.S. Army
had significant experience creating military governments and conducting military occupations in past
wars, by the time escalating tensions had led to World
War II, these experiences were distant and not well
understood or remembered in the U.S. Army. The
U.S. Army had played a significant role in the wake of
the victory over Mexico in 1847 and 1848 and an even
larger role in the occupied Confederate states during
the Civil War and Reconstruction. Similarly, during
and after the Spanish-American War, soldiers assumed these responsibilities in the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, and Cuba. Most recently, and only a generation
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before World War II, the U.S. Army had occupied
part of Germany itself. What all these occupations
shared–apart from their much forgotten status–was
agreement by the Army and the U.S. Government that
such duties were not a legitimate military function.6
Though relatively limited in scope and duration, the
U.S. occupation of Germany following World War I
was not recorded as having been a smashing success,
and the main official report on it laments, “The American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed
under its temporary sovereignty.”7
Following the end of World War I, the topic of military government proved to be little more than an abstract concept for the U.S. Army as it shrank dramatically from wartime strength in excess of three million
to fewer than a quarter-million soldiers by 1920.8 The
relatively brief military occupation by eight divisions
organized into three corps in the Rhineland region of
Germany ended on January 24, 1923.9 With a drastically reduced military in the 1920s and 1930s and very
few troops stationed abroad, the issue of occupation
and military government quickly fell from mainstream
discussion. Only the U.S. Army War College focused
any attention on the topic and even then, strictly as
matter of law and legal discussion in the classroom
rather than an item for which to plan. The few afteraction reports from the experience of that war were
consistent, in that they all warned against the consequences of lack of preparation and planning.10 Larger
budgetary and manpower issues that further reduced
the size and readiness of the U.S. Army throughout
the 1930s overshadowed any meaningful reform
initiatives.
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It is not surprising therefore that during the interwar years, and even at the start of World War II, little
serious effort or resources were dedicated to the creation of a military government or occupation organization. This was understandable, considering the U.S.
isolationist policies prior to World War II and then the
dire situation of the Allies during the early years of the
war. Nonetheless, despite having minimal resources
and perhaps even lacking enthusiasm for the task, farsighted individuals charged with the mission looked
at the scope of the problem as a whole and prepared,
as well as they could, for the future.
The main accomplishment during the 1930s was
the creation of a field manual that would define the
problem and develop a framework for how the army
would conduct military government should the situation arise and adequate resources be provided. Long
in genesis, two works were indeed published. The first
came out in October 1939, published as Field Manual
(FM) 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare. This manual reflected the interwar focus on the legal aspects of military government, although it contained a significant
amount focused on civil administration.11 The second
manual proved even more appropriate to the task: FM
27-5, Military Government, published in July 1940.12 In
both cases, the international situation added to the urgency of developing an army policy.
By October 1939, Poland had been defeated and
invaded completely by Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union, whereas by the summer of 1940, all of Central
and Western Europe except Great Britain was firmly
under the control of Nazi Germany. With Japan continuing its aggressive imperialism in Asia and Nazi
Germany apparently supreme in Europe, it was obvious to American strategists and policymakers that
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the United States could not remain isolationists much
longer. On the other hand, with the growing awareness of how desperately deficient American military
preparedness was immediately prior to and after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, HI, on December 7,
1941, the issue of military government was clearly at
the low end of the spectrum of priorities. Despite the
official state of war against Germany, Italy, and Japan,
continued allied setbacks throughout 1942 only reinforced the low priority assigned to planning for military government.
Yet, along with the massive expansion of the
Armed Forces that occurred with the first peacetime
draft in 1940 and then even more so following the
official declarations of war against Japan, Germany,
and Italy in December 1941, resources and personnel
came far more easily. While resources and personnel
improved with each passing month, it is safe to say
they never equaled demand until the final months of
the war. Key figures in the chain of command, most
obviously Army Chief of Staff, General of the Army
George C. Marshall, and the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, as well
as the G-1 and G-3, had the wisdom and foresight to
prepare for a future requirement long before it would
actually be needed. Their challenge was compounded
by the great uncertainties that accompanied the future
conduct and indeed the very outcome of the war itself.
By the summer of 1944, when the U.S. Army was
firmly established in France, the War Department assigned primary control of the military government
mission to the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Army in turn
established a two-phased process: the first phase
would consist of military government led by the U.S.
Army and the second phase would establish a civil-
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ian government to replace the military government.
However, none of this could have been foreseen clearly in mid-1942. Even so, between September 1942 and
June 1944, the G-1 and G-3 sections of the U.S. Army
had created the required organizations and training
programs in the face of significant bureaucratic opposition. Under the direction of Marshall, the Civil
Affairs Division (CAD) was established on March 1,
1943.13 Major General John H. Hilldring headed the
new organization and piloted it through a spirited
debate over whether it would report directly to the
Secretary of War or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While
this larger fight was taking place, Hilldring, in trying
to build his new command, quickly cited the need for
annual training for 1,200 junior officers.14 Such a figure
was openly mocked considering the state of the war at
the time, but he and his staff continued to press for the
right experts to be drawn from civilian life. As the actual reporting chain of command continued to evolve
in the ensuing years and international aspects of the
challenge loomed larger as the D-Day landings drew
closer, Hilldring and his staff never lost sight of the
objective of creating an organization that was staffed
by the right people and imbuing in it sufficient flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.
Even this brief overview provides several key lessons to be gleaned for those charged with the creation
of future military organizations and capabilities. First
and foremost is a statement of the general issue and
ultimate goal. In the case of the occupation of Germany and surrounding territories, the foundation was
laid through two seminal documents: FM 27-10, The
Rules of Land Warfare, and FM 27-5, Military Government, which were substantially amended in 1944 with
the publication of General Dwight Eisenhower’s direc-
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tive governing the occupation in North West Europe.15
Even though the details and outcomes were unclear,
the U.S. Army leadership had the foresight to identify the general need, and although initially resources
were unavailable, save to train a few individuals, the
framework would be in place. The second lesson that
stands out clearly from the World War II example is
the importance of selecting the right personnel for
the task at hand, especially in the formative stages. In
some cases, the U.S. Army recruited civilian experts
and provided them direct commissions at relatively
high rank to enable them to act quickly and with sufficient authority. A third key point is that the initial
structure built was formed around a core of experts
who waited literally for years until their larger command came into existence. By having a central group
of experts, the overall organization was infused with
flexibility so that, as it expanded, its core competencies were retained. Finally, in order to achieve its ultimate purpose the U.S. Army’s occupational effort had
to be supported at the highest military and political
levels. This demanded that those within the organization were able to express themselves capably to senior
army leadership and political masters.
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CHAPTER 10
STANDING UP SHAPE:
THE QUEST FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY
IN WESTERN EUROPE
Josiah Grover
INTRODUCTION
On December 19, 1950, President Harry Truman
designated General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower
as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Eisenhower faced daunting challenges in this
new role, not least of which was the development of
a joint and multinational command structure to integrate the defense of Western Europe. External pressures from the Korean War and internal political and
economic pressures added urgency to the undertaking. Responding to these pressures and the necessity
for a speedy activation, Eisenhower enlisted the aid of
proven subordinates to stand up a new organization
to command the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forces in Europe. The Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) evolved as a result of
these efforts from December 1950 through SHAPE’s
activation in April 1951. The challenges for creating
a new joint, multinational security command under
peacetime conditions were immense and involved
complex political-military considerations, questions
of jurisdiction, and the use of various prior models to
assist in the development of an adequate command
structure. Ultimately, the development of SHAPE is
a success story, but that outcome was by no means
certain in the closing days of 1950. Planners struggled
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to construct an organizational framework for the new
command while simultaneously unifying the military
actions of 12 nations. The ultimate solutions resulted
from both careful planning and vigorous debate in
early-1951.
The morning of December 16, 1950, found Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Goodpaster developing nuclear
strategy in the Pentagon, Washington, DC. A decorated veteran of the Italian campaign, Goodpaster
had served in the Washington Command Post during
World War II, followed by a 3-year stint at Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ, for a Ph.D. in international
relations. The phone rang that morning with a request
from a friend and former supervisor, Colonel Robert Wood. Assuming it a routine matter, Goodpaster
agreed to help before asking with what he was going
to be helping. Twenty-four hours later, Goodpaster
was in Brussels, Belgium, as part of the Advance Planning Group tasked with establishing SHAPE.1 Far
from addressing a single minor issue for an old friend,
Goodpaster instead found himself one of the first five
officers assigned to a brand new overseas command
with no headquarters, grappling with one of the most
complex problems American military planners had
ever faced in peacetime: how to integrate the military
forces of 12 nations under a single commander without the pressure of ongoing combat action to foreclose
debate. Their success in doing so rests, in no small
part, on the efforts of the Advance Planning Group
in developing the command structures for NATO
forces and their ability to build a truly joint and multinational headquarters.
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THE ORIGINS OF SHAPE—DEFINING THE
NEED FOR A UNIFIED COMMAND
That the Atlantic Treaty Nations even undertook
such an unprecedented endeavor is worth exploring.
On September 26, 1950, the North Atlantic Council
approved the “Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe,” which called for the “establishment at
the earliest possible date of an integrated force under
centralized command and control composed of forces
made available by Governments for the defense of
Western Europe” under the auspices of NATO and
commanded by a single Supreme Commander.2 The
initial report by the North Atlantic Council called for
a Chief of Staff to stand up a headquarters pending
the selection of a Supreme Commander. However, as
the international situation deteriorated over the fall of
1950, pressure grew instead to select a Supreme Commander immediately and then worry about the assignment of forces and organization of the command.
Continuing uncertainty, driven by the weakness of
NATO forces in 1950 and evidence of American military unpreparedness displayed in Korea, contributed
to the change. U.S. political and military leaders argued convincingly that naming a commander of some
stature could aid in the process of assigning forces to
the new centralized command.3
Consequently, on October 28, 1950, Truman asked
Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University,
to visit Washington, DC, to discuss the command of
Atlantic Pact forces.4 The United States had only recently adopted the recommendations of National Security Council (NSC)-68, a document that advocated
dramatically increased defense spending and emphasized the military component of Containment.5 By
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December 1950, the Western democracies perceived
the Soviet Union and its satellite states as a significant
threat, in part because of the ongoing Korean War and
the recent intervention of the Chinese Communists in
that conflict.6 Eisenhower, since early November, was
fairly convinced that he would soon be requested to
command NATO forces and had already begun laying the groundwork for the new command, selecting Lieutenant General Al Gruenther as his Chief of
Staff, and requesting other officers.7 By mid-December it was widely understood in national and international defense circles that Eisenhower would soon
be en route to Europe to take command of NATO
forces.8 Truman made it official when he designated
Eisenhower SACEUR on December 19, 1950.9
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS
As the Advance Planning Group—composed of
Gruenther, Wood, Goodpaster, Colonel Dodd Starbird, and Colonel Bob Worden (United States Air
Force)—arrived in Europe, they faced a series of challenges; one of the first was finding a place to set up
the nascent headquarters. The Hotel Astoria in Paris
became SHAPE’s first home, offering both rooms
to lodge the Advance Planning Group and suitable
meeting spaces, while also offering access to communication and transportation networks.10 The tasks to
be dealt with were significant; articulated in the initial
planning meeting on December 19, 1950, they included
the structure of the major commands; the organization
of the headquarters itself; the absence and future integration of non-U.S. officers; the desirability of collecting non-U.S. views regarding the command structure
and organization; and the basic problems associated

176

with multiple languages—including how many (and
which ones) to use and the viability of using interpreters.11 These basic problems could be sorted into three
categories: the command structure of Allied military
forces in Europe; the organizational structure and
composition of SHAPE; and the relationship between
American and European forces at all levels.
Yet all three categories were inextricably linked and
had to be dealt with simultaneously. The Advanced
Planning Group embraced a set of basic principles
in accomplishing the task, stressing the need to weld
separate national air, ground, and naval forces into a
unified structure. In order to prevent fissures within
the command, different nationalities were to be distributed across the allied command in key positions.
Closely related, the boundary between national and
NATO missions was deliberately left unresolved in
the near term, so as to permit freedom of action in the
future. Finally, the planners accepted that resources
for accomplishing their tasks were limited, but prioritized the development of command structure as a way
to increase available resources.12 This circular-seeming
logic was reinforced by the arrival of Eisenhower in
Europe in early January 1951.
Accompanied by his wife, Mamie, Eisenhower
commenced a whirlwind tour of the NATO nations,
seeking to ascertain the capabilities of each and urging their utmost cooperation in the collective security
effort. The unanimous selection to command NATO
forces, Eisenhower possessed an enormous amount
of prestige, and his presence in Europe bolstered
flagging morale. He made explicit use of his stature
to secure support for collective security. His efforts
to ensure European commitments proved successful,
and by the time he returned to the United States at the
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end of January 1951, he was able to go before Congress and report on significant progress in Europe.13
While Eisenhower strove to secure concrete commitments in the form of units assigned and funds allotted for collective security, his small staff continued to
work on how to integrate those forces into a command
structure. They were aided by the work of the Western Union Defense Organization and NATO’s three
existing Regional Planning Groups, which had done
some basic work on organizational concepts for future
NATO forces.14 Upon its activation, SHAPE would essentially replace those four organizations with a single
integrated command.
The Allied command structure was, in large part,
determined by the geography of Western Europe,
stretching from the tip of Scandinavia into the Mediterranean. As such, the planning group determined to
split the NATO command structure into three regional commands, North, Central, and South. The North
and South commands featured air and naval arenas,
flanking the central region, where planners and strategists had determined the decisive clash of arms would
likely occur should the Soviets invade Western Europe. In the atmosphere of uncertainty that pervaded
Europe in the waning days of 1950, such a possibility
was not entirely unrealistic, given what Allied forces
knew about Soviet strength in Eastern Europe.15
In the North, land forces were split between Norway and Denmark, while Allied air and naval commands were unified in Oslo, Norway. The southern
regional command was initially organized in Italy,
and featured a single land component, as well as associated air and naval commands. Over time, the southern regional command would evolve new and more
complex organizational structures in response to com-
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peting national interests and the entry of Greece and
Turkey into the Alliance. In the central region, Eisenhower opted to retain control of allied forces directly,
with subordinate ground, air, and naval commanders.
Eventually, as force structures evolved and grew, a
separate central region command would stand up, relieving the Supreme Commander from direct responsibility for that area.16
DESIGNING SHAPE: PRIOR MODELS AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENTS
Even as Gruenther and the planning group wrestled with forming new command arrangements in Europe, they simultaneously had to develop the structure of the headquarters that would command these
new organizations. By mid-January 1951, SHAPE was
slowly expanding, no longer restricted to eight or 10
officers as in the first weeks of its existence. Most of
the month was consumed by Eisenhower’s visits to the
member nations and the planning group’s attempts to
fit the resulting commitments into an organizational
framework. While the planners were making progress, in early-February 1951, Goodpaster reported to
his friend and mentor, Colonel George “Abe” Lincoln,
the head of the Department of Social Sciences at West
Point, NY, that:
we are still in something called the ‘Planning Group’
rather than ‘Headquarters’ stage of development,
though I must admit we look remarkably like a headquarters of the COSSAC [Chief of Staff to the Supreme
Allied Commander] type.17

Lincoln, who served as one of General George Marshall’s chief planners in World War II and thus knew
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something of headquarters structure, countered with
the observation that SHAPE looked more like the
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF), a comparison others also made.18 Writing
later in 1951, Wood addressed the differences between
the new SHAPE and its predecessor:
there have been some valuable but only rough precedents to SHAPE in the form of wartime combined
commands such as SHAEF. . . . The idea of a combined (i.e., more than one nation) command is thus
not a wholly new one. What is new is that now 12
nations are involved, and that the undertaking is going forward in peace, rather than being extemporized
during war.19

The “rough precedents” to SHAPE helped the planning group devise the initial form of the headquarters,
which they modeled on the American Army’s military
staff structure, creating divisions for Personnel, Intelligence, Logistics, Signals, and a G3, which was further
divided into Plans, Policy, and Operations on the one
hand and Organization and Training on the other.20
While the basic staff structure was being worked out,
the planning group began to transform into a truly
multinational organization as the first European officers arrived for service at SHAPE. The addition of
international officers complicated the basic functions
of the staff, with the addition of new languages and
martial traditions; it also, rather paradoxically, relieved some of the pressure on the planning group.
By mid-February 1951, Gruenther had imposed a “hiring freeze” for American personnel, especially senior
officers, as the accretion of Americans threatened to
defeat the intent of a multi-national headquarters.21
The assignment of European officers brought more
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perspectives to the planners and rolled back the perception that SHAPE would be an American command
with only a token of European representation.
The arrival of the international contingent also
explicitly raised the question of national viewpoints.
Simply put, SHAPE officers were expected to serve
SHAPE first, subordinating their national affiliations
to the needs of the headquarters generally and the Supreme Commander specifically. This is not to say that
national viewpoints had no representation in the new
collective security arrangement—a separate staff liaison group was established specifically to coordinate
the national representatives—but individual staff officers, regardless of their national origin or branch of
service, were assigned throughout the headquarters
according to the needs of the organization and the
officer’s particular skill set.22
While the creation of a separate liaison office for
national viewpoints represented one of the most significant early differences between SHAPE and a conventional military headquarters, the distribution of international officers throughout the organization also
required a great deal of flexibility. Indeed, as Wood
later wrote:
our methods have undoubtedly seemed very fluid to
many of our officers. Particularly, they have been a
strain on those officers lacking flexibility and habituated to a full set of regulations, standing procedures
and doctrine, the appropriateness of which it was not
their task to question.23

In fact, an assignment to SHAPE invariably forced
officers of all nationalities to grapple with complex
problems relating to the integration of multinational
and joint forces. The initial SHAPE staff structure
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had to be flexible enough to cope with problems for
which there was no prior precedent, solve the immediate problem, and devise an appropriate mechanism
for dealing with similar problems in the future. In the
initial phases of establishing the headquarters, that
responsibility fell to the newly created office of the
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff held by American Major General Cortlandt Schuyler. In the first 3
months of SHAPE’s existence, problems outside the
traditional purview of the staff system were resolved
at the Special Assistant level, thereby allowing the
staff divisions to focus on their particular areas of
responsibility.24
As the subordinate staff divisions became operational, the international character of the headquarters
became more apparent. Of the eight major staff divisions, half were headed by American officers, while
the rest were headed by an Italian, two French officers,
and one British officer.25 Deputy Supreme Commander Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery was British,
as was the Air Deputy, while the Naval Deputy was
a Frenchman. Officers from other nations also filled
positions at SHAPE, contributing to the sense that
SHAPE was truly an Allied effort.
NEGOTIATING JURISDICTIONS
Even as the multinational character of the headquarters became more evident, the planning group
still had to grapple with complex jurisdictional issues,
not least of which was the legal role of General Eisenhower. As the SACEUR, Eisenhower had an international mandate to ensure the security of Western Europe, while as a senior American Army officer, he had
specific responsibilities and obligations to the Ameri-
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can people. This quickly became known as the “dual-hat” problem, requiring that Eisenhower, and his
eventual successors, execute both international and
American responsibilities.26 The SACEUR’s authority
over Alliance military forces raised the specter of an
improper American influence in explicitly national
matters. From the European perspective, Eisenhower
would have to be able to subordinate his American
viewpoint to the best interests of the Alliance, while
the American public and President could rightly expect him to advance and defend U.S. interests. However, given the SACEUR’s role as the commander
of military forces from 12 separate nations, acting
in response to American interests without regard to
those of the other nations, or even appearing to act
in American interests, would almost certainly damage the SACEUR’s personal reputation and diminish
the power and prestige of the position. Eisenhower’s
skill in managing an alliance helped ensure that the issue did not prove particularly contentious during his
tenure, as did the fact that American and Alliance interests were closely aligned during that period. Later
SACEURs, such as General Matthew Ridgway, would
grapple with these two roles, particularly when U.S.
and Alliance interests were less convergent.
American congressional and Presidential support assisted Eisenhower in the negotiation of jurisdictional issues. Following his report to Congress in
January 1951, the United States designated four Army
divisions for deployment to Europe; these divisions
would serve as the American military contribution
to the collective security of Western Europe.27 This
concrete demonstration of an American commitment
to European security helped to mitigate complaints
about an American SACEUR.
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As the SACEUR and his SHAPE planners overcame the initial obstacles and growing pains of a
unique new organization, the commitment of troops
to the new regional commands stimulated much debate over the proper sequence of command activation.28 Ultimately, SHAPE was activated under the
authority of NATO when General Eisenhower issued
General Order Number One on April 2, 1951. The subordinate regional commands then activated as their
headquarters became capable of exercising command
and control over the forces allocated to them in the
summer of 1951.
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CHAPTER 11
WATCHING THE SKIES: THE FOUNDING OF
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Joseph C. Scott
INTRODUCTION
The North American Air (later Aerospace) Defense Command (NORAD) grew out of increasing
cooperation between American and Canadian forces
in response to the Soviet air threat in the early Cold
War. This gradual process was challenged periodically by those opposed to the integration, to American domination of Canadian defense policy, and to
strategic air defense in general. Dedicated advocacy
by American and Canadian air defense supporters,
who took advantage of concerns over world events,
eventually won over many of the skeptics. The two
nations deployed substantial radar, aircraft, and missile capability against the Soviet threat. To manage
this capability, Canadian and American military personnel developed pragmatic, informal solutions to the
problems of complex relationships, and this set the
stage for more formal bilateral arrangements. As the
strategic situation evolved, the organization adapted
with it, and NORAD continues an important role to
this day.
In August 1957, U.S. Secretary of Defense Charles
Wilson and Canadian Defense Minister George
Pearkes announced that their respective nations had
established “a system of integrated operational control of the air defense forces in the continental United
States, Alaska and Canada.” The headquarters, to be
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called “Air Defense Canada/United States” (ADCANUS) would control squadrons of fighter interceptors,
hundreds of ground-based anti-aircraft weapons, and
a vast, expanding radar network designed to protect
the two nations from the threat of the Soviet Union’s
ever-increasing nuclear bomber capability.1 Within
weeks, the command would abandon its clunky initial
title and rename itself the North American Air Defense
Command. At the time of NORAD’s creation, the defense establishment portrayed the organization as a
logical, if crucially important, step in a process dating
back to the early years of World War II. As the command and its air defense architecture had developed,
however, military officers who supported air defense
had faced a number of challenges, not the least of
which was skepticism of their ability to defend North
America adequately. Throughout NORAD’s formative experience and in the intervening years, its advocates overcame such opposition, while also adapting to a constantly evolving strategic arena. NORAD
ultimately became one of the world’s most enduring
bilateral security organizations.
THE EARLY YEARS
In the years immediately following World War II,
defense planners paid little attention to the air defense
of North America. The Army Air Force established
an Air Defense Command in early-1946, but it controlled only two fighter squadrons and a few radars
based in and around New York City. With the massive post-war drawdown, meager resources could not
support much else in a country that felt it had little to
fear because of its geographic isolation and aeronautic
and nuclear advantages.2 Canadian and American air
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defense planners generated grandiose plans for the
defense of the continent, including the establishment
of some sort of joint/combined air defense command,
but the military leadership of both nations largely ignored these proposals in the austerity of the immediate post-war era.3
The gradual escalation in Cold War tensions with
the Soviet Union, however, changed this posture. The
Berlin Blockade crisis of 1948, and revelations that the
Soviets had reverse-engineered the American B-29
bomber into their own long-range bomber led to growing focus on the problem of continental air defense.4
Initially, the Air Force expanded the number of interceptor squadrons and reactivated old radar systems in
Alaska and the Pacific Northwest, but there were concerns that this ad hoc “Lashup” network (named after
the engineering term for the temporary connection of
equipment for emergency or experimental use) was
inadequate against the new Soviet threat. After the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, the Air Force
secured funding to construct a massive network of 85
radars for Alaska and the Continental United States,
along with control centers to coordinate response to
a Soviet air attack. To distinguish this system from
the “Lashup” network established in response to the
crises of 1948-49, the Air Force referred to this new
system as the “Permanent System.”5
The Korean War led to further expansion of American air defense capability, but concerns remained
about what to do with America’s neighbor to the
north. The American defense establishment worried
about Canada’s limited radar and air defense capability, especially because they figured a Soviet attack
would likely come by way of Canada.6 American and
Canadian defensive cooperation had been ongoing
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since a meeting between American President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in August 1940 in Ogdensburg, New York.
Concerns over the potential threat that Nazi Germany
might eventually pose to the western hemisphere led
the two leaders to agree to an organization for studying defensive issues ranging from the German bomber
threat to maritime security.7 This “Permanent Joint
Board on Defense” (PJBD) met throughout World War
II and continued to assess defense issues in the postwar years.
EXPANSION AND CONTROVERSY
Thinking that Canadian radar capability was critical to American national security because of the early
warning it could provide, the United States paid twothirds of the cost for the construction of new air defense radars in southern Canada and near American
“Lend-Lease” Air Force bases in Newfoundland starting in 1951. The initial plan for this new “Pinetree”
radar system was for the Royal Canadian Air Force
(RCAF) to man almost all of the stations, but the Canadian military lacked the manpower to operate all
33 radars. The Americans agreed to man half of the
radars, and attempts to keep the decision quiet failed,
resulting in public controversy in Canada over the
growing American military presence on Canadian
soil. Headlines lamented Canada’s fate as “anotherBelgium” caught between the United States and the
Soviet Union. RCAF personnel reassured many doubters that Canadian sovereignty was not in jeopardy,
and over the next few years, the two air forces directly
coordinated procedures for intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft, including those instances where
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either nation’s interceptors had to cross the international border.8 Informal cooperation between the U.S.
Air Force (USAF) and RCAF became a routine part of
air defense planning and operations.
Expanding both nations’ interceptor and radar
capability was a good start, but defense planners remained concerned about the ability of the growing air
defense system to defend North America. The USAF
Chief of Staff publicly acknowledged that the technology of the day could hope to destroy only 25 percent of incoming Soviet aircraft and “undoubtedly” it
would be “less than that.”9 In the age of atomic and
thermonuclear weapons, such a figure was wholly unacceptable, and the Air Force sought answers from the
scientific community.
Two groups of scientists came up with proposals
to improve the continent’s air defenses, focusing on
the development of computerized management of air
defense operations: improvements to fighter and surface-to-air missile defenses, and the extension of the
radar network to the far northern reaches of Canada.
Significant portions of the American armed forces,
including some within the Air Force, opposed this
expansive vision for continental air defense because
they believed it would hamper growth and improvements to the nation’s offensive nuclear capability and
its conventional forces. Supporters of strategic air
defense won the day: the Dwight Eisenhower administration’s shift to the “New Look” national security
policy in 1953 led to a massive buildup in the Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) nuclear arsenal, but it
also gave the green light for expansion of the nation’s
air defense posture.10 The United States and Canada
agreed to build two lines of radar stations, one across
55 degrees north latitude (funded and manned by
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Canada) and one along the northern shores of arctic
Canada (funded and manned by the United States).11
Construction of the “Mid-Canada Line” and the “Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line” began in 1955.12
THE BIRTH OF NORAD
By the late-1950s, air defense radars, aircraft, and
surface-to-air missiles positioned throughout the
continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and even
Greenland formed a complex web of command and
control relationships. While the USAF maintained the
lion’s share of the responsibility, the Army’s groundbased air defense mission and the Navy’s potential
role in guarding the eastern and western approaches
to the United States meant they also played a part in
continental defense, and there were ongoing squabbles
over issues of command and control between the three
services. Early ad hoc solutions paved the way for the
more formal joint Continental Air Defense Command
(CONAD), which was granted operational control
over the air defense systems and units of all involved
services. The Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), for example, which was greatly expanding as
it deployed dozens of Nike missile batteries throughout the United States and overseas in places such as
Thule, Greenland, now fell under the overall control
of the Air Force general who commanded CONAD.
ARADCOM, like its Navy counterpart, established
headquarters co-located with CONAD’s base in
Colorado Springs, CO.13
The command and control relationship was even
more complicated in Canada. The two nations’ services coordinated so that U.S.-manned radar stations
and American fighter squadrons operating in Canada
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(either because they had crossed the border or because
they were based at U.S. facilities in Newfoundland)
were under the operational control of the RCAF. The
only stipulation was that the Canadians would exercise this control through the senior U.S. commander
present whenever possible.14
The ongoing radar expansion and the continued
close relationship between U.S. and Canadian air
forces increasingly intertwined the defense postures
of the two nations. Military and civilian air defense
advocates on both sides of the border began seeking
a more formal structure to coordinate continental
defense, but these efforts faced resistance from both
Canadian and American military and political authorities. The senior leadership in Canada remained
hesitant about subordinating their military independence to the Americans, and when the RCAF’s chief of
staff publicly referred to an official joint American-Canadian air defense command as “inevitable” in 1955,
the Canadian defense minister quickly repudiated the
claim. Admiral Arthur N. Radford, the Chairman of
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff echoed this criticism. The
heads of the American services were concerned that
an official agreement with the Canadians would limit
American freedom of action, especially because Canadian discussions about a combined command had
borrowed heavily from the precedent set by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Canada and the United States were both members. The
Joint Chiefs had no interest in subordinating another
military command to the whims of NATO.15
The air defense leadership within the RCAF and
USAF got around these hurdles by proposing, through
the American defense establishment, that American
and Canadian air defense efforts be “operationally in-
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tegrated” without forming an actual combined command. The Canadian military agreed to the plan, and
a combined study group developed the concept of
“Commander-in-Chief Air Defense Canada-United
States.” The commander in chief (CINC) ADCANUS
and his staff would develop procedures for the operational control of the air defense forces commanded
by the two respective nations, but they would not be
called a command. The study group proposed that the
American commander of the Continental Air Defense
command become CINCADCANUS, and that the
commander of the Canadian air defense forces serve
as the deputy.16 The Joint Chiefs, Canadian chiefs,
and the American secretary of defense all approved
the proposal. In the summer of 1957, after a brief
delay due to political changeover during Canadian
parliamentary elections, the Canadian minister of defense also endorsed the concept. At roughly the same
time, the DEW Line in northern Canada became fully
operational.17
Secretary of Defense Wilson and Defense Minister
Pearkes announced the new institution on August 1,
1957, but within weeks, General Earl Partridge, the
first commander of this not-quite-a-command, requested that its name be changed, and that the parties involved simplify the awkward nature of the
institution by acknowledging that it was, in fact, a
command.18 Both the Canadian and American military chiefs agreed, and the organization’s name was
changed to the North American Air Defense Command. NORAD was formally activated on September
12, 1957.19
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NORAD’S OTHER BIRTHDAY
The new command, based in Colorado Springs,
CO, tied together the Continental Air Defense Command and its subordinate headquarters (the respective
Air Force, Army, and Navy air defense components)
with the RCAF Air Defense Command. As under the
original model, the CINC of NORAD was an American and the deputy a Canadian.20 Within weeks of
NORAD’s activation, however, opposition to this arrangement emerged within the Canadian parliament.
The two militaries had founded this unified command
outside diplomatic channels, effectively giving command of significant Canadian forces to an American
(and, of course, theoretically giving command of
American forces to a Canadian, if the senior officer was
absent). The fact that there was no formal agreement
between the two heads of state on the issue concerned
many Canadians.
In a move that shocked the American Joint Chiefs,
the Canadian Prime Minister persuaded the opposition in Parliament of NORAD’s merits by arguing
that NORAD was essentially an extension of NATO.
While the original August 1957 announcement had
included a portion on bilateral air defense cooperation extending “the mutual security objectives of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the air defense
of the Canada-US Region,” the Joint Chiefs were concerned that tying NORAD explicitly to NATO would
open the door for European interference with North
American air defense.21 Behind the scenes, Canadian
military leaders assured their American counterparts
that they had no intentions of tying the new command
to NATO, and the secret “Terms of Reference” for
NORAD contained no references to NATO.22 While
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the two militaries negotiated with this understanding, their political masters and diplomats developed a
formal agreement containing allusions to NATO, but
in vague enough terms that the respective militaries
could be confident that NORAD would effectively
remain separate from NATO.23 The vague references
were enough to convince virtually all of Canada’s
lawmakers to agree to the new formal agreement.24
NORAD now traces its official founding to this
second, formal agreement, dated May 12, 1958.25
NORAD EVOLVES
NORAD had survived interservice and diplomatic
concerns during its creation, but new challenges arose
almost immediately. Skeptics complained about the
redundant staff structures and headquarters of the
joint American Continental Air Defense Command
and NORAD at Colorado Springs. General Partridge
responded by proposing to deactivate CONAD because it seemed unnecessary after the establishment
of NORAD, especially since the Canadians had no
equivalent organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff refused Partridge’s proposal, but he and his staff simply
combined the NORAD and CONAD headquarters
and eliminated all separate CONAD staff structures.26
The changing strategic environment was a more
serious challenge to NORAD. By the late-1950s, effective intelligence gathering, including flights by U-2 reconnaissance planes over the Soviet Union, revealed
that the Soviets had far fewer long-range bombers
than had been feared.27 Increasingly, nuclear planners
and theorists on both sides of the Iron Curtain were
emphasizing the role of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as nuclear delivery systems. American
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intelligence experts believed the Soviets would have
a “significant ICBM capability” by 1960. NORAD’s
current radars and anti-aircraft weapons would be
ineffective against this new threat. Even as the American government was negotiating the formal NORAD
agreement with its Canadian neighbors, the United
States was moving towards augmenting the air defense radar systems in northern Canada and Greenland with the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
The commander of NORAD worked to ensure these
new radars would fall under NORAD’s purview.28
Intelligence revelations and the shift to ICBMs
meant that the halcyon days of massive continental
air defense buildup were over. Starting in 1959, less
than 2 years after NORAD became operational, Congress began chipping away at air defense budgets.29
By the late-1960s, the continental air defense force
structure was a shadow of its former self.30 The Navy
and then the Army air defense commands deactivated
as their missions vanished.31 NORAD retained a key
role, however, through its continued use of the radar
networks in the far north of the continent. For the rest
of the Cold War, its primary mission was to warn the
SAC of an impending Soviet attack so that SAC could
launch its counterstrike.32
NORAD was the result of a gradual process of coordination and cooperation fostered from below by air
defense advocates in both the United States and Canada. Bit by bit, these service members developed pragmatic solutions to complicated issues involving joint
and combined cooperation, diplomacy, and incredibly
complicated technological systems. They overcame
opposition from within their own services, from other
military branches, and from their own governments
to gather allies and advocates, and ultimately estab-
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lished a vast network of radar systems and weapons
to defend North America from atomic attack, and the
organization to control all this. As the strategic and
threat situation evolved, so too did North American
air defense efforts.
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CHAPTER 12
A HISTORY OF NO HISTORY:
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN AIR FORCE, 1917 TO 1948
Gian P. Gentile
INTRODUCTION
The history of the origins of the American Air
Force is, interestingly, a history of a rejection of history. That is to say, as the early thinkers and organizers of the American air arm began to emerge in the
waning years of World War I and into the 1920s, they
eschewed the history of war as irrelevant for them
and their budding service. American airmen, like
many of their European counterparts, believed that
the airplane was a radically transformative piece of
technology and that its use in military operations had
revolutionized war itself. Because the military history
of past wars was confined to fighting on the ground
or at sea—fought without airplanes—airmen considered that history to be irrelevant. How could history
be relevant, they thought, if there were no airplanes
involved? Discarding history, however, caused serious problems, and over the next 20 years—as American air forces were established—created conceptual
holes in their thinking and led them to misunderstand
the nature of their new weapon, its potential effects,
and its overall role in warfare. These problems often
manifested themselves in constructed metaphors and
analogies that tended to confuse and misguide rather
than to explain and inform. Military history, if they
had paid attention to it, might have prevented them
from making these mistakes.
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American airmen started to consider aerial warfare
soon after the Wright Brothers made their first flight,
and, like warfare more generally, it encompasses a variety of complex and interrelated ideas. Even crafting
a logical and generally agreeable definition of “aerial
warfare” is difficult and reveals some of the problems
in approaching the subject ahistorically. First, aerial
warfare can be understood as a category of warfare. It
is the art, or activity, of conducting war from the air.
More specifically, it could be defined as the application of destructive force from things that fly through
the sky. Indeed, in war in general, many things fly
through the sky to kill, or destroy, or observe other
things on the ground.
In 1225, at the famous battle of Agincourt in the
Hundred Years War, King Henry V’s English longbowmen loosed flurries of arrows that flew through
the sky and struck their French enemies. Surely, the
French considered these objects falling from the sky
to pierce their armor dangerous, yet, clearly, this was
not aerial warfare. Thus, one thing that might seem to
make aerial warfare distinct is that the things that fly
through the sky, be they bombs, bullets, or missiles,
are launched from a platform that is also in the sky.
Over time, those platforms have included kites, hot
air balloons, and airplanes; today the possibility exists
of using satellites in outer space. But even this definition is not air tight. Indeed, missiles launched from the
ground that travel across oceans to attack targets—
referred to as intercontinental ballistic missiles—are
also considered part of aerial warfare. Common definitions of aerial warfare also include the reconnaissance and observation of enemy forces and nations.
Generally speaking, “aerial warfare” is the conduct of
war from the sky against other objects in the sky and
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objects on land or at sea as well, either to destroy or
to provide information.1 As the preceding discussion
demonstrates, the history of aerial warfare is closely
linked to the history of ground and sea warfare; ignoring this connection defines the subject too narrowly.
The first flight of an airplane by two American
brothers, Orville and Wilbur Wright, on December
17, 1903 in Kitty Hawk, NC, was the start. The Wright
Brother’s invention had immediate, and obvious, practical military utility. In fact, when The New York Times
broke the story, it reported that the Wright Brothers
were in a hurry to sell their “airship” for “scouting
and signal work, and possibly torpedo warfare” to the
government.2 Word of the Wright Brother’s invention
quickly spread, and within 5 years, the two brothers
were traveling to Europe giving demonstrations of
winged flight. All of the major European armies, as
well as the Japanese army, understood the military
significance of manned aerial flight through the use
of the airplane and began developmental programs in
their armies to build air forces.
But it was World War I, which began in August
1914 over a fragile balance of power between the major European states and would ultimately involve
countries the world over that realized the potential of
the airplane as a primary agent in the conduct of war.
World War I ushered in many of the ideas, methods,
applications, and technological developments of aerial
warfare. Historian Stephen Budiansky rightly notes,
“the effect of the First World War on military aviation was greater than the effect of military aviation on
the war.” What is meant here is that airpower—a new
term that came into widespread use by airmen during World War I and which seemed to encapsulate a
more inclusive conception of the many different forms
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of warfare in the air—did not win the war singlehandedly, nor did it win any battles on the ground, but it
did prove the critical military importance and utility
of airplanes and other machines that flew through the
air. Aerial warfare as it evolved in the 20th century
can trace its roots directly back to World War I.3
The development of fighter aircraft and the training
of pilots to protect reconnaissance aircraft produced,
by the middle part of the war, an idea among airpower advocates that was to have huge consequences
during the remainder of the war and beyond: air superiority—or as Italian airpower theorist Guilio Douhet
called it shortly after the war, “Command of the Air.”
If one side’s airplanes could completely control the
skies either by shooting down the opponent’s aircraft
or keeping them on the ground and thus preventing
them from flying at all, it could then do whatever it
wished from the air. If it controlled the skies, it could
conduct reconnaissance and observation, direct artillery, and strike at targets such as railroads and even
cities which lay deeper in the rear of the field armies.
Airpower advocates came to believe that command of
the air (i.e., operate without interference from enemy
aircraft) was required to have the necessary freedom
of action to pursue their strategic aims.4
As they looked to build their own air arm, American airmen, such as American flyer and combat veteran from World War I Brigadier General William
(Billy) Mitchell, bought into Douhet’s ideas. For them,
command of the air did many things for an air force.
For one, to achieve air superiority was to give raison
d’être for a call for independence from the Army they
supported. They argued that in order to establish
command of the air, airmen had to be left unfettered
by what they saw as the stodgy ways of the ground-
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bound land armies. There was no place for the history of past wars fought on the ground for airmen like
Mitchell and Douhet. Since the history of war prior to
the development of the airplane was naturally about
ground armies and navies in combat, American airmen like Mitchell thought it constrained the potential
of the airplane and airpower because it would make
them subordinate to ground commanders. This was
anathema to them.5 So instead of placing the airplane
in the context of greater military history, they started
from a conceptual scratch that drew on analogies and
metaphors to explain how airpower should be used
and the war winning effects it could create.
It was out of this intellectual ferment that airmen
began to look to the strategic bombing of cities and
other sources of enemy power as a mission fitting for
independent air forces.6 In the minds of many American airmen who flew and fought during World War
I, the use of the airplane in that war established the
immense promise of airpower—namely, that airpower alone could be sufficient to achieve victory in war.
Of these thinkers and practitioners, Italian theorist
of airpower Douhet became the most prominent. In
the 1920s, Douhet argued that the airplane had revolutionized warfare and that, if used and applied correctly, it could eliminate ground warfare in the future.
In his 1921 book, Command of the Air, Douhet, for example, reflected on trench warfare in World War I and
then imagined the next war in which massive fleets
of bombers flew over armies (making them irrelevant
in his mind) and going directly after vital population
centers in enemy cities. Douhet stated that the past
history of warfare provided no guide for war in the
future revolutionized by the airplane and airpower.
Yet, by jettisoning the past through history, Douhet
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came to base his theory of airpower on some very dubious assumptions.
The first and most important of these faulty assumptions was that a fleet of airplanes dropping
bombs on enemy cities and causing terror would necessarily cause that enemy population to force its government to capitulate.7 His views were not uncommon
among air zealots. Mitchell, for example, believed that
the American military must transform itself around
the war-winning potential of the airplane that could
conduct strategic bombing raids against enemy cities
and industry. Both of these men thought World War I
and the use of airplanes in it pointed to a future dominated by aerial warfare.8
During the years between the end of World War I
and the outbreak of World War II, American airmen
developed a doctrine referred to as “high altitude,
daylight precision bombing.” American airmen believed that if the right targets were chosen and bombed
effectively, then an enemy nation’s “industrial web”
could be broken and the nation possibly even forced
to surrender. The term “industrial web” was a metaphor that represented a complex, modern nation-state
and its economy and infrastructure. Embedded within
this metaphor, however, was the theoretical underpinning to the doctrine of “precision bombing.” The
metaphor likened the modern state’s economy and
infrastructure (the industrial web) to the literal web
a spider spins and concluded, therefore, that if the industrial web were hit at certain key points, the entire
web would collapse.
American airmen constructed a theory, which they
argued would work in practice, that fleets of American
bombers flying over enemy cities could drop bombs on
critical targets and destroy them, and from this tacti-
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cal process of destruction, the enemy state would collapse and ultimately surrender.9 A better understanding of history might have suggested otherwise, but
then again, American airmen, as they began to build
their air arm in the 1930s, were not really interested
in what they could learn from history. In order to put
this theory into practice, however, American airmen
understood that they needed to have an independent
air force, unfettered by ground officers wanting to use
air assets in support of operations on land. To be sure,
there was logic to this argument, but American airmen pushed their theory and doctrine into almost a
faith in order to argue for independence. The faith’s
central tenet, then, was the wholehearted acceptance
that airplanes could destroy a so-called “industrial
web” through bombing, and the result would be the
collapse of the enemy state.10
If this airpower religion were, in fact, true, then
it made perfect sense to establish an independent air
arm. However, the establishment of an independent
air arm would have implications for military and national strategy in war, since a large independent air
arm would take scarce resources away from the other
military arms. In the run up to World War II, American airmen were unsuccessful in gaining full independence from the Army, but they had come a long
way toward achieving their goal by the start of World
War II because, in reality, the air arm within the Army
was relatively independent, with its own organizational structure and chain of command. With an air
campaign plan to attack Nazi Germany called Air War
Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1), airmen garnered from
American President Franklin Roosevelt a substantial
commitment in American resources to build an independent fleet of bombers that would put into prac-
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tice the theory and doctrine developed in the 1930s.
But would American “precision bombing” work in
World War II?
As the United States entered the war, it would be
severely tested. In addition to the theoretical underpinning of the industrial-web concept, American airmen
also made a series of important tactical assumptions,
namely that their bombers could fly during the day
and protect themselves from enemy fighters with their
large amounts of protective machine guns on board.
This assumption was deadly. In August 1943, after
about a year of building up its bomber fleet to attack
German industry, the American Air Forces took such
serious losses from German fighters and anti-aircraft
fire from below that they had to reassess their operations fundamentally. From that month on, American
bombers usually had fighter protection as they flew.
As the war went on, American airmen were always hopeful that their bombing campaigns against
Germany and Japan would produce victory—namely
the unconditional surrender of both states—through
airpower alone. With regard to Germany, this did not
happen, and it ultimately took the combinations of aerial bombardment by American and British air forces
with ground operations in France and to the East, and
then into the heart of Germany to bring about German
surrender. Certainly, airpower played a critical role in
the defeat of Germany, but it did not do it by itself
as the originators of the “industrial web” theory had
hoped. Japan, and its surrender, presented a less clear
cut case as to what ended the war in the Pacific.11
Indeed, as World War II came to an end in the
Pacific in August 1945, nearly 4 months after it ended in Europe, American airmen began to argue that
airpower delivered by the Army Air Forces (AAF)
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largely alone had defeated Japan and brought about
its unconditional surrender. A major report sponsored
by the AAF and produced at the end of the War, the
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, argued that
British and American strategic bombing did not end
the war on their own in Europe, though it had contributed greatly to that end. But with regard to Japan, the
survey’s authors argued in a breathtaking conclusion
regarding the cause for Japan’s unconditional surrender that even if the United States had not dropped two
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and even
if a land invasion had never been planned or contemplated, Japan still would have surrendered due to the
effects of the American strategic bombing campaign
against Japanese cities.12
So, in the pages of the Strategic Bombing Survey,
American airmen and their civilian proponents sought
to create a fresh history of the end of World War II
in Japan as the result solely of American airpower.
Other events that played a crucial war in Japan’s surrender—like the Navy’s successful campaign to wreck
Japanese commerce from the sea, the threat of a major
American land invasion, and the Soviet entrance into
the war—were all buried under a newly-created history that sought to place the cause of American victory over Japan on the backs of American bombers.
But the actual history of why the war ended in Japan
was much more complex than the simplistic notion
that American bombers pummeling Japanese cities
had won the war. In the next 2 years, from 1945 to
1947, American airmen used these sorts of conclusions
from the Strategic Bombing Survey to help them gain
congressional approval to establish an independent
AAF in 1947.13
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American airmen began their crusade for an independent Air Force after World War I with a rejection
of history outright. Then, at the end of World War
II, they constructed a fresh history from scratch, but
that scratch-made history ignored the greater causes
and complexities of ending the war in the Pacific.
This flawed history, on which the AAF was founded,
would haunt the United States in the years ahead as
it foolishly guided an American air effort in the Vietnam War that hoped to break Vietnamese communist
will through aerial destruction. As was the case in the
past, in the absence of solid historical reasoning and
military analysis, American military leaders in Vietnam fell back on the use of metaphors to try to explain
what they were doing. Air Force Chief of Staff and former World War II American bomber leader General
Curtis LeMay said that, in order to defeat the communists, the United States should bomb North Vietnam
“back into the stone age.”14 LeMay’s quip betrays the
theoretical underpinnings of American airpower that
went back to the notions of “industrial web” in World
War II in that by breaking North Vietnam’s “industrial web,” it would be placed back into the “stone age”
and hence would surrender to American demands.
But the seduction of metaphor in place of sound historical reasoning prevented airmen like LeMay from
realizing that as far as industrial power went, North
Vietnam was already in the “stone age” at that time.
Still, the use of metaphors instead of sound historical thinking would continue. The next metaphor that
clouded clear military thinking based on flawed notions of the history of airpower would be the belief
in 2003 at the beginning of the second American War
in Iraq that American airplanes dropping bombs and
missiles from the sky would “shock and awe” Iraq into
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submission. Again, faulty historical thinking that produced understanding through metaphor prevented a
clear-eyed view of what airpower could really accomplish in war, and more importantly its limits.
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CHAPTER 13
TRIAL AND ERROR:
THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY
Kevin A. Scott
INTRODUCTION
The conflicts of the early-20th century showed the
American government the value of collecting communications intelligence (COMINT) on the enemies, and
sometimes the friends, of the United States. Interservice rivalries and the lack of collection coordination
initially hampered this effort. However, the global nature of World War II forced the services to tentatively
deconflict their COMINT collection responsibilities.
The U.S. Government also provided its military with
incredible amounts of resources to accomplish this
mission. This situation changed significantly at the
end of World War II. With rapid demobilization came
reduced resources to continue the COMINT mission.
At the same time, more and more government agencies requested access to intelligence about the Soviet
Union. President Harry Truman signed the National
Security Act of 1947 in part to coordinate COMINT
collection. The act created the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) as a mechanism
for synchronization between America’s COMINT collectors and its consumers, but the system did not work
smoothly because the USCIB did not have the authority to compel the cooperation of its constituents. In
1949 the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was
established in an attempt to solve some of these prob-
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lems by merging the COMINT sections with the armed
forces, but this military solution ignored the needs of
civilian agencies. This fact, combined with significant
intelligence failures during the Korean War, prompted
Truman to create the National Security Agency (NSA)
in 1952, with the express mission of controlling the
COMINT collection for the U.S. Government.
In the Presidential Directive that created the NSA
in 1952, COMINT was defined as “all procedures and
methods used in the interception of communications
other than foreign press and propaganda broadcasts
and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients.”1 Although the United States already conducted rudimentary COMINT in each of its conflicts, this field did not
really come into its own until the widespread use of
radios in the early-20th century made the interception
of enemy transmissions relatively easy. But this ability to read enemy messages did not translate directly
into an effective collection program because it was so
resource intensive to keep up with the increasing sophistication of the methods used to protect these messages. American COMINT changed during the 20th
century to meet the challenges posed by each new
national conflict, and the trend during this period was
toward centralization. The U.S. Government brought
most of its communications assets together with the
creation of the NSA in 1952. Truman ordered the creation of the NSA to reinforce the primacy of civilian
control over the COMINT apparatus and to streamline the use of intelligence resources.
The technology that allowed for the rapid transmission of messages over great distances developed
in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. The Great
War (World War I) taught American military leaders
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the importance of securing their own long-range communications and the advantages that could be gained
by intercepting the internal messages of their adversaries.2 Following World War I, the U.S. Government
relied upon the Army and the Navy to conduct the
COMINT mission. While the services had the equipment and manpower to accomplish this task, it also
proved to be another venue for intraservice competition. As an NSA history of the period notes, “each
[service] worked . . . on those military and naval targets of direct interest to themselves.”3 Army and naval
COMINT assets were not always employed against
corresponding targets, which prevented them from
creating a holistic intelligence picture. The services
also used their monopoly on COMINT to intercept
the diplomatic cables of foreign governments, resulting in duplicated efforts as both services attempted
to impress the President and the Secretary of State by
being the first to update them on such transmissions.4
Thus, interservice competition and an unclear mission for the military COMINT collection and analysis
programs in the 1920s and 1930s resulted in both inefficient collection of intelligence and an incomplete
intelligence picture.
This parochialism began to change during World
War II when the demands of a two-front war forced
the Armed Services to begin working together to
manage the collection of COMINT. In June 1942, representatives of the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) met to plan the COMINT focus
of each of their agencies and, by extension, the U.S.
Government. Under the pressure of fighting in both
the Atlantic and the Pacific Theaters, the Navy agreed
to let the Army collect all diplomatic traffic until the
end of the war.5 This marked the first time that either
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service agreed to cede any primacy in the politically
critical realm of diplomatic intelligence. The attendees
also recommended that other governmental agencies
should be prohibited from collecting COMINT to prevent the expansion of this key field outside the control
of military and law enforcement authorities.6 They
wanted to keep COMINT collection and management
capabilities within the agencies best prepared to conduct this mission and to exploit the information provided. Though this meeting was successful and the
services were willing to compromise in order to complete the wartime mission, the COMINT environment
was still inherently competitive. The services did not
want any more competition in the COMINT field, and
the President agreed for the duration of the war.
The Armed Forces’ ability initially to integrate and
then cooperate in the collection of intelligence contributed to the successful exploitation of enemy communications throughout World War II. Among other
achievements, the Army successfully deciphered
Japanese diplomatic traffic, while the Navy decoded
many Japanese and German naval messages.7 The services effectively established a connection between COMINT collection and battlefield success. As a result,
they expanded their COMINT collection and analysis
operations. Recognizing the utility of working together, and not wanting to provide room for bureaucratic
competitors, the services created the Army-Navy
Communications Intelligence Board (ANCIB) in 1944
to further facilitate collaboration and to arbitrate any
disagreements.8 By the end of the war, the uniformed
services had enough men, equipment, and money to
maintain COMINT coverage across most of the world.
The end of World War II, however, affected American intelligence collection in conflicting ways, es-
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sentially decreasing resources across the board, but
increasing the number of agencies demanding a role
in collecting COMINT. First, as a result of Truman’s
order for rapid demobilization, an 80 percent reduction in the size of the U.S. military created shortages in
both manpower and experience that rendered worldwide coverage impossible.9 Second, other governmental agencies, unwilling to adhere to the wartime
precedent of deferring COMINT collection to military
ownership, claimed a role in the process. These agencies, which had become heavily reliant on COMINT
products during and after the war, wanted to shape
collection priorities in addition to accessing products
already collected by the now understaffed military
collectors. By 1946, both the State Department and the
FBI had joined the once exclusively military ANCIB,
now known as the USCIB. The military did, however,
maintain control over the national COMINT focus because it still owned the collection assets. This arrangement led to growing tension between the civilian
federal agencies and their uniformed counterparts,
as both desired detailed intelligence about their own
specific national missions.
These de facto cooperative policies were transformed into a more organized collection strategy in
1947, when the President signed the National Security
Act, as part of a broader program intended to provide
coherence to the government’s defensive posture in
the post-war world and to reassert civilian control
over the American military. The act established the
National Security Council (NSC), whose mission was
to advise the president about national security matters and to promote cooperation among governmental departments.10 In its role as primary coordinating
agency, the NSC began issuing Intelligence Directives
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(NSCIDs) to identify the specific missions of each intelligence organization and to prevent any overlap or
redundancy. Issued in March 1950, Directive Number
9, “Communications Intelligence,” added the newlyformed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the USCIB membership and gave the USCIB the mission to
affect “the authoritative coordination of Communications Intelligence activities of the Government.”11
Recognizing an increased role for other nonmilitary,
federal agencies in national defense, the act widened
participation in the USCIB and added additional oversight from the NSC. This structure added more civilian oversight to the military collection program and
attempted to increase the efficiency of intelligence
sharing within the government, thereby meeting
the growing demands for information and reducing
tensions between intelligence consumers.
Since many considered the Soviet Union (then the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]) the primary threat to the United States and its foreign policy, the
USCIB focused the American COMINT collection assets against the USSR. The Army and Navy had early
success intercepting and decoding Soviet governmental communications, but Soviet defensive measures including landlines and cipher systems made COMINT
collection increasingly troublesome, if not impossible.
Additionally, each armed service maintained separate
collection efforts against their Soviet sister service in
addition to the other requested targets coming from
the USCIB, which reignited the interservice competition that had characterized COMINT collection prior
to World War II. In 1947, the creation of the U.S. Air
Force (USAF) only exacerbated this problem. The
fledgling Air Force Security Service demanded that it
be allowed to gather COMINT about the Soviet strate-
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gic bomber force, but without the manpower, budget,
or expertise to do so, the chief of USAF intelligence
admitted that his organization’s COMINT ability was
severely lacking.12 The military’s inability to produce
valuable COMINT due to a shortage of trained specialists and collection equipment led to complaints
throughout the government and from the USCIB itself.13 To address these issues, Secretary of Defense
Louis A. Johnson issued Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 2010 on May 20, 1949, establishing the AFSA.
Its mission was to “conduct all communications intelligence and communications security activities within
the Department of Defense [DoD].”14 He hoped that
unification would force the services’ cryptologic units
to work together more efficiently to provide a better
product.
As it looked for more effective ways to manage the
collection of COMINT, DoD studied several foreign
examples. The first system they analyzed was the contemporary, integrated Soviet cryptographic program.
Advocates of centralization argued that the unified Soviet communications program allowed them to more
effectively utilize all of their resources and expertise
by avoiding the duplication faced by American officials.15 Others looked to the most recent experience
of worldwide conflict, World War II, to understand
the most useful way to build a global intelligence
collection network. They asserted that decentralization hampered German COMSEC (communications
security) while consolidation facilitated British communications interception and decoding efforts.16 For
them, the events surrounding the Allied cracking of
the Enigma code and the subsequent inability of German intelligence to recognize this situation supported their push for American COMINT centralization.
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These examples supported the drive within the DoD
to consolidate its intelligence structure in the form of
AFSA. They did little, though, to identify the proper
role for civilian agencies in the COMINT collection
and analysis process.
Though it represented progress in synchronization
of the military collection effort, the creation of AFSA
also complicated the bureaucratic controversy characteristic of the ongoing rivalry for primacy in directing COMINT. The civilian agencies each thought that
AFSA’s new mission conflicted with the mission of the
USCIB.17 They did not object to the goals of efficiency
and economy espoused by the Secretary of Defense,
but they did fear losing the ability to provide input
concerning the conduct of COMINT collection. The
Director of the AFSA reported to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Because of this relationship, the civilian agencies
suspected that the JCS alone was establishing the COMINT priorities for the new agency and the military
collection assets that belonged to it; a task that they
claimed rightfully belonged to the USCIB. For the civilian agencies, this arrangement contradicted the intentions of the 1947 National Security Act and NSCID
9.18 Johnson had also gotten presidential approval for
the merger without the consent of the USCIB. This
end-run infuriated the nonmilitary agency representatives and earned him their mistrust.
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 tested
the ability of the new American intelligence community to respond effectively to international crisis. Structural problems inherent in the design of the national
COMINT apparatus, particularly the overlap and
resulting tension between AFSA and USCIB, became
apparent with the outbreak of the Korean War on June
25, 1950. The North Korean invasion took the Ameri-
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can intelligence community by complete surprise. The
first problem was that AFSA was under-resourced
and, as a result, the majority of U.S. COMINT intercept and processing personnel were assigned to Soviet
communications, which were considered to have collection priority.19 In fact, staffing levels were so low
that many targets were given a lower priority or, in
many cases, ignored. This lack of focus on credible,
but non-critical target areas like North Korea meant
that, at the time of the invasion, “there were no traffic
analysts working on North Korean communications,
no Korean linguists . . . and an almost total absence
of knowledge of North Korean terminology.”20 For an
American military used to communications superiority, such a failure was shocking. This lack of resources
was acknowledged in a July 1950 Joint Chiefs memorandum that directed that AFSA receive 1,961 additional COMINT personnel and an $8.13 million dollar
increase in Fiscal Year 1951.21 Such increases were welcome, but having lost many trained and experienced
personnel to post-war staff reductions, this infusion
of people and money would take time to achieve
meaningful results.
The second problem highlighted by the Korean
War was the ambiguous nature of AFSA’s relationship with the tactical COMINT units of the military
services. The AFSA charter “excluded from AFSA’s
control those COMINT facilities and activities that
served in direct support of the field commanders for
the purpose of providing tactical intelligence.”22 This
exclusion limited AFSA’s ability to intercept strategic communications because they were forced to rely
on the same collection assets as the military’s tactical
commanders. This issue became more complex once
the North Koreans instituted more stringent commu-
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nications security on their higher level traffic. This
transition eliminated the little strategic intelligence
that AFSA had been intercepting. Tactical intercepts
became the only source of COMINT, and both AFSA
and the field commanders wanted priority in analyzing and exploiting it. This limited the effectiveness
of AFSA in the eyes of other governmental agencies
that did not have ready access to tactical COMINT of
the military services and reignited the old collection
rivalries.
The intelligence failures of the Korean War left
AFSA and military dominance within the COMINT
system vulnerable to critics who advocated a new COMINT strategy. Walter B. Smith, Director of Central
Intelligence, proposed a review of Communications
Intelligence activities to the NSC. In a memorandum
dated December 10, 1951, he stated that:
it is believed that existing means of control over, and
coordination of, the collection and process of Communications Intelligence have proved ineffective. . . .
Because of the unique value of Communications Intelligence, this matter directly affects the national
security.23

In response, Truman ordered the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director of Central Intelligence
to form a special committee to survey the national COMINT structure.24 They formed the Brownell Committee, consisting of representatives from the State Department and the CIA. Significantly, the military was
excluded in the review process.25 This circumstance
could not help but telegraph the conclusion that both
the President and civilian authorities were dissatisfied
with military efforts at planning and synchronization
and therefore sought to reorganize these systems to
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civilian specifications. Ultimately, the mistrust created
by this unilateral change under Johnson ensured that
the civilian agencies would not seek input from the
military branches as they designed its successor.
First, the civilian agency-dominated Brownell
Committee focused on the government’s institutional
intelligence relationships. They identified COMINT
resources as “being national in nature.”26 This was a
critical source of intelligence, which was very important to more than just the military. Even though the
civilian agencies had a vote on the U.S. Communication Intelligence Board, the military controlled the actual collection by having AFSA report directly to the
JCS. To make COMINT more responsive to agencies
outside the military, Brownell’s committee advocated
that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the JCS, directly control AFSA. For the first time, a civilian would
be directly responsible for the organization that collected the COMINT. They also put forth the idea that
the USCIB be reorganized and given “greater responsibility for ‘policy and coordination’ in COMINT matters.”27 These changes would allow for more oversight
and information sharing as part of a truly national
COMINT effort.
Second, the committee determined that AFSA’s
authority should be broadened in order to streamline
its efforts and increase productivity. The committee
concluded that the problem of insufficient resources
resulted from the fact that AFSA had “insufficient authority or control over the COMINT activities of the
three services.”28 Without the ability to force compliance from the service’s COMINT activities, the AFSA
director had to waste time and effort negotiating
with the service representatives for collection assets
needed to fulfill the mission. Therefore, the committee
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recommended that “AFSA should have operational
and technical control over all the COMINT collection
and production resources of the military services.”29
This would not only save AFSA officials time but also
avoid the duplication of intelligence effort across the
armed services. The second problem the committee
noted was a transient workforce. A lot of time and
money went into training COMINT collectors and analysts. However, the report noted a high rate of turnover due, in large part, to “the lack of professional and
managerial opportunities for the civilian workforce.”30
Civilians felt excluded from decisionmaking roles in
these primarily military organizations. To remedy
this, Brownell’s committee suggested that AFSA open
up more leadership paths to civilian employees.
The President agreed with most of the Brownell
Committee’s recommendations and issued a Directive on October 24, 1952, entitled “Communications
Intelligence Activities.” As recommended, Truman
ordered the creation of the newly-named NSA. To
reassert civilian control of communications intelligence, he identified the Secretary of Defense as “executive agent of the Government, for the purpose of
COMINT information.”31 The USCIB was also given
a clearer mandate and all civilian agencies received
two votes on the board as opposed to each military
service’s one. This directive also clarified that the
military’s COMINT services worked for the NSA director without the qualifications that had hampered
AFSA leadership. Civilian concerns were addressed
by mandating that the military director “have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to
ensure the mobilization and effective employment of
the best available human and scientific resources.”32
In this manner the Presidential Directive reasserted

228

civilian control of COMINT and streamlined the use
of limited governmental resources.
The first director of the NSA, Army Lieutenant
General Ralph Canine, also worked to win the trust of
his civilian workforce. To maintain the secret nature
of this new organization, DoD planned to establish the
NSA headquarters at Fort Knox, KY. This disturbed a
larger portion of the cryptologic workforce who lived
in and around Washington, DC. Canine petitioned the
Secretary of Defense to keep the NSA close to the capital for the principal purpose of mollifying his civilians.33 This action, combined with new opportunities
for advancement, demonstrated the importance that
NSA leaders placed on their combined military and
civilian workforce.
These policy changes at both the national and
agency levels reflected the growing importance of
civilians to the national defense following the end of
World War II. Nonmilitary federal agencies demanded more say in the decisions regarding the targeting
and exploitation of COMINT. Civilian specialists also
wanted more recognition of their skills and the ability to move into leadership positions. These trends,
combined with a military establishment looking to
maximize the use of their finite resources, led to the
centralization of American COMINT in the period between World War II and the Korean War. This evolution can be seen in the NSA’s original 1952 structure.
While imperfect, the NSA initial organization was
the successful product of hard-earned experience and
bureaucratic maneuvering.
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CHAPTER 14
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Matthew J. Flynn
INTRODUCTION
The following analysis of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) targets issues and challenges
confronting the department as it was “stood up” in an
atmosphere of crisis in the wake of the September 11,
2001 (9/11) attacks. DHS is portrayed as a department
struggling to complete its mission without adversely
affecting civil liberties at home, all while requiring
military assets to protect the homeland from terrorist
attacks and to mitigate the effects of natural disasters.
On the positive side, DHS is seen as setting a new path
in terms of defining military actions and capabilities in
an area germane to, and intimately linked to, the civilian sphere. This chapter is presented with the caveat
that the publications discussing DHS are remarkably
limited, and rectifying this deficiency will be essential
to telling the full creation story of DHS.
Formed in the aftermath of the tragedy of 9/11,
DHS is a key security organization, which, as of this
writing, is still developing a command structure. The
key question is how (and how effectively) DHS managed unprecedented challenges in terms of “standing
up” a command. Because of a lack of available DHS
source information, however, it is difficult to pinpoint
key players and measure results and achievements.
While its relative newness within the defense system
means a lack of historical perspective and concrete
conclusions about its formation, it also makes it a
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compelling case study precisely because it is so new.
Indeed, in a changing world featuring terrorism and
related threats, DHS may be a useful model to study
as new commands learn how best to balance military
and civilian concerns in terms of planning operations, understanding the effect of technology on the
security apparatus, and gauging whether the scope of
such challenges are beyond a single agency’s ability to
address. This last point is unsettling, for if a department cannot complete its mission, how then does one
cope with the changing world and the resultant dangers that affect national security? The DHS currently
wrestles with this very problem, and if it does so imperfectly, it is certainly not for lack of attention to the
issue. Rather, the primary challenge for DHS—and,
indeed, for any command that must fully integrate civilian and military components—is that it must seek
security in a primarily civilian setting without curbing
foundational American civil liberties.
ORIGINS
DHS faced structural command challenges from its
inception. There are two main reasons for this. First,
those responsible for shaping the department had to
calculate whether a domestic response to terrorism
should include both a civilian and military component
and, if so, in what mix. Second, decisionmakers feared
the department was too large, with too much bureaucracy that could render it ineffectual. These concerns
grew out of the crisis-driven context of the creation of
DHS, coming as it did in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These two fundamental problems were not
resolved early on, and DHS faced reorganization after
only a year in existence.
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The sense of all those involved in the formation
of DHS was that the new Cabinet-level department
was essential to face a new threat, that of terror. What
this organization most represented to its creators was
a response to a new age, one dominated by terrorist threats, and therefore the DHS was upheld as the
“cutting edge” answer to this new era, at least on the
home front. In this view, there were (and are) no analogies to past organizations or commands that could be
made, since it represented a fundamental departure
from the past.
Just how “new” this all was, however, is questionable. The terror attacks of 9/11 may have been new
in how they were delivered, but external threats to
American security obviously have always existed. So,
for DHS, the key was to ask whether it was in danger
of overkill when it came to creating a new bureaucracy to respond to the threat. This was, especially in an
era that was imbued with a conservative mantra of not
“growing” government, a deeply political question
related to long-standing debates within the American
system about the appropriate level of government
presence at home. Thus, the fear of a garrison (militarized) state, honed during the Cold War, permeates
this discussion, and it does so for good reason. The
question is, essentially, this: In response to a terrorist
attack on the home front, whether by an internal or
external enemy, what is the required response? Does
it require a military response, civilian response, or any
change at all at home? In sum, are law enforcement
agencies obsolete in this new age of terrorism, and if
they are, is the DHS equipped to fill the void?
Those involved in standing up DHS, and presumably sustaining it now, declared that a change was
necessary. The assumption behind the entire edifice of
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DHS is that 9/11 was possible to a large degree because
of the failure of government agencies to work together
and share information. Infamously, and underscoring
this problem, many of the terrorists perpetrating the
attacks had trained at American flight schools, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was aware
of this before the attacks occurred.1 The implication
is that more effective communication within the government may have thwarted the attackers. So, better
coordinating the government’s response became the
initial mandate of DHS, one involving almost 180,000
government employees and billions of dollars. The urgency of the situation lent credence to the belief that a
better home front defense could be accomplished with
the vast government apparatus already in place if only
that apparatus were better managed. In the rush to
form DHS, this basic assumption went unquestioned.
Initially, the department consisted of five directorates: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency
Preparedness and Response; Science and Technology;
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection;
and Management. Under Tom Ridge, the first head
of DHS, it became a viable agency in this form on
January 24, 2003.
FROM RIDGE TO CHERTOFF
Circumstance soon forced the DHS to redefine itself as something more than an organization designed
to stop terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Hurricane Katrina’s devastation and destruction of New Orleans,
LA, prompted this realignment of purpose in August
2005. “Homeland security” would now include a
broader mission of emergency relief and disaster response. Michael Chertoff, the second head of the DHS,
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recast the Department’s mission statement with this
dual purpose made clear:
pursue a unified, risk-managed strategy of preventing
or reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism and
natural disasters . . . a strategy designed to guard the
nation and its infrastructure from dangerous people
and material, while mitigating the consequences of disasters by strengthening the nation’s emergency preparedness and response systems.2

But the National Security Agency (NSA), Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the FBI all remained
outside of the domain of the DHS. Instead, the Coast
Guard, the Secret Service, the Border Patrol, and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) served
to provide manpower and military assets for DHS.
This dilemma—that DHS was charged with a mission requiring military force, but equipped with no
military assets—left the issue of orientation unresolved: was the DHS more a military instrument or a
civilian one?
Of course, there were starts and stops to what
was the largest restructuring of the federal government since the National Security Act of 1947 and the
creation, among other things, of the National Security Council (NSC), the President’s advisory body on
foreign affairs, and the CIA. Chertoff, who took over
from Ridge on February 15, 2005, outlined a six-point
review looking to “transform” the department.3 Chertoff’s review was, essentially, an admission of initial
failure, which necessitated transformation of the DHS.
But what came next was more circumspect in concept
and implementation, and perhaps did not represent
a transformation so much as a restructuring that ultimately changed little and perpetuated existing problems and concerns.
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In Chertoff’s view, the biggest change was his insistence on a more powerful administrative arm answering to the director. One part, the Homeland Security
Advisory Council, looks to better share information
with federal agencies and state and local authorities. The other, the National Infrastructure Advisory
Council, provides guidance on securing information
systems of public and private institutions critical to
the nation’s economy. The need to pull the threads
of domestic security together, and do so to gain actionable intelligence but not overstep mandates, fell
to one individual. Since the management office that
had done much of this in the previous organizational
scheme had been abolished, the burden was all the
greater and raised questions of feasibility and workability of the department at the top. In short, were two
advisory bodies really better than one?
Additionally, instead of five directorates, a number
of “primary components” (and at times labeled directorates) now constituted the department: Directorate
for Preparedness; Directorate for Science and Technology; Office of Intelligence and Analysis; Office of Operations Coordination; Policy Directorate; Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and Border Security. To some
degree, these changes retained the narrow standing
(i.e., to fight terrorism) of the DHS when first stood
up. But to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, the
structure needed to reflect this mission as well. Better
policy coordination, better intelligence and information sharing, efficiency of operations, consolidating
preparedness assets—all these aims were to be better
achieved via reorganization. Of course, it is arguable
that these measures could have occurred within the
existing structure and had, in fact, been goals of the
first organization.
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In admitting, however tacitly, this structural flaw,
the subsequent reorganization of DHS emphasized
investment in the training of personnel so that they
would perform better on the job. Linking this step
to successful reorganization was specious, however.
More concrete, and perhaps more important, were
two changes: moving FEMA into a line that reported
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security and
creating a new assistant secretary of cyber security to
identify and assess cyber threats. These were changes
for the better. But these moves, when taken together,
highlighted a department establishing its foundation
along two different fault lines. One was a move to
advance DHS beyond its initial concern of defeating
terrorism at home in order to include mitigating the
impact of natural disasters, and the second was a recognition of the prominent role played by technology
in stopping terror threats to America.
Did these ends require a complete restructuring of
the DHS to succeed and did this occur? On paper, a
new series of directorates were enacted constituting a
transformation. But a paper model only underscored
the need for outstanding personnel, and this was, at
times, overtly acknowledged. In sum, what would
make DHS function best was a streamlined organization staffed with talented and dedicated personnel.
This remained the mission under Chertoff as much as
it had been under Ridge, so exactly what was transformed remained unclear.
A focus on achieving better security again raised
the fault-line issue, however. Renewed emphasis on
strengthening the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
provided DHS with its own intelligence arm, a near
military function. A Directorate for Preparedness,
however, brought to the foreground the civilian side
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of DHS as first responder training, citizen awareness, public health, and infrastructure security were
all established as priorities. These steps did not alleviate the tension of defining homeland security as
confronting the new threat of terrorism at home and
simultaneously addressing the long-standing need to
better cope with natural disasters. Furthermore, many
experts considered both of these essentially military
problems, but the existing DHS structure was disallowed a military component to meet these challenges.
This contradiction remains unresolved.
There are additional aspects of the undertaking.
DHS represented a consolidation of bureaucracy as a
number of existing agencies were simply moved under its umbrella (e.g., transportation, treasury, and agriculture). Others were eliminated and valued features
subsumed into other parts of the DHS apparatus (e.g.,
the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the Energy
Security and Assurance Program).4 For those decrying
its size, some 187,000 employees, this centralization
was a mitigating factor.
The organizational structures of DHS as described
in both incarnations, are, in reality, but a thin layer
of bureaucracy trying to pull together existing government agencies that failed to coordinate with one
another in the past. With the establishment of DHS,
the government got marginally bigger, but arguably
more coordinated, at least on paper. The Directorate of Policy, for example, targeted this end directly
by ensuring implementation of policies, regulations,
and initiatives across DHS. Reality, though, fell to the
human element. Could personnel satisfactorily staff
the DHS and make existing parts work as a whole?
Janet Napolitano, the third head of the department,
tacitly endorsed this assumption once again when she
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did little to change its structure after taking over on
January 20, 2009.5
Another tension in DHS structure, one which was
not resolved but managed, was that of lateral enmeshment in the overall machinery of the U.S. Government. Under Chertoff, the Office of Legislative and
Intergovernmental Affairs was charged with the task
of ensuring that DHS coordinated its actions with the
office of the President and with state and city governments. But the immense need for coordination in this
respect made it clear that “homeland security” was a
task larger than the already huge department. The reality was that as the larger mandate necessitated ever
deeper ties between DHS and the outside world, this
fact could be managed but not resolved or eliminated.
Access to the President had been accomplished early
on with a cabinet seat for the department head. But
to subsume state and local authorities into the department was absurd; to name additional figures to
oversee such interaction was equally undesirable—
adding personnel without any appreciable benefit.
The expectation was that dynamic leaders in already
existing key positions within DHS could overcome,
by successful management, any possible problems of
coordination or communication.
GOING FORWARD
Following the structural evolution of DHS, however, does not necessarily speak to its effectiveness. It
probably has better coordinated existing governmental agencies. But the more concrete measure of results
lies in the answer to more obvious questions: has it
helped prevent a terrorist attack, and did it speed a
response to a domestic crisis? When asking these
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questions, the proverbial dilemma becomes how to
prove a negative. There has not been a successful terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, but many experts
are not willing to allow DHS to take the credit. The
color-coded threat level advisory system (now three
colors, not five) came under criticism for heightening
concern, but offering no coping methods should the
concerns prove validated. Estimates indicate that far
too much of U.S. freight, shipping, and other ports of
entry are not sufficiently checked. Airport security has
called itself into question with search criteria of passengers. In terms of disaster relief, there has not been
a crisis on the scale of Hurricane Katrina, and hopefully there will not be one. The British Petroleum (BP)
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 exemplified the
difficulty of classifying “disasters.” Whatever it was,
many critiqued the Barack Obama administration for
failing to respond quickly and decisively to the problem. Was this the fault of the DHS as well?
What this partial list points to is a department still
in need of proving itself. But how can it? Homeland
security in the United States is a zero-sum game, and
this expectation is given life by domestic politics. A
terrorist attack would adversely influence the voters’ view of the sitting political party. The BP oil spill
probably did have a negative impact on the polls for
Democrats in that year, although it would have been
but one factor of defeat.
Regrettably, this dynamic brings the conversation full circle—is the fundamental challenge for
DHS one of structure or mandate? Can DHS keep the
country safe whatever its structure? This chapter has
suggested that it cannot. Yet this does not mean the
department is dysfunctional, that finding the right
organization would solve the problem, or that DHS
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represents a vain effort at achieving better homeland
security. Rather, the preceding analysis suggests that
the mandate is simply larger than DHS’s capabilities. The question that remains is whether DHS could
stop a terrorist attack or respond to a natural disaster
such as Hurricane Katrina without a kinetic military
component. This question speaks to a larger concern:
that the American government still lacks coordination
when looking to respond to the challenge of homeland security. The DHS has attempted to marshal the
civilian sector. Is this enough?
A NOTE ON SOURCES
There are surprisingly few publications covering
DHS. A larger vein of literature addresses the general
concept of homeland security. See, for example, Understanding Homeland Security by John B. Noftsinger,6
and Bruce Maxwell, editor of Homeland Security: A
Documentary History.7 Often, these studies, like the
Maxwell book, present a historical overview and then
bring things current. Only a few of these studies comment on the structure of the DHS at some length. Tom
Lansford, in To Protect and Defend: US Homeland Security Policy, offers a chapter on the department’s organization.8 Jane A. Bullock, in Introduction to Homeland
Security, provides more comprehensive coverage than
does Lansford’s book, but again, like Lansford, offers
only one chapter, “Organizational Actions,” on structure and formation of the department.9 The overall focus of these two books, like all of this literature, is the
general concept of homeland security. Additionally,
both books are stilted toward being noninterpretative,
the Bullock book in particular, given that it is basically
a textbook. So structure and organization of the DHS
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is present in the most generic and base way imaginable when it is present.
Ridge and Chertoff wrote books addressing their
roles in homeland security. Interestingly, neither comments directly on the DHS in any way. Rather, they offer their views on achieving better homeland security,
assuming that this is something they imprinted on
the organization they led. Both offer shallow analysis,
conjecture, and anecdotal evidence.10
In sum, there is no good history of the DHS, let
alone a good history of its organization and its “stand
up” process. Nor is there a historian assigned to the
DHS. The U.S. Army Historical Directory 2010 lists
the position of “Chief Historian” as vacant. Phone
calls to DHS Office of Public Affairs, as listed in the
Army directory, produced no one answering to the
title of historian in any way. The previous historian
was Priscilla Jones, and a phone conversation with
her confirmed that position is currently vacant. Jones
served under Chertoff and he, according to her, did
not value a historian as part of DHS.
More promising is primary research that follows
the evolution of the DHS from President George
Bush’s proposal, to the DHS as conceived of in both
houses of Congress, to its fate in conference prior to
becoming officially operational. Chertoff’s “transformation” of the department has created another extensive paper trail. The steps in the process of “standing
up” the DHS are starkly presented in this chapter. It
would be valuable to determine the nuance to this picture in terms of the DHS stand up based on this evidence. Also, decisionmakers involved in this process
can be identified beyond what is done here, and that is
following the lead of the secondary sources and referencing the department heads, Ridge, Chertoff, and in
passing, Napolitano.
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An extensive look at congressional records, coupled with interviews of key personnel, including
the retired former heads of the department, can go
a long way to augmenting and confirming many of
the important issues and concerns raised in this chapter. Such a chapter promises to initiate the first real
substantial book-length history of DHS, a worthwhile
endeavor in its own right. Cyber Command would be
wise to back such a study, given the DHS’s own interest in stopping terrorism and doing so in the cyber
world. Avoiding mistakes, emulating successes, and,
better still, avoiding duplication of effort, these steps
forward could be better undertaken with such a study
in hand.
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CHAPTER 15
CONCLUSION
Ty Seidule
COMMON ISSUES FOR NEW SECURITY
ORGANIZATIONS
Since 1947, most newly created security organizations have had at least one of four tacit missions. The
first is to create a single, integrated command separate from the parochial services or other federal agencies. The second is to provide more civilian oversight
of military and intelligence organizations. The third
mission is to integrate other countries into America’s
security posture. The final mission is to integrate new
technology. In many cases, incorporating new technology into security organizations requires overcoming joint, combined, and interagency problems. While
technology, then, does require new organizations, an
implied purpose is an attempt to overcome service rivalry for roles and missions. Listed in this book are
themes that warrant careful thought as new organizations stand up.
Organizational Rivalry.
The trouble with organizing a thing is that pretty soon
folks get to paying more attention to the organization
than to what they’re organized for.1
Laura Ingalls Wilder

We looked at the creation of many different types
of security organizations; interservice or interagency
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competition played a role in almost all of their creations. The fight for general officer billets, resources,
and turf is so ubiquitous that it becomes a natural part
of the organizational landscape. Major Seanegan Sculley describes in the creation of Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) that a new organization inherently upsets
the old order.2 The Navy never approved of JFCOM
despite overseeing it, and throughout the many incarnations of this organization, the Navy worked to
undermine it. The reorganization after the September
11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks stripped JFCOM of its
operational responsibilities, hastening its death. Faced
with reorganization, each service will see opportunity
for gains or losses and fight ruthlessly (although bureaucratically, thankfully) for its best interest.
If interservice fighting is inherent, are there remedies? Each reform was to some degree an attempt to
quell service rivalry, thereby increasing efficiency and
efficacy. Yet, perhaps ironically, the process for creating new organizations has often invited or initiated
rivalry, even as the ultimate goal was to minimize it.
Simply understanding that service rivalry is a natural
byproduct of forming a new organization can lower
tension. Most new security organizations have one or
two branches championing reform, while at least one
sees a threat. As Major Samuel Cook wrote, when U.S.
Space Command (SPACECOM) formed, the Army
enthusiastically participated because it saw an opportunity to exploit a new medium of warfare—and receive additional funding. On the other hand, the Navy
resisted because it worried about losing autonomy
and funding.3 Managing expectations can help. By acknowledging service concerns, leaders can try to lower
parochialism through extensive communications with
the services. Leadership is the key. However, when
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resources, prestige, and commands are in the balance,
interservice rivalry is devilishly hard to avoid.
Leaders set the tone for interservice interactions,
and can just as easily exacerbate service rivalries.
When U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was
formed, the senior military officer for the Army, General Volney Warner, and the Marines, Lieutenant General P. X. Kelly, disagreed over the vision of the new
organization. Warner later recognized the extreme
tension between the two, as he wrote, “Unfortunately,
we were both caught up in the service argument as to
whether it should become a premier Army or Marine
force.”4 As Major James Harbridge argued in his study
of CENTCOM, the atmosphere became so toxic that
it affected the staffs and contributed to an unhealthy
command climate.5 Senior leaders in a new organization must work tirelessly to promote a common vision.
Subordinates can sense acrimony among their leaders.
Looking to the future, rivalry will continue, but
service jealousies may pale beside interagency ones.
The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DoD)
have always engaged in turf wars, but State has historically (and relatively) had so few resources that the
fight was one of symbolism and prestige rather than
a fight over power. However, the intelligence fight
looks to be much stiffer because the resources and
mission of the Director of National Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and DoD are overlapping and unclear. The services’ fight over roles and
missions, which resulted in the “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949 followed by the compromise “Key West
Agreement,” was organizationally bloody. It took
several laws to end the turf fight. The creation of the
Air Force and a disruptive new technology—nuclear
weapons—required years to sort out. One could argue

251

that the combination of the 9/11 attack, the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and a
new disruptive technology (cyber warfare) could lead
to another turf war.
Working with Allies.
One element that tends to dampen service rivalry
is multinational participation. Since World War II,
the United States has participated in the creation of
many organizations that combine different nationalities to promote collective security. Major Joseph Scott
examines the creation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), in which American and Canadian air force officers worked together
to counter the Soviet air threat.6 The initial contacts
were informal and pragmatic. Military officers led the
integration process. What began as informal working
groups evolved into a bilateral agreement by both legislatures, despite fears on both sides of the border. It
remains one of the great multinational organizational
success stories in military history.
NORAD’s sense of self is apparent in their wildly
successful “Santa Claus Tracker,” which started in
1955. The mission to track Santa’s journey lifted the
children’s story into the age of technology. Today,
NORAD’s officers explain that they use “ultra-cool,
high-tech, high-speed digital cameras,” as well as
fighter jets and satellites to track the jolly old elf. Tracking Santa started by mistake. A Colorado Springs, CO,
newspaper ad asked local children to call Santa at a
department store. The number was typed incorrectly
and the calls went to NORAD. The duty officers and
noncommissioned officers answered every call, and a
tradition was born.

252

Almost 60 years later, the program takes almost
100,000 calls and e-mails answered by citizens and
luminaries such as First Lady Michelle Obama. Corporate sponsors such as Google, Verizon, and Booz
Allen Hamilton gladly underwrite financial costs. The
Santa Tracker is more than a public relations ploy.
Canadian Forces Lieutenant General Marcel Duval,
the deputy commander of NORAD, explained that
the Santa Tracker helps define the organization. “It’s
really ingrained in the NORAD psyche and culture.
It’s a goodwill gesture from all of us, on our time off,
to all the kids on the planet.”7 NORAD stumbled into
the Santa Tracker, but their organizational culture
was open to Santa, in part, because of their multinational mission.
While NORAD’s charter is explicitly combined,
most American security organizations have an implicit multinational role. Some, like Special Operations Command (SOCOM), with its Foreign Internal
Defense mission to organize, train, advise and assist
host nation military forces, have a clear assignment
to work with other states.8 Other commands use
military-to-military contacts to promote security. Every organization must promote security with other
nations, whether they are like-minded democracies
or strategic allies. The implied mission of each new
security organization is to forge partnerships abroad.
An added benefit comes from working with allies—
reduced American service rivalry.
American military leaders play a crucial role in selling multinational organizations. The best leadership
example among the chapters in this book comes from
Dwight Eisenhower. When he became the first Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
commander, he spent a year on the road travelling to
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every nation, meeting with politicians, the press, and
military leaders to sell the importance of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to a post-war
Europe. Leadership engaged outside the organization
paved the way for trust and cooperation, both within
the organization and external to it.
The Analogy and Metaphor Problem.
Though analogy is often misleading, it is the least misleading thing we have.9
		

Samuel Butler

As organizations stand up, they look to the past
for successful examples. Humans want analogies or
models because they help us organize the overwhelming complexity of the present and future in a coherent
way. Organizations—made up, of course, of human
actors—also look to the past for models. Yet, more
often than not, analogies provide a siren song that
lead new organizations into trouble. Too often, leaders look only to successful examples and forego the
hard analysis necessary to see the differences between
the past and current circumstances. Conversely, they
ignore examples of past failures and therefore fail to
see congruencies in those circumstances. Our natural
desire for analogies clouds our judgment and reduces
the complexity of current problems to the haze of the
past. Even so, the lure of historical analogies is powerful, and ignoring past experience entirely seems also
unwise; rather, leaders would do well to use historical examples critically and carefully instead of cherry-picking positive examples to support an already
determined conclusion.
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Colonel Gregory Daddis provides one example in
the Vietnam War in the history of the Office of Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), an interagency organization created
to coordinate all military and civilian pacification efforts in Vietnam.10 The American leaders of CORDS
found the analogy of the British effort in Malaya an
all-too-tempting example of a successful counterinsurgency campaign against a communist enemy. Yet
the differences between the two countries and wars
were staggering. The British problem occurred on a
small peninsula under very different circumstances.
For one, the British had already agreed to leave, and
unlike in Vietnam, where the Americans also faced a
conventional foe in the North Vietnamese Army, the
British military did not face a conventional enemy in
addition to the insurgents. The leaders of CORDS believed, however, that the Malayan counterinsurgency
demonstrated that an organization dedicated to the
pacification effort could win the war. The analogy
helped to shape the view that better organization and
better pacification was the road to victory, ignoring
a fundamental difference between the two wars: the
South Vietnamese government suffered from terminal
internal rot. CORDS was helpless to change an entire
foreign government.
Today, the model of choice for new security organizations is SOCOM. SOCOM has had very public
successes over the last decade. One indelible image
stands out. A bearded Special Forces Soldier wearing
Afghan garb directs bombers and drones to defeat the
Taliban. He is adaptive, well-trained, and technologically competent—a mule-driving soldier with a satellite phone who captured the imagination of the nation.
Inheritors of a maverick or cowboy American tradi-

255

tion, in the public imagination (and, to some extent, in
reality), Special Forces Soldiers work in small teams
with little guidance, far from higher headquarters. A
handful of Green Berets can turn a motley bunch of
gun-toting thugs into an army, and its SEALS can take
down America’s enemies in stealth raids.
Military and civilian leaders see other, more important, reasons to emulate SOCOM. It has a substantial, independent funding stream directly from
Congress and a separate personnel system. Every new
organization wants to replicate its success—and its
money. Moreover, each soldier is better trained, better equipped, and better paid (with large retention
bonuses) than their counterparts. Regular military
forces look to SOCOM jealously. Special Operations
Forces have no support function that takes them away
from training. No mundane garrison tasks for them.
Deployments are short compared to those of a line infantry unit, which allows them to train more often. Finally, the training for each Special Forces Soldier takes
years and includes dedicated language education. No
wonder they are the envy of anyone who wears a
uniform.
Yet, as Major Brian Dunn writes, Special Operations Command’s creation was most unusual and unlikely to be replicated.11 All four services aggressively
tried to stop SOCOM’s formation at every turn over
the course of 30 years (see service rivalries and turf
wars already mentioned). That very intransigence
led powerful members of Congress to create an organization despite, and even to spite, the services.
Legislators hoped to headquarter the new command
near Washington, DC, where key senators and congressmen could oversee their brainchild. Instead, the
Pentagon spitefully relegated the headquarters to the

256

Florida boondocks. After SOCOM’s formation, the
Army, Navy and Air Force tried to undercut it for
years. The Marine Corps refused to participate at all.
SOCOM’s success came because Congress distrusted
the Pentagon and, therefore, lavished SOCOM with
designated resources over the long term. No other
organization began with so little military input, and
no new organization is likely to receive the special
treatment SOCOM received and continues to receive
from Congress.
While explicitly using analogies is generally problematic, each new organization does have a history.
As Major Josiah Grover writes, the multinational security organization SHAPE was able to see the World
War II-era SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) as a starting point but quickly realized the difference between a wartime coalition and
a peacetime alliance, and then worked to account for
the differences.12 The leaders of SHAPE understood
the past, but saw present issues clearly enough to remain unshackled from analogies.
Seeing a new organization as standing outside history is as problematic as using unsuitable analogies.
As Colonel Gian Gentile describes, the U.S. Air Force
argued during its formation in 1947 that its technological novelty rendered all previous war irrelevant.13
Airpower, its adherents claimed, would win war by
itself without the need for a punishing ground campaign. Denying the relevance of history, air leaders
instead invented a metaphor for the modern nation—
the industrial web. Like a spider’s web, if a nation’s
industrial web was damaged at crucial points, the
entire web (and therefore the nation) would collapse.
The metaphor, like the analogy, took the complex and
unpredictable activity of war and simplified it into a
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manageable concept. Nothing about war or security is
simple. While airpower was, and is, a crucial element
to warfare, it is not the only one. To date, no technology
has either eliminated warfare or caused a nation-state
to surrender on its own. New organizations would do
well to place themselves within history, not outside it.
If analogies and metaphors are so powerful, what
should be done? Curiously, the remedy for over-reliance on historical analogies may, in fact, be to use
more of them. If leaders are thinking about multiple
analogies, a single model will less likely stick. More
examples require people to think critically about what
aspects of an analogy are similar and which are different. In Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, historians Richard Neustadt and Ernest
May recommend that every time staff officers use an
analogy, they take a piece of paper and create two
columns, “likenesses” and “differences.” When an
analogy comes up, using this simple exercise will at
least help find the negative aspects of the comparison
as well as the positive. Neustadt and May also have
a recommendation for putting the problem in historical context to avoid the error made by those who created the Air Force in 1947. Create a timeline for the
organization that acknowledges all the previous and
current organizations tasked with a similar mission.
By putting a new organization on a timeline, staff officers can see their organization on a continuum. This is
important because new organizations, by design, will
overlap with old organizations.14
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Simulations.
When a headquarters stands up, the leadership
naturally wants to test the unit. How will the new staff
react to a simulated wartime situation? What problems can be determined in peacetime? Far better to
learn about internal problems in training than during
the stark reality of war, the thinking goes. One of the
themes that emerges from this book is the crucial role
simulations and command post exercises play in the
early stages of a new security organization. Leaders
craft these exercises carefully for a variety of reasons.
As we looked at the various organizations, these early
exercises helped create organizations and, in one case,
set the stage for a command’s death.
Prior to the creation of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), leading logisticians doubted
its ability to project and sustain forces should the President call on the Armed Forces to fight a large war.
To highlight the problem, general officers created a
simulation exercise called NIFTY NUGGET in 1978.
As Colonel Gail Yoshitani describes in her chapter, the
simulation showed that in a war between the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) in Europe, 400,000 soldiers in theater would
die because they failed to receive basic supplies. The
post-exercise report argued strenuously for a single
command to supervise mobilization and deployment.
A well-designed simulation, run honestly and publicly, showed the potential for catastrophic failure without the real casualties of war. Politicians and senior
military leaders saw the results and acted, creating
what would become USTRANSCOM.
At the other end of the spectrum, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) executed the largest simulation and
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field exercise in American history. Dubbed MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002, it tested joint concepts created by JFCOM. As Major Sculley writes, it involved
over 10,000 people on 26 different installations and
cost in excess of $250 million.15 Several vocal critics
thought the experiment was rigged to validate assumptions based on a doctrine known as Effects Based
Operations that is now widely discredited.16 When the
critics found no outlet within JFCOM, they went to
the press and Congress. The exercise became a validation of the organization itself, not its doctrine or ability. The perception of both the exercise and the command became one of intellectual dishonesty. When
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was looking for a
four-star command to eliminate, he found only a few
proponents wishing to keep JFCOM. Unsurprisingly,
they were congressional leaders from the command’s
home state of Virginia worried about jobs. A poorly
conceived, expensive, and rigged simulation helped
kill its parent organization.
Simulations can be crucial. Properly designed exercises that are well-publicized and seen as fair and
accurate can help a fledgling organization. SOCOM,
TRANSCOM, and JFCOM wrote about their simulations in journals and other professional outlets. Congressional appropriators and defense officials take
simulations seriously as long as they are not seen to
be gaming the system in a search of more resources.
Leadership is again crucial to ensure staffs understand
that the simulation’s purpose is an honest assessment
of capabilities and doctrine.
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Reacting to Failure.
War remains the decisive human failure.17
		

John Kenneth Galbraith

Speaking to West Point’s Corps of Cadets in February 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked
“that when it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam,
our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten
it right.”18 As a long-time CIA analyst and a historian,
Gates understands that the future will always remain
unpredictable and dangerous. Despite the billions of
dollars America spends annually on intelligence in
dozens of agencies, world events have a near-universal ability to surprise even the brightest military and
civilian minds. The unknowable questions include
where, when, and against whom we will next fight.
With hindsight, the attack may seem obvious, but only
after the fact. Security organizations must understand
that world events will radically change their mission.
Several organizations in this book owe their existence to failures of intelligence collection or processing. As Major Kevin Scott writes, the National Security Agency was one such outfit.19 In June, 1950, North
Korea attacked South Korea, leading to American
and United Nations (UN) military involvement. Six
months later, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River.
America’s intelligence collection agencies missed both
attacks. To remedy the problem, the existing defense
organizations created in the 1947 National Defense
Act were strengthened, forming the National Security Agency and adding thousands of billets to its
end strength.
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Then, as Professor Matthew Flynn writes, DHS
was also a byproduct of an attack. To atone for the
intelligence lapses that led to the 9/11 attack, the
American people and their government did not demand bureaucratic seppuku from any single agency,
politician, analyst, or military leader. Instead, the demand was for “reform.” Harking back to the Progressive Era again, reform, many thought, would solve
the problem of bureaucratic selfishness in intelligence
gathering. Many government leaders argued that, if
government agencies had communicated effectively,
they could have thwarted the al-Qaeda attack. A better chain of command and more effective interagency
processes were the remedies. In this case, civilian
agencies would receive the same legislative medicine imposed upon the defense establishment in 1947
and 1986.
The solution was more centralization and unity of
command, yet new organizational charts and the creation of the largest federal agency since the creation of
the Department of Defense (DoD) in 1947 still failed to
force an alphabet soup of military and civilian intelligence agencies to work together. Congress and the
President again tried to reform humans through management and bureaucratic efficiency. As Professor
Flynn argues, DHS may have crossed the threshold of
organizational utility.20 Could something so big and
with so many different missions work effectively? Initially, the answer was no. Two years after its creation,
the second director admitted failure and issued a plan
to “transform” DHS.
No organization can prepare for mission failure.
However, through simulations, exercises and “red
cells,” a new organization can think through the effect
of an attack. The likelihood of an assault using cyber
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technology seems increasingly likely. Even if a cyber
attack is less catastrophic than 9/11 or Pearl Harbor,
HI, any disruption will have consequences. The 1983
invasion of Grenada accomplished its mission of saving American medical students and ousting a communist leader linked to Cuba. Nonetheless, the military problems garnered much more interest than the
fleeting success. Should failure occur, the government
will likely not seek individual accountability. Instead,
America’s elected representatives will look for organizational problems followed by reform legislation.
New organizations, especially those focused on new
capabilities, should have suggestions ready for changes in legislation, personnel, and oversight should an
attack occur.
Culture.
Each multinational or joint command takes on a
personality or culture created by early leaders and decisions. While the culture might be hard to describe
by someone inside the organization, visitors, or new
arrivals can sense it quickly. Once set, organizational
cultures become entrenched and difficult to change.
As the cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas has written, ‘If you want to change the culture, you will have
to start by changing the organization.”21
Harbridge writes that CENTCOM developed
a culture of inferiority because it was seen as a less
important regional command.22 European Command
and Pacific Command were older, more prestigious,
and had permanently-assigned forces. Moreover,
CENTCOM’s first commander was only a lieutenant general. These factors made CENTCOM the least
among equals, creating a culture that affected its war
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plans and eventually the way it fought. As a strategic
headquarters, it should have designated a subordinate command to fight the operational level of war.
Yet, even as the region gained significance within the
arena of American security, the persistence of this
culture of inferiority led successive CENTCOM commanders to fight at the operational level, including in
two invasions of Iraq. CENTCOM needed to focus on
the regional implications of war, but that was not the
organizational culture. By focusing on the operational
level, CENTCOM commanders failed to think about
the policy goals when war ended.
“The Best Defense Is a Good Offense.”
Starting in World War II, security organizations
played a far greater role in American life than they
had before. The Pearl Harbor attack created fear and
fear caused panic. Panic led to overreaction and a
search for fifth column agents in America. In 1942,
President Franklin Roosevelt ordered the military to
intern hundreds of thousands of Japanese-American
citizens in concentration camps. Democracies should
worry about the excesses born out of fear.
The threat of carrier-based planes attacking American cities was frightening, but the Cold War era was
even worse. Starting in 1949, the threat posed by planes
laden with nuclear bombs followed by the even greater existential threat of nuclear tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles induced panic and required further
governmental action into American life. (Think, for
example, of the “Duck and Cover” cartoons played at
schools across the country to teach children how to
survive a nuclear blast.) As in World War II, fear led
to such pernicious policies as the witch hunt for Com-
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munists in the State Department, Hollywood, and
even the U.S. Army.
The Armed Forces reacted by creating tens of thousands of nuclear weapons from Atomic Demolition
Munitions (tiny backpack nukes) to 15 megaton bombs
that could destroy any city. Nuclear weapons on constant airborne patrol were dangerous for Americans
as well as for Soviets. Collisions between Strategic Air
Command bombers caused several bombs to drop to
the ground in the United States and allied countries.
Luckily, those weapons never exploded, but today
there are two missing nuclear weapons—one off the
coast of Georgia and one off the coast of Washington
state. The cure for the Soviet threat was nearly worse
than the threat itself. Today, only a few rusting yellow
signs designating fallout shelters remain from those
scary times.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks restored fear about their
basic security to Americans. Fear revived elements
of the national security state that had lessened as the
USSR became sclerotic and then died. In some ways,
fear has induced panic similar to the early years of the
nuclear era. Are there sleeper cells of Islamic terrorists
in America? Questions like that hark back to the worst
days of the Red Scare.
The threats facing America require organized governmental response. The 9/11 attack was perpetrated
against civilians by an ideologically driven enemy. The
reaction from the President was to send military force
to deny the enemy sanctuary in Afghanistan. While
this mission was difficult and dangerous, it followed
established lines of command. The President called it
war and placed DoD in charge. Military forces led the
effort in Afghanistan and guarded the nation’s transportation hubs while the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
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tion (FBI), CIA, Department of Treasury, the Coast
Guard, and dozens of other agencies supported DoD’s
effort. While the Afghan mission remains difficult and
problematic, the issue of cyber attacks presents problems just as acute.
While identifying the enemy in a cyber attack is difficult, that is a technical problem of “cat and mouse”
that America’s brilliant computer scientists will work
to solve. The real problem from an organizational perspective is the intended target. If the problem hits DoD
computers, the issue is easy to resolve. Cyber Command takes the lead. When Chinese hackers attacked
Google, the lead agency was Google.23 Who else could
claim jurisdiction? Was it DoD? DHS? CIA? FBI? Is
this a domestic issue or a foreign one?
The Google attack was against a single business
and involved a fairly simple response, organizationally. The next, perhaps more sustained, attack could
hit Bank of America, Yahoo!, and Nestle as well as
Boise, ID; Sao Paulo, Brazil; the U.S. Department of
Treasury, and the Italian Carabinieri, simultaneously.
An enemy bent on chaos could create a situation that
would involve dozens of businesses and agencies
from all over the world, leaving each group groping
individually for an appropriate response. What is the
protocol to allow feuding security organizations entrée to business? How does an agency prepare for an
attack against millions of potential targets? Who has
responsibility? It is a vexing problem.
Often security organizations see a loss of initiative when a potential enemy has too many tempting
targets. The enemy can choose the place and time for
an attack and mass at that location, overwhelming
any defense. The answer to a defensive problem is to
find a public deterrent or an offensive option. Security
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organizations hate relying on defensive remedies. If
history is a guide, security organizations that face new
threats will develop an offensive capability to deter
the enemy from acting. If deterrence fails, then a reaction that takes the fight to the enemy may deter future
aggressors.
When a new technology emerges, security organizations often look first to defensive remedies as an
expedient first step before gravitating to an offense capability. In the late-19th century, the initial reaction to
British armored warships stationed in Canada and the
Caribbean was to build strong coast artillery batteries, yet Congress funded the program only after a war
with Spain. In the early part of the 20th century, hundreds of batteries were built, but with that build-up
came an offensive capability in battleships, cruisers,
and destroyers. Then President Theodore Roosevelt
sent the “Great White Fleet” on a world tour to announce that any potential attackers of the U.S. coast
should beware.
While defensive capabilities provide some deterrence and make the American people feel safer, defense professionals want an offensive capability. In
the nuclear era, America tried both defensive and offensive options. On the defensive side, billions of dollars went to solutions such as the Nike/Hercules missiles meant to destroy a Soviet air attack on American
soil as well as the anti-ballistic missile defense of the
1960s and 1970s and the Strategic Defense Initiative
(Star Wars). Yet most of the defense budget went to
offensive capability, specifically the threat of overwhelming retaliation from a 24-hour manned bomber force by the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command
and then from intercontinental and sea launched
ballistic missiles.
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The current war on terror provides another example of how a defensive policy changes to an integrated offensive one. In the 1990s, the Bill Clinton
administration reacted to violent Islamic radical attacks in New York and Africa with civil prosecutions
and cruise missiles. After the 9/11 attacks, the United
States used DoD and the Treasury and Justice Departments, as well as the CIA, to attack al-Qaeda overseas
simultaneously and in depth. A declared war allows
the government to react in an offensive way.
Perhaps the government’s successful response to
the al-Qaeda threat provides a model of how to provide defense against cyber attacks as well. When an
attack comes, neither a military nor cyber reaction will
be sufficient to address an anonymous cyber threat.
All agencies in the federal government with assistance
from business, state, local, and foreign governments
will need to work together to identify and attack the
enemy simultaneously and in depth, using all of the
same tools that have worked so well against al-Qaeda over the last decade. Good intelligence is the key,
and good intelligence comes from a variety of sources
that only an interagency and international coalition
can provide.
While cyber attacks will continue, now is the
time for America’s cyber warriors to build relationships with local and foreign governments. As Winston Churchill said, “There is at least one thing worse
than fighting with allies—and that is to fight without
them.”24 Because cyber attacks easily cross national
boundaries, partners will be a requirement to counter
the threat. Creating partnerships will be difficult for
business and government both in the United States
and outside it, but partnerships created in peace will
pay dividends in war.
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What will be the cyber equivalent of a deterrent or
an offensive option? Will offensive action make America safer or less safe? When an attack does come, will
fear rule? History provides no easy answers, and neither do we. Smart, dedicated leaders at all levels will
make the best decisions they can based on incomplete
information. When an attack occurs, which it will, the
organization will be ready to fight as well as it can.
When the attack is over, it should conduct a thorough review and recommend changes and reforms to
statutes, regulations, standard operating procedures,
and training.
What history does provide is perspective. America
has an excellent record of protecting its citizens. Since
the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1789, there
have been four major attacks on American soil—the
British invasion in 1814, the Civil War from 1861 to
1865, the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, and the 9/11
attacks in New York and Washington. In each case,
America reacted with policies meant to protect the
American people that also took away the civil liberties
of significant parts of the population. Even in times of
relative peace, Americans have reacted to perceived
threats with coercive policies. Recall, the measures
taken during the “red” scares in the 1920s and 1950s
came from the threat of attack, not actual attack. Leaders of security organizations would do well to remember the Hippocratic Oath, “First do no harm.”
Overall, American politicians and security organizations have an admirable record of balancing security concerns. However, as the investment ads say,
“Past results are no indication of future performance.”
We hope the chapters in this book and the lessons at
the end of it will help the reader learn from the successes and the failures of American security organiza-
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tions over the last 70 years. History provides no answers, but thinking critically about the past can bring
wisdom to current security problems.
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